jean-victor moreau

moreau was about this time a man thirty-seven years of age, and, with hoche, the only man who could dispute with bonaparte—in reputation at least, if not in fortune.

he had at this time just joined an association, which later became a conspiracy, which lasted from 1797 to 1809, when it became extinct at the death of general oudot, the head of the society, which was called the philadelphiles. in this society he was known as fabius, in memory of the famous roman general who conquered hannibal by temporizing.

therefore moreau was known as the temporizer.

unfortunately, temporizing was not with him the result[pg 531] of calculation nor the effect of character. moreau was absolutely lacking in firmness in politics and strength of will. had he been gifted with more instinctive force, he might have had a greater influence upon events in france, and have traced out for himself a career comparable with the most glorious careers of modern or ancient times.

moreau was born at morlaix in brittany. his father was a distinguished lawyer. his family was of high standing, and rich rather than poor. at eighteen years of age, being attracted toward the military profession, he enlisted. his father, who wished him to become a lawyer like himself, bought young moreau's discharge, and sent him to rennes to study law. he soon acquired considerable influence over his companions, which was undoubtedly due to his moral superiority. inferior in intellect to bonaparte, and inferior in rapidity of thought to hoche, he was nevertheless superior to most men.

when the troubles which were the precursors of the revolution burst out in brittany, moreau sided with the parliament against the court, and carried with him the whole body of students. then followed between moreau, who was thenceforth called the parliamentary general, and the commandant of rennes a struggle in which the old soldier did not always have the advantage. the commandant at rennes finally gave orders for moreau's arrest.

but moreau, who possessed as a part of his genius the quality of prudence, found means to evade the search, showing himself every day, now at one point, now at another, so that the people should be convinced that the spirit of parliamentary opposition had not departed from the old capital of amorica.

but later, seeing that this parliament which he was defending opposed the convocation of the states-general, and considering that such a convocation was necessary for the future welfare of france, he changed sides, while still holding the same opinions, supported the convocation of the states-general, and appeared at the head of all the mobs[pg 532] which were thereafter organized in brittany. he was president of the breton youths gathered at pontivy when the procureur-general, desiring to utilize the talents which he was revealing, made him commander of the first brigade of volunteers from ille-et-vilaine.

here is what moreau says of himself:

i was destined to the study of the law at the beginning of this revolution which was to burst the bonds of the french people. it changed the whole course of my life; i devoted it to the profession of arms. i did not take my place among the soldiers of liberty through ambition, but i entered upon a military career out of respect for the rights of the nation: i became a warrior because i was a citizen.

to his calm and slightly lymphatic nature, moreau owed a sure insight in times of danger and a coolness which were astonishing in so young a man. men were still lacking at this time, although they were soon to swarm forward in crowds. his qualities, though of a negative order, procured for moreau the rank of brigadier-general in the army of which pichegru was then commander-in-chief. pichegru, the man of genius, appreciated moreau, the man of talent, and conferred on him, in 1794, the rank of general of division. from that time he had command of twenty-five thousand men, and was most frequently intrusted with the conduct of siege operations. in the brilliant campaign of 1794, which subdued holland, moreau commanded the right wing of the army. the conquest of holland had been deemed impossible by all strategists, holland being, as is well known, a land that lies lower than the sea, which was wrested from the seas, and which can be flooded at will.

the hollanders risked this semi-suicide. they pierced the dikes which held back the seas, and thought to escape invasion by inundating their country. but cold weather fell suddenly, of a severity unknown in the country, in which the mercury fell to fifteen degrees, and which had not been seen there more than once in a century, and froze the canals and the rivers.

[pg 533]

then, with a daring which is peculiar to them, the french ventured out upon the deep. the infantry risked the passage first, then the cavalry, and, finally, the light artillery. seeing that the ice bore this unaccustomed weight bravely, they ventured upon it with the heavy pieces of field-artillery. they fought on ice as they were in the habit of fighting on dry land. the english were attacked and driven back with the bayonet. the austrian batteries were captured. that which should have saved holland was its destruction. the cold which later became the mortal enemy of the empire was now the faithful ally of the republic.

after this there was nothing further to hinder the invasion of the united provinces. the ramparts could no longer defend the town, for they were on a level with the ice. arnheim, amsterdam, rotterdam, and the hague were taken. the conquest of over-yssel, gr?ningen and friesland finished the subjugation of holland.

there remained the stadtholder's fleet, which was frozen in the ice of the straits of texel, the different vessels of which were near the margin of the water. moreau brought his cannon to bear upon the artillery of the fleet. he fought the vessels as he would have attacked a fortress, sending a regiment of hussars to board it; and the fleet was captured by a regiment of artillery and light cavalry—a thing unheard-of in the annals of nations or in naval history.

these were the achievements which had caused pichegru and moreau to grow in stature; but moreau remained merely the clever lieutenant of the man of genius.

meanwhile, pichegru was given the command of the army of the moselle and the rhine, and moreau that of the army of the north.

before long, as we have said, pichegru fell under suspicion and was recalled to paris, and moreau succeeded to his command of the army of the rhine and the moselle.

at the beginning of the campaign, some skirmishers captured a wagon which formed part of the equipage of[pg 534] the austrian general klinglin. in a little chest which was forwarded to moreau, the latter discovered the whole correspondence between fauche-borel and the prince de condé. this correspondence gave a full and detailed account of the relations which had obtained between fauche-borel and pichegru when the former had posed as a travelling wine-merchant.

in this matter every one is free to judge moreau according to his own way of thinking and his own conscience.

ought moreau—the friend, the debtor, the lieutenant of pichegru—simply to have examined the contents of the chest and then have sent it to his former chief, with the simple recommendation "take care!" or ought he, putting his country before his affections, the stoic before the friend, to have done what he did; that is to say, spend six months in deciphering, or having deciphered, all the letters which were in cipher, and then, with his suspicions verified, but with pichegru's guilt unproved, take advantage of the preliminaries of the treaty of léoben, and when the tempest was ready to burst over pichegru's head, go to barras and say: "behold me, i am the thunderbolt!"

now that was what moreau had come to say to barras. just such proofs as these, not of complicity, but of negotiations, were what the directory needed to accuse pichegru, and these proofs moreau supplied.

barras was closeted alone with moreau for two hours, satisfying himself that he held weapons that were the more deadly because they were poisoned. then, when convinced that there were grounds, if not for condemnation, at least for trial, he rang. an usher entered.

"go," said barras, "bid the minister of police, and my two colleagues, rewbell and la reveillière come hither." then, looking at his watch, he said: "ten o'clock of the evening; we still have six hours before us. citizen-general, you have come in time." then holding out his hand to moreau, he added, with his inscrutable smile: "we will reward you for this."

[pg 535]

moreau asked permission to withdraw and it was granted. he would have embarrassed barras quite as much as barras would have embarrassed him.

the three directors remained in consultation until three o'clock in the morning. the commissioner of police joined them at once, and they sent him for merlin (of douai) and augereau, one after the other. then about three o'clock in the morning they sent an address to the government printer which was couched in the following terms:

the directory, attacked about two o'clock in the morning by the troops of the two councils under general ramel, was obliged to meet force with force.

after about an hour's fighting, the troops of the two councils were defeated, and the government remained victorious.

more than a hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the directors; to-morrow a list of their names will be given, together with a more ample list of their conspiracies, which have almost succeeded in overturning the established power.

18th fructidor, four a.m.

this curious production was signed by barras, rewbell, and la reveillière-lepaux. sothin, the minister of police, had suggested it and had drawn it up.

"they will not believe in your placard," said barras, shrugging his shoulders.

"they will believe in it to-morrow," replied sothin, "and that is all we need. it does not matter what they believe the day after; the trick will be turned then."

the directors separated, giving orders to arrest first of all their two colleagues, carnot and barthélemy.