terrible massacre—tranquillity restored—reflections on the massacre—further proceedings—envoys from montezuma

1519

with the first streak of morning light, cortés was seen on horseback, directing the movements of his little band. the strength of his forces he drew up in the great square or court, surrounded partly by buildings, as before noticed, and in part by a high wall. there were three gates of entrance, at each of which he placed a strong guard. the rest of his troops, with his great guns, he posted without the enclosure, in such a manner as to command the avenues and secure those within from interruption in their bloody work. orders had been sent the night before to the tlascalan chiefs to hold themselves ready, at a concerted signal, to march into the city and join the spaniards.

the arrangements were hardly completed, before the cholulan caciques appeared, leading a body of levies, tamanes, even more numerous than had been demanded. they were marched at once into the square, commanded, as we have seen, by the spanish infantry, which was drawn up under the walls. cortés then took some of the caciques{201} aside. with a stern air, he bluntly charged them with the conspiracy, showing that he was well acquainted with all the particulars. he had visited their city, he said, at the invitation of their emperor; had come as a friend; had respected the inhabitants and their property; and, to avoid all cause of umbrage, had left a great part of his forces without the walls. they had received him with a show of kindness and hospitality, and, reposing on this, he had been decoyed into the snare, and found this kindness only a mask to cover the blackest perfidy.

the cholulans were thunderstruck at the accusation. an undefined awe crept over them as they gazed on the mysterious strangers and felt themselves in the presence of beings who seemed to have the power of reading the thoughts scarcely formed in their bosoms. there was no use in prevarication or denial before such judges. they confessed the whole, and endeavored to excuse themselves by throwing the blame on montezuma. cortés, assuming an air of higher indignation at this, assured them that the pretence should not serve, since, even if well founded, it would be no justification; and he would now make such an example of them for their treachery that the report of it should ring throughout the wide borders of anahuac!

the fatal signal, the discharge of an arquebuse, was then given. in an instant every musket and cross-bow was levelled at the unfortunate cholulans in the courtyard, and a frightful volley poured into them as they stood crowded together like a{202} herd of deer in the centre. they were taken by surprise, for they had not heard the preceding dialogue with the chiefs. they made scarcely any resistance to the spaniards, who followed up the discharge of their pieces by rushing on them with their swords; and, as the half-naked bodies of the natives afforded no protection, they hewed them down with as much ease as the reaper mows down the ripe corn in harvest-time. some endeavored to scale the walls, but only afforded a surer mark to the arquebusiers and archers. others threw themselves into the gateways, but were received on the long pikes of the soldiers who guarded them. some few had better luck in hiding themselves under the heaps of slain with which the ground was soon loaded.

while this work of death was going on, the countrymen of the slaughtered indians, drawn together by the noise of the massacre, had commenced a furious assault on the spaniards from without. but cortés had placed his battery of heavy guns in a position that commanded the avenues, and swept off the files of the assailants as they rushed on. in the intervals between the discharges, which, in the imperfect state of the science in that day, were much longer than in ours, he forced back the press by charging with the horse into the midst. the steeds, the guns, the weapons of the spaniards were all new to the cholulans. notwithstanding the novelty of the terrific spectacle, the flash of fire-arms mingling with the deafening roar of the artillery as its thunders reverberated among the buildings, the despairing{203} indians pushed on to take the places of their fallen comrades.

while this fierce struggle was going forward, the tlascalans, hearing the concerted signal, had advanced with quick pace into the city. they had bound, by order of cortés, wreaths of sedge round their heads, that they might the more surely be distinguished from the cholulans.[210] coming up in the very heat of the engagement, they fell on the defenceless rear of the townsmen, who, trampled down under the heels of the castilian cavalry on one side, and galled by their vindictive enemies on the other, could no longer maintain their ground. they gave way, some taking refuge in the nearest buildings, which, being partly of wood, were speedily set on fire. others fled to the temples. one strong party, with a number of priests at its head, got possession of the great teocalli. there was a vulgar tradition, already alluded to, that on removal of part of the walls the god would send forth an inundation to overwhelm his enemies. the superstitious cholulans with great difficulty succeeded in wrenching away some of the stones in the walls of the edifice. but dust, not water, followed. their false god deserted them in the hour of need. in despair they flung themselves into the wooden turrets that crowned the temple, and poured down stones, javelins, and burning{204} arrows on the spaniards, as they climbed the great staircase which, by a flight of one hundred and twenty steps, sealed the face of the pyramid. but the fiery shower fell harmless on the steel bonnets of the christians, while they availed themselves of the burning shafts to set fire to the wooden citadel, which was speedily wrapt in flames. still the garrison held out, and though quarter, it is said, was offered, only one cholulan availed himself of it. the rest threw themselves headlong from the parapet, or perished miserably in the flames.[211]

all was now confusion and uproar in the fair city which had so lately reposed in security and peace. the groans of the dying, the frantic supplications of the vanquished for mercy, were mingled with the loud battle-cries of the spaniards as they rode down their enemy, and with the shrill whistle of the tlascalans, who gave full scope to the long-cherished rancor of ancient rivalry. the tumult was still further swelled by the incessant rattle of musketry, and the crash of falling timbers, which sent up a volume of flame that outshone the ruddy light of morning, making altogether a hideous confusion of sights and sounds that converted the holy city into a pandemonium. as resistance slackened, the victors broke into the houses and sacred places, plundering them of whatever valuables they contained, plate, jewels, which were found in some quantity, wearing-apparel and{205} provisions, the two last coveted even more than the former by the simple tlascalans, thus facilitating a division of the spoil much to the satisfaction of their christian confederates. amidst this universal license, it is worthy of remark, the commands of cortés were so far respected that no violence was offered to women or children, though these, as well as numbers of the men, were made prisoners to be swept into slavery by the tlascalans.[212] these scenes of violence had lasted some hours, when cortés, moved by the entreaties of some cholulan chiefs who had been reserved from the massacre, backed by the prayers of the mexican envoys, consented out of regard, as he said, to the latter, the representatives of montezuma, to call off the soldiers, and put a stop, as well as he could, to further outrage.{*} two of the caciques were, also, permitted to go to their countrymen with assurances of pardon and protection to all who would return to their obedience.

{*} [andrés de tápia, who participated in the massacre, says that the work of destroying the city (“el trabajar por destruir la cibdad”) went on for two days, before cortés gave orders for it to cease, and that it was not till two or three days later that the inhabitants, many of whom had fled to the mountains and neighboring territory, obtained pardon and leave to return. col. de doc. para la hist. de méxico, publicada por joaquin garcía icazbalceta, tom. ii.—k.]

these measures had their effect. by the joint efforts of cortés and the caciques, the tumult was with much difficulty appeased. the assailants, spaniards and indians, gathered under their re{206}spective banners, and the cholulans, relying on the assurance of their chiefs, gradually returned to their homes.

the first act of cortés was to prevail on the tlascalan chiefs to liberate their captives.[213] such was their deference to the spanish commander that they acquiesced, though not without murmurs, contenting themselves, as best they could, with the rich spoil rifled from the cholulans, consisting of various luxuries long since unknown in tlascala. his next care was to cleanse the city from its loathsome impurities, particularly from the dead bodies which lay festering in heaps in the streets and great square. the general, in his letter to charles the fifth, admits three thousand slain, most accounts say six, and some swell the amount yet higher. as the eldest and principal cacique was among the number, cortés assisted the cholulans in installing a successor in his place.[214] by these pacific measures confidence was gradually restored. the people in the environs, reassured, flocked into the capital to supply the place of the diminished population. the markets were again opened; and the usual avocations of an orderly, industrious community were resumed. still, the long piles of black and smouldering ruins proclaimed the hurricane which had so lately swept over the city, and the walls surrounding the scene{207} of slaughter in the great square, which were standing more than fifty years after the event, told the sad tale of the massacre of cholula.[215]

this passage in their history is one of those that have left a dark stain on the memory of the conquerors. nor can we contemplate at this day, without a shudder, the condition of this fair and flourishing capital thus invaded in its privacy and delivered over to the excesses of a rude and ruth{208}less soldiery. but, to judge the action fairly, we must transport ourselves to the age when it happened. the difficulty that meets us in the outset is, to find a justification of the right of conquest, at all. but it should be remembered that religious infidelity, at this period, and till a much later, was regarded—no matter whether founded on ignorance or education, whether hereditary or acquired, heretical or pagan—as a sin to be punished with fire and fagot in this world, and eternal suffering in the next. this doctrine, monstrous as it is, was the creed of the romish, in other words, of the christian church,—the basis of the inquisition, and of those other species of religious persecutions which have stained the annals, at some time or other, of nearly every nation in christendom.[216] under this code, the territory of the heathen, wherever found, was regarded as a sort of religious{209} waif, which, in default of a legal proprietor, was claimed and taken possession of by the holy see, and as such was freely given away by the head of the church, to any temporal potentate whom he pleased, that would assume the burden of conquest.[217] thus, alexander the sixth generously granted a large portion of the western hemisphere to the spaniards, and of the eastern to the portuguese. these lofty pretensions of the successors of the humble fisherman of galilee, far from being nominal, were acknowledged and appealed to as conclusive in controversies between nations.[218]

with the right of conquest, thus conferred, came also the obligation, on which it may be said to have been founded, to retrieve the nations sitting in darkness from eternal perdition. this obligation was acknowledged by the best and the bravest, the gownsman in his closet, the missionary, and the warrior in the crusade. however much it may{210} have been debased by temporal motives and mixed up with worldly considerations of ambition and avarice, it was still active in the mind of the christian conqueror. we have seen how far paramount it was to every calculation of personal interest in the breast of cortés. the concession of the pope, then, founded on, and enforcing, the imperative duty of conversion,[219] was the assumed basis—and, in the apprehension of that age, a sound one—of the right of conquest.[220]{211}

this right could not, indeed, be construed to authorize any unnecessary act of violence to the natives. the present expedition, up to the period of its history at which we are now arrived, had probably been stained with fewer of such acts than almost any similar enterprise of the spanish discoverers in the new world. throughout the campaigns, cortés had prohibited all wanton injuries to the natives in person or property, and had punished the perpetrators of them with exemplary severity. he had been faithful to his friends, and, with perhaps a single exception, not unmerciful to his foes. whether from policy or principle, it should be recorded to his credit; though, like every sagacious mind, he may have felt that principle and policy go together.

he had entered cholula as a friend, at the invitation of the indian emperor, who had a real, if not avowed, control over the state. he had been received as a friend, with every demonstration of good will; when, without any offence of his own or his followers, he found they were to be the victims of an insidious plot,—that they were standing on a mine which might be sprung at any moment and bury them all in its ruins. his safety, as he{212} truly considered, left no alternative but to anticipate the blow of his enemies. yet who can doubt that the punishment thus inflicted was excessive,—that the same end might have been attained by directing the blow against the guilty chiefs, instead of letting it fall on the ignorant rabble who but obeyed the commands of their masters? but when was it ever seen that fear, armed with power, was scrupulous in the exercise of it? or that the passions of a fierce soldiery, inflamed by conscious injuries, could be regulated in the moment of explosion?

we shall, perhaps, pronounce more impartially on the conduct of the conquerors if we compare it with that of our own contemporaries under somewhat similar circumstances. the atrocities at cholula were not so bad as those inflicted on the descendants of these very spaniards, in the late war of the peninsula, by the most polished nations of our time; by the british at badajoz, for example,—at tarragona, and a hundred other places, by the french. the wanton butchery, the ruin of property, and, above all, those outrages worse than death, from which the female part of the population were protected at cholula, show a catalogue of enormities quite as black as those imputed to the spaniards, and without the same apology for resentment,—with no apology, indeed, but that afforded by a brave and patriotic resistance. the consideration of these events, which, from their familiarity, make little impression on our senses, should render us more lenient in our judgments of the past, showing, as they do, that man in a state of excitement, savage or civilized, is much the same{213} in every age. it may teach us—it is one of the best lessons of history—that, since such are the inevitable evils of war, even among the most polished people, those who hold the destinies of nations in their hands, whether rulers or legislators, should submit to every sacrifice, save that of honor, before authorizing an appeal to arms. the extreme solicitude to avoid these calamities, by the aid of peaceful congresses and impartial mediation, is, on the whole, the strongest evidence, stronger than that afforded by the progress of science and art, of our boasted advance in civilization.

it is far from my intention to vindicate the cruel deeds of the old conquerors. let them lie heavy on their heads. they were an iron race, who perilled life and fortune in the cause; and, as they made little account of danger and suffering for themselves, they had little sympathy to spare for their unfortunate enemies. but, to judge them fairly, we must not do it by the lights of our own age. we must carry ourselves back to theirs, and take the point of view afforded by the civilization of their time. thus only can we arrive at impartial criticism in reviewing the generations that are past. we must extend to them the same justice which we shall have occasion to ask from posterity, when, by the light of a higher civilization, it surveys the dark or doubtful passages in our own history, which hardly arrest the eye of the contemporary.{*}

{*} [the “massacre” at cholula was a military necessity to one warring as cortés was. having discovered the existence of a plot to exterminate his forces, he simply struck first. the cholulans had taken measures to annihilate the invaders, which must have proved successful against ordinary foes. not only the spanish historians but the native chroniclers testify to this fact. the mexican story is told in the indian paintings still preserved at san juan cuauhtlautzinco. the cholulans did not regard the spaniards as gods. they went to work to trap them and starve them like ordinary human beings. they cut off their supplies. they shut them up in the great tecpan. the tlascalans knew all the while that treachery was planned. they knew also (what the spaniards did not know, because of their ignorance of indian governmental institutions) that any oaths the cholulan chiefs might take would be binding upon the tribe only if the tribe had commissioned its representatives to take them. the embassy was only a decoy. the spaniards thought that the perfuming with incense indicated submission to themselves. they did not know that prisoners of war, destined for sacrifice, were perfumed in the same way. but the slaughter could not have been by any means as great as is ordinarily supposed. in the first place, there were not as many inhabitants in the city as cortés imagined; and, in the second place, three of the wards of the city were not involved either in the plot or the killing. the great crowd which attended the spaniards as they passed through the streets was always the same crowd. it made a prodigious noise, and the invaders naturally imagined it to betoken an immense population. but bandelier’s estimate of 30,000 inhabitants is probably correct. cortés, in his first report, writes, with apparent complacency, that “3000 muriéron en dos horas.” this would imply a most astounding killing capacity on the part of the less than 500 spaniards and their allies. the fire-arms of course made awful havoc, yet we must remember that it was a matter of time to load and fire the muskets and cannons of that age. no women and children were killed, not only because the soldiers were ordered to spare all women and children, but also because all non-combatants had been sent away some time before. armed men fought and killed armed men. moreover, the tlascalan allies were more eager to plunder and to capture prisoners than to kill. bandelier, recalling the fact that the battle was fought on a space not a quarter of a mile in length, questions whether more than five hundred men fell. his estimate is probably too small. the killing was stopped by cortés five hours after the first shot was fired. andrés de tápia, who wrote some time after the affair, says the pillaging, etc., went on for two days. bernal diaz, writing fifty years afterward, says it ended the second ?lay. but cortés, writing the next year, says the place was full of women and children the next day. the “smoking ruins” must be dismissed as a creation of the imagination. adobe and stone walls, and roof timbers covered with a thick coating of earth, do not afford good material for a conflagration. the 20,000 warriors from mexico mentioned on p. 194 could not have been present. it would have been impossible for so large a body to have been sent from that city, and cortés would have learned of its approach, through his tlascalan allies, long before. bandelier treats the massacre very lucidly in his “gilded man,” pp. 258-282.—m.]{214}

but, whatever be thought of this transaction in a moral view, as a stroke of policy it was unques{215}tionable. the nations of anahuac had beheld, with admiration mingled with awe, the little band of christian warriors steadily advancing along the plateau in face of every obstacle, overturning army after army with as much ease, apparently, as the good ship throws off the angry billows from her bows, or rather like the lava, which, rolling from their own volcanoes, holds on its course unchecked by obstacles, rock, tree, or building, bearing them along, or crushing and consuming them in its fiery path. the prowess of the spaniards—“the white gods,” as they were often called[221]—made them to be thought invincible. but it was not till their arrival at cholula that the natives learned how terrible was their vengeance; and they trembled!

none trembled more than the aztec emperor on his throne among the mountains. he read in these events the dark characters traced by the finger of destiny.[222] he felt his empire melting away like{216} a morning mist. he might well feel so. some of the most important cities in the neighborhood of cholula, intimidated by the fate of that capital, new sent their envoys to the castilian camp, tendering their allegiance, and propitiating the favor of the strangers by rich presents of gold and slaves.[223] montezuma, alarmed at these signs of defection, took counsel again of his impotent deities; but, although the altars smoked with fresh hecatombs of human victims, he obtained no cheering response. he determined, therefore, to send another embassy to the spaniards, disavowing any participation in the conspiracy of cholula.

meanwhile cortés was passing his time in that capital. he thought that the impression produced by the late scenes, and by the present restoration of tranquillity, offered a fair opportunity for the good work of conversion. he accordingly urged the citizens to embrace the cross and abandon the false guardians who had abandoned them in their extremity. but the traditions of centuries rested on the holy city, shedding a halo of glory around it as “the sanctuary of the gods,” the religious capital of anahuac. it was too much to expect that the people would willingly resign this pre-eminence and descend to the level of an ordinary community. still cortés might have pressed the matter, however unpalatable, but for the re{217}newed interposition of the wise olmedo, who persuaded him to postpone it till after the reduction of the whole country.[224]

the spanish general, however, had the satisfaction to break open the cages in which the victims for sacrifice were confined, and to dismiss the trembling inmates to liberty and life. he also seized upon the great teocalli, and devoted that portion of the building which, being of stone, had escaped the fury of the flames, to the purposes of a christian church; while a crucifix of stone and lime, of gigantic dimensions, spreading out its arms above the city, proclaimed that the population below was under the protection of the cross. on the same spot now stands a temple overshadowed by dark cypresses of unknown antiquity, and dedicated to our lady de los remedios. an image of the virgin presides over it, said to have been left by the conqueror himself;[225] and an indian ecclesiastic, a descendant of the ancient cholulans, performs the peaceful services of the roman catholic communion on the spot where his ancestors celebrated the sanguinary rites of the mystic quetzalcoatl.[226]

during the occurrence of these events, envoys arrived from mexico. they were charged, as usual, with a rich present of plate and ornaments of gold, among others, artificial birds in imitation of turkeys, with plumes of the same precious metal. to these were added fifteen hundred cotton dresses of delicate fabric. the emperor even ex{218}pressed his regret at the catastrophe of cholula, vindicated himself from any share in the conspiracy which he said had brought deserved retribution on the heads of its authors, and explained the existence of an aztec force in the neighborhood by the necessity of repressing some disorders there.[227]

one cannot contemplate this pusillanimous conduct of montezuma without mingled feelings of pity and contempt. it is not easy to reconcile his assumed innocence of the plot with many circumstances connected with it. but it must be remembered here, and always, that his history is to be collected solely from spanish writers and such of the natives as flourished after the conquest, when the country had become a colony of spain. not an aztec record of the primitive age survives, in a form capable of interpretation.[228] it is the hard fate of this unfortunate monarch to be wholly in{219}debted for his portraiture to the pencil of his enemies.

more than a fortnight had elapsed since the entrance of the spaniards into cholula, and cortés now resolved without loss of time to resume his march towards the capital. his rigorous reprisals had so far intimidated the cholulans that he felt assured he should no longer leave an active enemy in his rear, to annoy him in case of retreat. he had the satisfaction, before his departure, to heal the feud—in outward appearance, at least—that had so long subsisted between the holy city and tlascala, and which, under the revolution which so soon changed the destinies of the country, never revived.

it was with some disquietude that he now received an application from his cempoallan allies to be allowed to withdraw from the expedition and return to their own homes. they had incurred too deeply the resentment of the aztec emperor, by their insults to his collectors, and by their co-operation with the spaniards, to care to trust themselves in his capital. it was in vain cortés endeavored to reassure them by promised of his protection. their habitual distrust and dread of “the great montezuma” were not to be overcome. the general learned their determination with regret, for they had been of infinite service to the cause by their stanch fidelity and courage. all this made it the more difficult for him to resist their reasonable demand. liberally recompensing their services, therefore, from the rich wardrobe and treasures of the emperor, he took leave of his faithful{220} followers, before his own departure from cholula. he availed himself of their return to send letters to juan de escalante, his lieutenant at vera cruz, acquainting him with the successful progress of the expedition. he enjoined on that officer to strengthen the fortifications of the place, so as the better to resist any hostile interference from cuba,—an event for which cortés was ever on the watch,—and to keep down revolt among the natives. he especially commended the totonacs to his protection, as allies whose fidelity to the spaniards exposed them, in no slight degree, to the vengeance of the aztecs.