"the adoption of the term secularism is justified by its
including a large number of persons who are not atheists,
and uniting them for action which has secularism for its
object, and not atheism. on this ground, and because, by the
adoption of a new term, a vast amount of impediment from
prejudice is got rid of, the use of the name secularism is
found advantageous."—harriet martineau. boston
liberator.—letter to lloyd garrison, november, 1853.
every one observant of public controversy in england, is aware of its improved tone of late years. this improved tone is part of a wider progress, 'increase of wealth has led to improvement of taste, and the diffusion of knowledge to refinement of sentiment. the mass are better dressed, better mannered, better spoken than formerly. a coffee-room discussion, conducted by mechanics, is now a more decorous exhibition than a debate in parliament was in the days of canning.* boisterousness at the tables of the rich, and insolence in the language of the poor, are fast disappearing. "good society" is now that society in which people practise the art of being genial, without being familiar, and in which an evincible courtesey of speech is no longer regarded as timidity or effeminacy, but rather as proof of a disciplined spirit, which chooses to avoid all offence, the better to maintain the right peremptorily punishing wanton insult. theologians, more inveterate in speech than politicians, now observe a respectfulness to opponents before unknown. that diversity of opinion once ascribed to "badness of heart" is now, with more discrimination, referred to defect or diversity of understanding—a change which, discarding invective, recognizes instruction as the agent of uniformity.
* from whose lips the house of commons cheered a reference
to a political adversary as "the revered and ruptured
ogden."
amid all this newness of conception it must be obvious that many old terms of theological controversy are obsolete. the idea of an "atheist" as one warring against moral restraints—of an "infidel" as one treacherous to the truth—of a "freethinker" as a "loose thinker,"* arose in the darkness of past times, when men fought by the flickering light of their hatreds—times which tradition has peopled with monsters of divinity as well as of nature. but the glaring colours in which the party names invented by past priests were dyed, no longer harmonize with the quieter taste of the present day. the more sober spirit of modern controversy has, therefore, need of new terms, and if the term "secularism" was merely a neutral substitute for "freethinking," there would be reason for its adoption. dissenters might as well continue the designation of "schismatics," or political reformers that of "anarchists," as that the students of positive philosophy should continue the designation "atheism," "infidelism," or any similar term by which their opponents have contrived to brand their opinions. it is as though a merchant vessel should consent to carry a pirate flag. freethinker is, however, getting an acceptable term. upon the platform, christian disputants frequently claim it, and resent the exclusive assumption of it by others. these new claimants say, "we are as much freethinkers as yourselves," so that it is necessary to define freethinking. it is fearless thinking, based upon impartial inquiry, searching on both sides, not regarding doubt as a crime, or opposite conclusions as a species of moral poison. those who inquire with sinister, pre-possessions will never inquire fairly. the freethinker fears not to follow a conclusion to the utmost limits of truth, whether it coincides with the bible or contradicts it. if therefore any pronounce the term "secularism" "a concealment or a disguise," they can do so legitimately only after detecting some false meaning it is intended to convey, and not on the mere ground of its being a change of name, since nothing can more completely "conceal and disguise" the purposes of freethought than the old names imposed upon it by its adversaries, which associate with guilt its conscientious conclusions and impute to it as outrages, its acts of self-defence.
* as the reverend canon kingsley has perversely rendered it.
besides the term secularism, there was another term which seemed to promise also distinctiveness of meaning—namely, cosmism, under which adherents would have taken the designation of cosmists. rut this name scientific men would have understood in a purely physical sense, after the great example of humboldt, and the public would not all have understood it—besides, it was open to easy perversion in one of its declinations. next to this, as a name, stands that of realism—intrinsically good. a society of realists would have been intelligible, but many would have supposed it to be some revival of the old realists. moralism, a sound name in itself, is under evangelical condemnation as "mere morality." naturalism would seem an obvious name, were it not that we should be confounded with naturalists, to say no more. some name must be taken, as was the case with the theophilan-thropists of paris. many of them would rather not have assumed any denomination, but they yielded to the reasonable argument, that if they did not choose one for themselves, the public would bestow upon them one which would be less to their liking. those who took the name of philantropes found it exposed them to a pun, which greatly damaged them: philantropes was turned into filoux en troupe.
historical characteristics, however, seemed to point to a term which expressed the secular element in life; a term deeply engrafted in literature; of irreproachable associations; a term found and respected in the dictionaries of opponents, and to which, therefore, they might dispute our right, but which they could not damage. instead, therefore, of finding ourselves self-branded or caricatured by this designation, we have found opponents claiming it, and disputing with us for its possession.
