"tricks and treachery," said benjamin franklin, "are the practice of fools that have not wit enough to be honest." had the kindly philosopher been familiar with all the exigencies of the criminal law he might have added a qualification to this somewhat general, if indisputably moral, maxim. though it doubtless remains true as a guiding principle of life that "honesty is the best policy," it would be an unwarrantable aspersion upon the intellectual qualities of the members of the criminal bar to say that the tricks by virtue of which they often get their clients off are "the practice of fools." on the contrary, observation would seem to indicate that in many instances the wiser, or at least the more successful, the practitioner of criminal law becomes, the more numerous and ingenious become the "tricks" which are his stock in trade. this must not be taken to mean that there are not high-minded and conscientious practitioners of criminal law, many of them financially successful, some filled with a noble humanitarian purpose, and some drawn to their calling by a sincere enthusiasm for the vocation of the advocate which, in these days of "business" law and commercial methods, reaches perhaps its highest form in the criminal courts.
there are no more "tricks" practised in these[pg 304] tribunals than in the civil, but they are more ingenious in conception, more lawless in character, bolder in execution and less shamefaced in detection.
let us not be too hard upon our brethren of the criminal branch. truly, their business is to "get their clients off." it is unquestionably a generally accepted principle that it is better that ninety-nine guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be convicted. however much persons of argumentative or philosophic disposition may care to quarrel with this doctrine, they must at least admit that it would doubtless appear to them of vital truth were they defending some trembling client concerning whose guilt or innocence they were themselves somewhat in doubt. "charity believeth all things," and the prisoner is entitled to every reasonable doubt, even from his own lawyer. it is the lawyer's business to create such a doubt if he can, and we must not be too censorious if, in his eagerness to raise this in the minds of the jury, he sometimes oversteps the bounds of propriety, appeals to popular prejudices and emotions, makes illogical deductions from the evidence, and impugns the motives of the prosecution. the district attorney should be able to take care of himself, handle the evidence in logical fashion, and tear away the flimsy curtain of sentimentality hoisted by the defence. these are hardly "tricks" at all, but sometimes under the name of advocacy a trick is "turned" which deserves a much harsher name.
not long ago a celebrated case of murder was moved for trial after the defendant's lawyer had urged him in vain to offer a plea of murder in the second degree. a jury was summoned and, as is[pg 305] the usual custom in such cases, examined separately on the "voir dire" as to their fitness to serve. the defendant was a german, and the prosecutor succeeded in keeping all germans off the jury until the eleventh seat was to be filled, when he found his peremptory challenges exhausted. then the lawyer for the prisoner managed to slip in a stout old teuton, who replied, in answer to a question as to his place of nativity, "schleswig-holstein." the lawyer made a note of it, and, the box filled, the trial proceeded with unwonted expedition.
the defendant was charged with having murdered a woman with whom he had been intimate, and his guilt of murder in the first degree was demonstrated upon the evidence beyond peradventure. at the conclusion of the case, the defendant not having dared to take the stand, the lawyer arose to address the jury in behalf of what appeared a hopeless cause. even the old german in the back row seemed plunged in soporific inattention. after a few introductory remarks the lawyer raised his voice and in heart-rending tones began:
"in the beautiful county of schleswig-holstein sits a woman old and gray, waiting the message of your verdict from beyond the seas." (number 11 opened his eyes and looked at the lawyer as if not quite sure of what he had heard.) "there she sits" (continued the attorney), "in schleswig-holstein, by her cottage window, waiting, waiting to learn whether her boy is to be returned to her outstretched arms." (number 11 sat up and rubbed his forehead.) "had the woman, who so unhappily met her death at the hands of my unfortunate client, been like those women of schleswig-holstein—noble,[pg 306] sweet, pure, lovely women of schleswig-holstein—i should have naught to say to you in his behalf." (number 11 leaned forward and gazed searchingly into the lawyer's face.) "but alas, no! schleswig-holstein produces a virtue, a loveliness, a nobility of its own." (number 11 sat up and proudly expanded his chest.)
when, after about an hour or more of schleswig-holstein the defendant's counsel surrendered the floor to the district attorney, the latter found it quite impossible to secure the slightest attention from the eleventh juror, who seemed to be spending his time in casting compassionate glances in the direction of the prisoner. in due course the jury retired, but had no sooner reached their room and closed the door than the old teuton cried, "dot man iss not guilty!" the other eleven wrestled with him in vain. he remained impervious to argument for seventeen hours, declining to discuss the evidence, and muttering at intervals, "dot man iss not guilty!" the other eleven stood unanimously for murder in the first degree, which was the only logical verdict that could possibly have been returned upon the evidence.
at last, worn out with their efforts, they finally induced the old teuton to compromise with them on a verdict of manslaughter. wearily they straggled in, the old native of schleswig-holstein bringing up the rear, bursting with exultation and with victory in his eye.
"gentlemen of the jury, have you agreed upon a verdict?" inquired the clerk.
"we have," replied the foreman.
"how say you, do you find the defendant guilty or not guilty?"
[pg 307]
"guilty—of manslaughter," returned the foreman feebly.
the district attorney was aghast at such a miscarriage of justice, and the judge showed plainly by his demeanor his opinion of such a verdict. but the old inhabitant of schleswig-holstein cared for this not a whit. the old mother in schleswig-holstein might still clasp her son in her arms before she died! the defendant was arraigned at the bar. then for the first time, and to the surprise and disgust of no. 11, he admitted in answer to the questions of the clerk that his parents were both dead and that he was born in hamburg, a town for whose inhabitants the old juryman had, like others of his compatriots, a constitutional antipathy.
the "tricks" of the trade as practised by the astute and unscrupulous criminal lawyer vary with the stage of the case and the character of the crime charged. they are also adapted with careful attention to the disposition, experience and capacity of the particular district attorney who happens to be trying the case against the defendant. an illustration of one of these occurred during the prosecution of a bartender for selling "spirituous liquors" without a proper license. he was defended by an old war-horse of the criminal bar famous for his astuteness and ability to laugh a case out of court. the assistant district attorney who appeared against him was a young man recently appointed to office, and who was almost overcome at the idea of trying a case against so well known a practitioner. he had personally conducted but very few cases, had an excessive conception of his own dignity, and dreaded nothing so much as to appear ridiculous.[pg 308] everything, except the evidence, favored the defendant, who, however, was, beyond every doubt, guilty of the offence charged.
the young assistant put in his case, calling his witnesses one by one, and examining them with the most feverish anxiety lest he should forget something. the lawyer for the defence made no cross-examination and contented himself with smiling blandly as each witness left the stand. the youthful prosecutor became more and more nervous. he was sure that something was wrong, but he couldn't just make out what. at the conclusion of the people's case the lawyer inquired, with a broad grin, "if that was all."
the young assistant replied that it was, and that, in his opinion, it was "quite enough."
"let that be noted by the stenographer," remarked the lawyer. "now, if your honors please," he continued, addressing the three judges of the special sessions, "you all know how interested i am to see these young lawyers growing up. i like to help 'em along—give 'em a chance—teach 'em a thing or two. i trust it may not be out of place for me to say that i like my young friend here and think he tried his case very well. but he has a great deal to learn. i'm always glad, as i said, to give the boys a chance—to give 'em a little experience. i shall not put my client upon the stand. it is not necessary. the fact is," turning suddenly to the unfortunate assistant district attorney—"my client has a license." he drew from his pocket a folded paper and handed it to the paralyzed young attorney with the harsh demand: "what do you say to that?"
[pg 309]
the assistant took the paper in trembling fingers and perused it as well as he could in his unnerved condition.
"mr. district attorney," remarked the presiding justice dryly (which did not lessen the confusion of the young lawyer), "is this a fact? has the defendant a license?"
"yes, your honors," replied the assistant; "this paper seems to be a license."
"defendant discharged!" remarked the court briefly.
the prisoner stepped from the bar and rapidly disappeared through the door of the court-room. after enough time had elapsed to give him a good start and while another case was being called, the old lawyer leaned over to the assistant and remarked with a chuckle:
"i am always glad to give the boys a chance—help 'em along—teach 'em a little. that license was a beer license!"
before trial
to begin at the beginning, whenever a person has been arrested, charged with crime, and has secured a criminal lawyer to defend him, the first move of the latter is naturally to try and nip the case in the bud by inducing the complaining witness to abandon the prosecution. in a vast number of cases he is successful. he appeals to the charity of the injured party, quotes a little of the scriptures and the "golden rule," pictures the destitute condition of the defendant's family should he be cast into prison, and the dragging of an honored name in the gutter if he should be convicted. few complainants have[pg 310] ever before appeared in a police court, and are filled with repugnance at the rough treatment of prisoners and the suffering which they observe upon every side. after they have seen the prisoner emerge from the cells, pale, hollow-eyed, bedraggled, and have beheld the tears of his wife and children as they crowd around the husband and father, they begin to realize the horrible consequences of a criminal prosecution and to regret that they ever took the steps which have brought the wrong-doer where he is. the district attorney has not yet taken up the case; the prosecution up to this point is of a private character; there are loud promises of "restitution" and future good behavior from the defendant, and the occasion is ripe for the lawyer to urge the complainant to "temper justice with mercy" and withdraw "before it be too late and the poor man be ruined forever."
if the complainant is, however, bent on bringing the defendant to justice and remains adamantine to the arguments of the lawyer and the tears of the defendant's family connections, it remains for the prisoner's attorney to endeavor to get the case adjourned "until matters can be adjusted"—to wit, restitution made if money has been stolen, or doctors' bills paid if a head has been cracked, with perhaps another chance of "pulling off" the complainant and his witnesses. failing in an attempt to secure an adjournment, two courses remain open: first, to persuade the court that the matter is a trivial one arising out of petty spite, is all a mistake, or that at best it is a case of "disorderly conduct" (and thus induce the judge to "turn the case out" or inflict some trifling punishment in the shape of a fine); or,[pg 311] second, if it be clear that a real crime has been committed, to clamor for an immediate hearing in order, if it be secured, to subject the prosecution's witnesses to a most exhaustive cross-examination, and thus get a clear idea of just what evidence there is against the accused.
at the conclusion of the complainant's case, if it appear reasonably certain that the magistrate will "hold" the prisoner for the action of a superior court, the lawyer will then "waive further examination," or, in other words, put in no defence, preferring the certainty of having to face a jury trial to affording the prosecution an opportunity to discover exactly what defence will be put in and to secure evidence in advance of the trial to rebut it. thus it rarely happens in criminal cases of importance that the district attorney knows what the defence is to be until the defendant himself takes the stand, and, by "waiving further examination" in the police court, the astute criminal attorney may select at his leisure the defence best suited to fit in with and render nugatory the prosecution's evidence.
the writer has frequently been told by the attorney for a defendant on trial for crime that "the defence has not yet been decided upon." in fact, such statements are exceedingly common. in many courts the attitude of all parties concerned seems to be that the defendant will put up a perjured defence (so far as his own testimony is concerned, at any rate) as a matter of course, and that this is hardly to be taken against him.
on the other hand, if a guilty defendant has been so badly advised as to give his own version of the case before the magistrate in the first instance, it[pg 312] requires but slight assiduity on the part of the district attorney to secure, in the interval between the hearing and the jury trial, ample evidence to rebut it.
as illustrating merely the fertility and resourcefulness of some defendants (or perhaps their counsel), the writer recalls a case which he tried in the year 1902 where the defendant, a druggist, was charged with manslaughter in having caused the death of an infant by filling a doctor's prescription for calomel with morphine. it so happened that two jars containing standard pills had been standing side by side upon an adjacent shelf, and, a prescription for morphine having come in at the same time as that for the calomel, the druggist had carelessly filled the morphine prescription with calomel, and the calomel prescription with morphine. the adult for whom the morphine had been prescribed recovered immediately under the beneficent influence of the calomel, but the baby for whom the calomel had been ordered died from the effects of the first morphine pill administered. all this had occurred in 1897—five years before. the remainder of the pills had disappeared.
upon the trial (no inconsistent contention having been entered in the police court) the prisoner's counsel introduced six separate defences, to wit: that the prescription had been properly filled with calomel and that the child had died from natural causes, the following being suggested:
1. acute gastritis.
2. acute nephritis.
3. cerebro-spinal meningitis.
4. fulminating meningitis.
[pg 313]
5. that the child had died of apomorphine, a totally distinct poison.
6. that it had received and taken calomel, but that, having eaten a small piece of pickle shortly before, the conjunction of the vegetable acid with the calomel had formed, in the child's stomach, a precipitate of corrosive sublimate, from which it had died.
these were all argued with great learning. during the trial the box containing the balance of the pills, which the defence contended were calomel, unexpectedly turned up. it has always been one of the greatest regrets of the writer's life that he did not then and there challenge the defendant to eat one of the pills and thus prove the good faith of his defence.
this was one of the very rare cases where a chemical analysis has been conducted in open court. the chemist first tested a standard trade morphine pill with sulphuric acid, so that the jury could personally observe the various color reactions for themselves. he then took one of the contested pills and subjected it to the same test. the first pill had at once turned to a brilliant rose, but the contested pill, being antiquated, "hung fire," as it were, for some seconds. as nothing occurred, dismay made itself evident on the face of the prosecutor, and for a moment he felt that all was lost. then the five-year-old pill slowly turned to a faint brown, changed to a yellowish red, and finally broke into an ardent rose. the jury settled back into their seats with an audible "ah!" and the defendant was convicted.
let us return, however, to that point in the pro[pg 314]ceedings where the defendant has been "held for trial" by the magistrate. the prisoner's counsel now endeavors to convince the district attorney that "there is nothing in the case," and continues unremittingly to work upon the feelings of the complainant. if he finds that his labors are likely to be fruitless in both directions, he may now seek an opportunity to secure permission for his client to appear before the grand jury and explain away, if possible, the charge against him.
we will assume, however, that, in spite of the assiduity of his lawyer, the prisoner has at last been indicted and is awaiting trial. what can be done about it? of course, if the case could be indefinitely adjourned, the complainant or his chief witness might die or move away to some other jurisdiction, and if the indictment could be "pigeon-holed" the case might die a natural death of itself. indictments, however, in new york county, whatever may be the case elsewhere, are no longer "pigeon-holed," and they cannot be adequately "lost," since certified copies are made of each. the next step, therefore, is to secure as long a time as possible before trial.
usually a prisoner has nothing to lose and everything to gain by delay, and the excuses offered for adjournment are often ingenious in the extreme. the writer knows one criminal attorney who, if driven to the wall in the matter of excuses, will always serenely announce the death of a near relative and the obligation devolving upon him to attend the funeral. another, as a last resort, regularly is attacked in open court by severe cramps in the stomach. if the court insists on the trial proceeding, he invariably recovers. of course, there are many legitimate reasons[pg 315] for adjourning cases which the prosecution is powerless to combat.
the most effective method invoked to secure delay, and one which it is practically useless for the district attorney to oppose, is an application "to take testimony" upon commission in some distant place. here again it must be borne in mind that such applications are often legitimate and proper and should be granted in simple justice to the defendant. although this right to take the testimony of absent witnesses is confined in new york state to the defendant and does not extend to the prosecution, and is undoubtedly often the subject of much abuse, it not infrequently is the cause of saving an innocent man.
an example of this was the case of william h. ellis, recently brought into the public eye through his connection with the treaty between the united states government and king menelik of abyssinia. ellis was accused in 1901 by a young woman of apparently excellent antecedents and character of a serious crime. prior to his indictment a colored man employed in his office (the alleged scene of the crime) disappeared. when the case was moved for trial, ellis, through his attorneys, moved for a commission to take the testimony of this absent, but clearly material, witness in one of the remote states of mexico—a proceeding which would require a journey of some two weeks on muleback, beyond the railway terminus. the district attorney, in view of the peculiarly opportune disappearance of this person from the jurisdiction, strenuously opposed the application and hinted at collusion between ellis and the witness. the application, however, was granted, and a delay of over a month ensued. during that time[pg 316] evidence was procured by the counsel of the prisoner showing conclusively that the complaining witness was mentally unsound and had made similar and groundless charges against others. the indictment was at once dismissed.
but such delays are not always so righteously employed. there is a story told of a case where a notorious character was charged with the unusual crime of "mayhem"—biting off another man's finger. the defendant's counsel secured adjournment after adjournment—no one knew why. at last the case was moved for trial and the prosecution put in its evidence, clearly showing the guilt of the prisoner. at the conclusion of the people's testimony, the lawyer for the defendant arose and harshly stigmatized the story of the complainant as a "pack of lies."
"i will prove to you in a moment, gentlemen," exclaimed he to the jury, "how absurd is this charge against my innocent client. take the stand!"
the prisoner arose and walked to the witness-chair.
"open your mouth!" shouted the lawyer.
the defendant did so. he had not a tooth in his head. the delay had been advantageously employed.
the importance of mere delay to a guilty defendant cannot well be overestimated. "you never can tell what may happen to knock a case on the head." for this reason a sufficiently paid and properly equipped counsel will run the whole gamut of criminal procedure, and—
1. demur to the indictment.
2. move for an inspection of the minutes of the proceedings before the grand jury.
[pg 317]
3. move to dismiss the indictment for lack of sufficient evidence before that body.
4. move for a commission to take testimony.
5. move for a change of venue.
6. secure, where possible, a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of proceedings from some federal judge on the ground that his client is confined without due process of law.
all these steps he will take seriatim, and some cases have been delayed for as much as two years by merely invoking "legitimate" legal processes. in point of fact it is quite possible for any defendant absolutely to prevent an immediate trial provided he has the services of vigilant counsel, for these are not the only proceedings of which he can avail himself.
a totally distinct method is for the defendant to secure bail, and, after securing as many adjournments as possible, simply flee the jurisdiction. he will then remain away until the case is hopelessly stale, or he no longer fears prosecution.
in default of all else he may go "insane" just before the case is moved for trial. this habit of the criminal rich when brought to book for their misdeeds is too well known to require comment. all that is necessary is for a sufficient number of "expert" alienists to declare it to be their opinion that the defendant is mentally incapable of understanding the proceedings against him or of preparing his defence, and he is shifted off to a "sanitarium" until some new sensation occupies the public mind and his offences are partially forgotten.
in this way justice is often thwarted and the law cheated of its victim, but unless fortune favors him,[pg 318] sooner or later the indicted man must return for trial and submit the charge against him to a jury. but if this happens, even if he be guilty, all hope need not be lost. there are still "tricks of the trade" which may save him from the clutches of the law.
at the trial
what can be done when at last the prisoner who has fought persistently for adjournment has been forced to face the witnesses against him and submit the evidence to a jury of peers? let us assume further that he has been "out on bail," with plenty of opportunity to prepare his defence and lay his plans for escape.
when the case is finally called and the defendant takes his seat at the bar after a lapse of anywhere from six months to a year or more after his arrest, the first question for the district attorney to investigate is whether or no the person presenting himself for trial be in point of fact the individual mentioned in the indictment. this is often a difficult matter to determine. "ringers"—particularly in the magistrates' courts—are by no means unknown. sometimes they appear even in the higher courts. if the defendant be an ex-convict or a well-known crook, his photograph and measurements will speedily remove all doubt upon the subject, but if he be a foreigner (particularly a pole, italian or a chinaman), or even merely one of the homogeneous inhabitants of the densely-populated east side of new york, it is sometimes a puzzling problem. "mock duck," the celebrated highbinder of chinatown, who was set free after two lengthy trials for murder, was charged not long ago[pg 319] with a second assassination. he was pointed out to the police by various chinamen, arrested and brought into the criminal courts building for identification, but for a long time it was a matter of uncertainty whether friends of his (masquerading as enemies) had not surrendered a substitute. luckily the assistant district attorney who had prosecuted this wily and dangerous celestial in the first instance was able to identify him.
many years ago, during the days of fernando wood, a connection of his was reputed to be the power behind the "policy" business in new york city—the predecessor of the notorious al adams. a "runner" belonging to the system having been arrested and policy slips having been found in his possession, the reigning policy king retained a lawyer of eminent respectability to see what could be done about it. the defendant was a particularly valuable man in the business and one for whom his employer desired to do everything in his power. the lawyer advised the defendant to plead guilty, provided the judge could be induced to let him off with a fine, which the policy king agreed to pay. accordingly, the lawyer visited the judge in his chambers and the latter practically promised to inflict only a fine in case the defendant, whom we will call, out of consideration for his memory, "johnny dough," should plead guilty. unfortunately for this very satisfactory arrangement, the judge, now long since deceased, was afflicted with a serious mental trouble which occasionally manifested itself in peculiar losses of memory. when "johnny dough," the policy king's favorite, was arraigned at the bar and, in answer to the clerk's[pg 320] interrogation, stated that he withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and now stood ready to plead "guilty," the judge, to the surprise and consternation of the lawyer, the defendant, and the latter's assembled friends, turned upon him and exclaimed:
"ha! so you plead guilty, do you? well, i sentence you to the penitentiary for one year, you miserable scoundrel!"
utterly overwhelmed, "johnny dough" was led away, while his lawyer and relatives retired to the corridor to express their opinion of the court. about three months later the lawyer, who had heard nothing further concerning the case, happened to be in the office of the district attorney, when the latter looked up with a smile and inquired:
"well, how's your client—mr. dough?"
"safe on the island, i suppose," replied the lawyer.
"not a bit of it," returned the district attorney. "he never went there."
"what do you mean?" inquired the lawyer. "i heard him sentenced to a year myself!"
"i can't help that," said the district attorney. "the other day a workingman went down to the island to see his old friend 'johnny dough.' there was only one 'johnny dough' on the lists, but when he was produced the visitor exclaimed: 'that johnny dough! that ain't him at all, at all!' the visitor departed in disgust. we instituted an investigation and found that the man at the island was a 'ringer.'"
"you don't say!" cried the lawyer.
"yes," continued the district attorney. "but that is not the best part of it. you see, the 'ringer'[pg 321] says he was to get two hundred dollars per month for each month of dough's sentence which he served. the prison authorities have refused to keep him any longer, and now he is suing them for damages, and is trying to get a writ of mandamus to compel them to take him back and let him serve out the rest of the sentence!"
probably the most successful instance on record of making use of a dummy occurred in the early stages of the now famous morse-dodge divorce tangle. dodge had been the first husband of mrs. morse, and from him she had secured a divorce. a proceeding to effect the annulment of her second marriage had been begun on the ground that dodge had never been legally served with the papers in the original divorce case—in other words, to establish the fact that she was still, in spite of her marriage to morse, the wife of dodge. dodge appeared in new york and swore that he had never been served with any papers. a well-known and reputable lawyer, on the other hand, mr. sweetser, was prepared to swear that he had served them personally upon dodge himself. the matter was sent by the court to a referee. at the hour set for the hearing in the referee's office, messrs. hummel and steinhardt arrived early, in company with a third person, and took their seats with their backs to a window on one side of the table, at the head of which sat the referee, and opposite ex-judge fursman, attorney for mrs. morse. mr. sweetser was late. presently he appeared, entered the office hurriedly, bowed to the referee, apologized for being tardy, greeted messrs. steinhardt and hummel, and then, turning to their companion, exclaimed: "how[pg 322] do you do, mr. dodge?" it was not dodge at all, but an acquaintance of one of howe & hummel's office force who had been asked to accommodate them. nothing had been said, no representations had been made, and sweetser had voluntarily walked into a trap.
the attempt to induce witnesses to identify "dummies" is frequently made by both sides in criminal cases, and under certain circumstances is generally regarded as professional. of course, in such instances no false suggestions are made, the witness himself being relied upon to "drop the fall." in case he does identify the wrong person, he has, of course, invalidated his entire testimony.
not in one case out of five hundred, however, is any attempt made to substitute a "dummy" for the real defendant, the reason being, presumably, the prejudice innocent people have against going to prison even for a large reward. the question resolves itself, therefore, into how to get the client off when he is actually on trial. first, how can the sympathies of the jury be enlisted at the very start? weeping wives and wailing infants are a drug on the market. it is a friendless man indeed, even if he be a bachelor, who cannot procure for the purposes of his trial the services of a temporary wife and miscellaneous collection of children. not that he need swear that they are his! they are merely lined up along a bench well to the front of the court-room—the imagination of the juryman does the rest.
a defendant's counsel always endeavors to impress the jury with the idea that all he wants is a fair, open trial—and that he has nothing in the world to conceal. this usually takes the form of a loud[pg 323] announcement that he is willing "to take the first twelve men who enter the box." inasmuch as the defence needs only to secure the vote of one juryman to procure a disagreement, this offer is a comparatively safe one for the defendant to make, since the prosecutor, who must secure unanimity on the part of the jury (at least in new york state), can afford to take no chances of letting an incompetent or otherwise unfit talesman slip into the box. caution requires him to examine the jury in every important case, and frequently this ruse on the part of the defendant makes it appear as if the state had less confidence in its case than the defence. this trick was invariably used by the late william f. howe in all homicide cases where he appeared for the defence.
the next step is to slip some juryman into the box who is likely for any one of a thousand reasons to lean towards the defence—as, for example, one who is of the same religion, nationality or even name as the defendant. the writer once tried a case where the defendant was a hebrew named bauman, charged with perjury. mr. abraham levy was the counsel for the defendant. having left an associate to select the jury the writer returned to the court-room to find that his friend had chosen for foreman a hebrew named abraham levy. needless to say, a disagreement of the jury was the almost inevitable result. the same lawyer not many years ago defended a client named abraham levy. in like manner he managed to get an abraham levy on the jury, and on that occasion succeeded in getting his client off scot-free.
no method is too far-fetched to be made use of[pg 324] on the chance of "catching" some stray talesman. in a case defended by ambrose hal. purdy, where the deceased had been wantonly stabbed to death by a blood-thirsty italian shortly after the assassination of president mckinley, the defence was interposed that a quarrel had arisen between the two men owing to the fact that the deceased had loudly proclaimed anarchistic doctrines and openly gloried in the death of the president, that the defendant had expostulated with him, whereupon the deceased had violently attacked the prisoner, who had killed him in self-defence.
the whole thing was so thin as to deceive nobody, but mr. purdy, as each talesman took the witness-chair to be examined on the voir dire, solemnly asked each one:
"pardon me for asking such a question at this time—it is only my duty to my unfortunate client that impels me to it—but have you any sympathy with anarchy or with assassination?"
the talesman, of course, inevitably replied in the negative.
"thank you, sir," purdy would continue. "in that event you are entirely acceptable!"
not long ago two shrewd irish attorneys were engaged in defending a client charged with an atrocious murder. the defendant had the most hebraic cast of countenance imaginable, and a beard that reached to his waist. practically the only question which these lawyers put to the different talesmen during the selection of the jury was, "have you any prejudice against the defendant on account of his race?" in due course they succeeded in getting several hebrews upon the jury who managed in the jury-room to argue[pg 325] the verdict down from murder to manslaughter in the second degree. as the defendant was being taken across the bridge to the tombs he fell on his knees and offered up a heartfelt prayer such as could only have emanated from the lips of a devout roman catholic.
lawyers frequently secure the good-will of jurors (which may last throughout the trial and show itself in the verdict) by some happy remark during the early stages of the case. during the clancy murder trial each side exhausted its thirty peremptory challenges and also the entire panel of jurors in filling the box. at this stage of the case the foreman became ill and had to be excused. no jurors were left except one who had been excused by mutual consent for some trifling reason, and who out of curiosity had remained in court. he rejoiced in the name of stone. both sides then agreed to accept him as foreman provided he was still willing to serve, and this proving to be the case he triumphantly made his way towards the box. as he did so, the defendant's counsel remarked: "the stone which the builders refused is become the head stone of the corner." the good-will generated by this meagre jest stood him later in excellent stead.
in default of any other defence, some criminal attorneys have been known to seek to excite sympathy for their helpless clients by appearing in court so intoxicated as to be manifestly unable to take care of the defendant's interests, and prisoners have frequently been acquitted simply by virtue of their lawyer's obvious incapacity. the attitude of the jury in such cases seems to be that the defendant has not had a "fair show" and so should be ac[pg 326]quitted anyway. of course, this appeals to the juryman's sympathies and he overlooks the fact that by his action the prosecution is given no "show" at all.
generally speaking, the advice credited to mr. lincoln, as being given by him to a young attorney who was about to defend a presumably guilty client, is religiously followed by all criminal practitioners:
"well, my boy, if you've got a good case, stick to the evidence; if you've got a weak one, go for the people's witnesses; but—if you've got no case at all, hammer the district attorney!"
as a rule, however, criminal lawyers are not in a position to "hammer" the prosecuting officer, but endeavor instead to suggest by innuendo or even open declaration his bias and unfairness.
"be fair, mr. ——!" is the continual cry. "try to be fair!"
the defendant, whether he be an ex-convict or thirty-year-old professional thief, is always "this poor boy," and, as he is not compelled by law to testify, and as his failure to do so must not be weighed against him by the jury, he frequently walks out of court a free man, because the jury believe from the lawyer's remarks that he is in fact a mere youthful offender of hitherto good reputation and deserves another chance.
by all odds the greatest abuse in criminal trials lies in the open disregard of professional ethics on the part of lawyers who deliberately supply of themselves, in their opening and closing addresses to the jury, what incompetent bits of evidence, true or false, they have not been able to establish by their witnesses. there is no complete cure for this, for even if the judge rebukes the lawyer and directs the[pg 327] jury to disregard what he has said as "not being in the evidence," the damage has been done, the statement still lingering in the jury's mind without any opportunity on the part of the prosecutor to disprove it. there is no antidote for such jury-poison. a shyster lawyer need but to keep his client off the stand and he can saturate the jury's mind with any facts concerning the defendant's respectability and history which his imagination is powerful enough to supply. on such occasions an ex-convict with no relatives may become a "noble fellow, who, rather than have his family name tainted by being connected with a criminal trial, is willing to risk even conviction"—"a veteran of the glorious war which knocked the shackles from the slave"—"the father of nine children"—"a man hounded by the police." the district attorney may shout himself hoarse, the judge may pound his gavel in righteous indignation, the lawyer may apologize because in the zeal with which he feels inspired for his client's cause he perhaps (which only makes matters worse) has overstepped the mark—but some juryman may suppose that, after all, the prisoner is a hero or nine times a father.
there is one notorious attorney who poses as a philanthropist and who invariably promises the jury that if they acquit his client he will personally give him employment. if he has kept half of his promises he must by this time have several hundred clerks, gardeners, coachmen, choremen and valets.
in like manner attorneys of this feather will deliberately state to the jury that if the defendant had taken the stand he would have testified thus and so; or that if certain witnesses who have not appeared[pg 328] (and who perhaps in reality do not exist at all) had testified they would have established various facts. such lawyers should be locked up or disbarred; courts are powerless to negative entirely their dishonesty in individual cases.
clever counsel, of course, habitually make use of all sorts of appeals to sympathy and prejudice. in one case in new york in which james w. osborne appeared as prosecutor the defendant wore a g.a.r. button. his lawyer managed to get a veteran on the jury. mr. osborne is a native of north carolina. the defendant's counsel, to use his own words, "worked the war for all it was worth," and the defendant lived, bled and died for his country over and over again. in summing up the case, the attorney addressed himself particularly to the veteran on the back row, and, after referring to numerous imaginary engagements, exclaimed: "why, gentlemen, my client was pouring out his life blood upon the field of battle when the ancestors of mr. osborne were raising their hands against the flag!" for once mr. osborne had no adequate words to reply.
by far the most effective and dangerous "trick" employed by guilty defendants is the deliberate shouldering of the entire blame by one of two persons who are indicted together for a single offence. a common example of this is where two men are caught at the same time bearing away between them the spoil of their crime and are jointly indicted for "criminally receiving stolen property." both, probably, are "side partners," equally guilty, and have burglarized some house or store in each other's company. they may be old pals and often have served time together. they agree to demand sepa[pg 329]rate trials, and that whoever is convicted first shall assume the entire responsibility. accordingly, a. is tried and, in spite of his asseveration that he is innocent and that the "stuff" was given him by a strange man, who paid him a dollar to transport it to a certain place, is properly convicted.[45] the bargain holds. b.'s case is moved for trial and he claims never to have seen a. in his life before the night in question, and that he volunteered to help[pg 330] the latter carry a bundle which seemed to be too heavy for him. he calls a., who testifies that this is so—that b., whom he did not know from adam, tendered his services and that he availed himself of the offer. the jury are usually prone to acquit, as the weight of evidence is clearly with the defendant.
many changes are rung upon this device. there is said to have been a case in which the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be executed. it was one of circumstantial evidence and the verdict was the result of hours of deliberation on the part of the jury. the prisoner had stoutly denied knowing anything of the homicide. shortly before the date set for the execution, another man turned up who admitted that he had committed the crime and made the fullest sort of a confession. a new trial was thereupon granted by the appellate court, and the convict, on the application of the prosecuting attorney, was discharged and quickly made himself scarce. it then developed that apart from the prisoner's own confession there was practically nothing to connect him with the crime. under a statute making such evidence obligatory in order to render a confession sufficient for a conviction, the prisoner had to be discharged.
in the case of mabel parker, a young woman of twenty, charged with the forgery of a large number of checks, many of them for substantial amounts, her husband made an almost successful attempt to procure her acquittal by means of a new variation of the old game. mrs. parker, after her husband had been arrested for passing one of the bogus checks, had been duped by a detective into believing that the[pg 331] latter was a fellow criminal who was interested in securing parker's release. in due course she took this supposed friend into her confidence, made a complete confession, and illustrated her skill by impromptu copies of her forgeries from memory upon a sheet of pad paper. this the detective secured and then arrested her. she was indicted for forging the name alice kauser to a check upon the lincoln national bank. on her trial she denied having done so, and claimed that the detective had found the sheet containing her supposed handwriting in her husband's desk, and that she had written none of the alleged copies upon it. the door of the court-room then opened, and james parker was led to the bar and pleaded guilty to the forgery of the check in question. (for the benefit of the layman it should be explained that as a rule indictments for forgery also contain a count for "uttering.") he then took the stand, admitted that he had not only uttered but had also written the check, and swore that it was his handwriting which appeared on the pad.
the prosecutor was nonplussed. if he should ask the witness to prove his capacity to forge such a check from memory on the witness-stand, the latter, as he had had ample time to practise the signature while in prison, would probably succeed in doing so. if, on the other hand, he should not ask him to write the name, the defendant's counsel would argue to the jury that he was afraid to do so. the district attorney therefore took the bull by the horns and challenged parker to make from memory a copy of the signature, and, much as he had suspected, the witness produced a very good one. an acquittal seemed[pg 332] certain, and the prosecutor was at his wit's end to devise a means to meet this practical demonstration that the husband was in fact the forger. at last it was suggested to him that it would be comparatively easy to memorize such a signature, and acting on this hint he found that after half an hour's practice he was able to make almost as good a forgery as parker. when therefore it came time for him to address the jury he pointed out the fact that parker's performance on the witness-stand really established nothing at all—that any one could forge such a signature from memory after but a few minutes' practice.
"to prove to you how easily this can be done," said he, "i will volunteer to write a better kauser signature than parker did."
he thereupon seized a pen and began to demonstrate his ability to do so. mrs. parker, seeing the force of this ocular demonstration, grasped her counsel's arm and cried out: "for god's sake, don't let him do it!" the lawyer objected, the objection was sustained, but the case was saved. why, the jury argued, should the lawyer object unless the making of such a forgery were in fact an easy matter?
in desperate cases, desperate men will take desperate chances. the traditional instance where the lawyer, defending a client charged with causing the death of another by administering poisoned cake, met the evidence of the prosecution's experts with the remark: "this is my answer to their testimony!" and calmly ate the balance of the cake, is too familiar to warrant detailed repetition. the jury retired to the jury-room and the lawyer to his[pg 333] office, where a stomach pump quickly put him out of danger. the jury is supposed to have acquitted.
such are some of the tricks of the legal trade as practised in its criminal branch. most of them are unsuccessful and serve only to relieve the gray monotony of the courts. when they achieve their object they add to the interest of the profession and teach the prosecutor a lesson by which, perhaps, he may profit in the future.
footnotes:
[45] the defence that the accused innocently received the stolen property into his possession was a familiar one even in 1697, as appears by the following record taken from the minutes of the sessions. it would seem that it was even then received with some incredulity.
city & county of new york: ss:
att a meeting of the justices of the peace for the said city & county att the city hall of the said city on thursday the 10th day of june anno dom 1697.
present
william morrott } esquires
james graham } quorum
jacobus cortlandt } esquires
grandt schuylor } justices
leonard lowie } of the peace
jacobus cortlandt, esq., one of his majestys justices of the peace for ye said city and county informed the kings justices that a peace of linnen ticking was taken out of his shop this morning. that he was informed a negro slave named joe was seen to take the same whereupon the said jacobus van cortlandt pursued the said joe and apprehended him and found the said piece of ticking in his custody and had the said negro joe penned in the cage, upon which the said negro man being brought before the said justices said he did not take the said ticking out of the shop window but that a boy gave itt to him, but upon examination of sundry other evidence itt manifestly appeareth to the said justices that the said negro man named joe, did steal the said piece of linnen ticking out of the shop window of the said jacobus van cortlandt and thereupon doe order the punishment of the said negro as follows vigt. that the said negro man slave named joe shall be forthwith by the common whipper of the city or some of the sheriffs officers att the cage be stripped naked from the middle upwards and then and there shall be tyed to the tayle of a cart and being soe stripped and tyed shall be drove round the city and receive upon his naked body att the corner of each street nine lashes until he return to the place from whence he sett out and that he afterwards stand committed to the sheriffs custody till he pay his fees.
