the cause of citizen-general bonaparte's ill-humor

bonaparte returned to the palace serbelloni. he was indeed in a bad humor.

while he was hardly at the beginning of his career, had hardly reached the dawn of his vast renown, calumny was already persecuting him with her endeavors to rob him of the merit of his incredible victories, which were comparable only to those of alexander, hannibal, or c?sar. men said that carnot laid out his military plans, and that his pretended military genius merely followed step by step the written directions of the directory. they also said that he knew nothing of the matter of administration, and that berthier, his chief of staff, attended to everything.

he saw the struggle which was taking place in paris against the partisans of royalty, then represented by the clichy club, as they had been represented two years earlier by the section le peletier.

bonaparte's two brothers, in their private correspondence, urged him to take a stand between the royalists, that is to say the counter-revolution, and the directory, which still stood for the republic, greatly diverted no doubt from its original starting-point and its original aim, but the only standard nevertheless around which republicans could rally.

in the majority of the two councils ill-will against him was patent. party leaders were incessantly wounding his self-esteem by their speeches and their writings. they belittled his glory, and decried the merits of the admirable army with which he had conquered five others.

[pg 447]

he had attempted to enter civil affairs. he had been ambitious to become one of the five directors in the stead of the one who had resigned.

if he had succeeded in that attempt he was confident that he would in the end have been sole director. but they had objected to his age—twenty-eight—as an obstacle, since he would have to be at least thirty to become a director. he had therefore withdrawn, not daring to ask an exception in his favor, and thus violate that constitution for the maintenance of which he had fought on the 13th vendémiaire.

the directors, moreover, were far from desiring him for a colleague. the members of this body did not disguise the jealousy with which bonaparte's genius inspired them, nor did they hesitate to proclaim that they were offended at his haughty manner and assumption of independence.

it grieved him to think that they styled him a furious demagogue, and called him the "man of the 13th vendémiaire," whereas, on the 13th vendémiaire, he had been only the "man of the revolution," in other words, of the public interests.

his instinctive inclination was, if not toward the revolution, at least against the royalists. he was therefore pleased to note the republican spirit of the revolution and to encourage it. his first success at toulon had been against the royalists, his victory on the 13th vendémiaire had also been against royalist forces. what were the five armies which he had defeated? armies which supported the cause of the bourbons; in other words, royalist armies.

but that which, at this period of all others, when he was wavering between the safe r?le of monk and the dangerous r?le of c?sar, made him fling high the banner of the republic, was his innate presentiment of his future grandeur. even more than that, it was the proud feeling which he shared with c?sar that he would rather be the first man in a country town than the second in rome.

indeed, no matter how exalted a rank the king might[pg 448] confer upon him, even though it be that of constable of france, that king would still be above him, casting a shadow upon his brow. mounting with the aid of a king, he would never be more than an upstart; mounting by his own unaided efforts, he would be no upstart—he would stand upon his own feet.

under the republic, on the contrary, he was already head and shoulders above the other men, and he could but continue to grow taller and taller. perhaps his glance, piercing though it was, had not yet extended to the vast horizon which the empire revealed to him; but there was in a republic an audacity of action and a breadth of enterprise which suited the audacity of his genius and the breadth of his ambition.

as sometimes happens with men who are destined to greatness, and who perform impossible deeds—not because they are predestined to them, but because some one had prophesied that they would do them, and they thereafter regard themselves as favorites of providence—the most insignificant facts, when presented in certain lights, often led to momentous resolves with bonaparte. the duel which he had just witnessed, and the soldiers' quarrel respecting the words monsieur and citizen, had brought before him the whole question that was then agitating france. faraud, in naming his general, augereau, as an inflexible exponent of democracy, had indicated to bonaparte the agent he was seeking to second him in his secret plans.

more than once bonaparte had reflected upon the danger of a parisian revolt which would either overthrow the directory, or oppress it as the convention had been oppressed, and which would lead to a counter-revolution, or, in other words, the victory of the royalists, and to the accession of some prince of the house of bourbon. in that case bonaparte had fully determined to cross the alps with twenty-five thousand men, and march upon paris by way of lyons. carnot, with his sharp nose, had no doubt scented his design, for he sent him the following letter:

[pg 449]

people ascribe to you a thousand projects, each one more absurd than the other. they cannot believe that a man who has achieved so much can be content to remain a simple citizen.

the directory also wrote him:

we have noticed, citizen-general, with the utmost satisfaction, the proofs of attachment which you are constantly giving to the cause of liberty and the constitution of the year iii. you can count upon the most complete reciprocity on our part. we accept with pleasure all the offers that you have made to come at the first appeal to the succor of the republic. they are only another proof of your sincere love for your country. you may rest assured that we shall make use of them only to the interests of its tranquillity, its happiness, and its glory.

this letter was in the handwriting of la reveillière-lepaux, and was signed by barras, rewbell, and la reveillière. the other two, carnot and barthélemy, either knew nothing about it, or refused to sign it.

but as chance would have it, bonaparte was better informed concerning the situation of the directors than were the directors themselves. a certain comte delaunay d'entraigues—a royalist agent well-known in the revolution—happened to be in venice when the city was besieged by the french. he was considered the moving factor in all the machinations which were on foot against france, and particularly against the army of italy. he was a man of sure judgment. he realized the peril of the republic of venice and tried to escape; but the french troops occupied the mainland, and he and his papers were taken. when he was brought before bonaparte as an emigré, the latter treated him with all the consideration which he habitually showed toward them. he had all his papers returned to him except three, and, upon his giving his parole, the general gave him the entire city of milan for a prison.

one fine morning it was learned that the comte delaunay d'entraigues, abusing the confidence which the general[pg 450] had reposed in him, had left milan and escaped to switzerland.

but one of the three papers left in bonaparte's hands, was, under the circumstances, of the greatest importance. it was an exact recital of what had taken place between fauche-borel and pichegru at their first interview at dawendorff, which has been described in a previous volume, when fauche-borel presented himself to pichegru under the name and garb of citizen fenouillot, commercial dealer in the wines of champagne.

the famous comte de montgaillard, of whom we have, i think, already said a few words, was intrusted with further communications from the prince de condé to pichegru; and this paper, written by the comte delaunay d'entraigues at the dictation of the comte de montgaillard himself, contained the successive offers which the prince de condé had made to the general in command of the army of the rhine.

the prince de condé, who was vested with all the authority of louis xviii., with the exception of the right of bestowing the blue ribbon, had offered pichegru, if he would give up the town of huningue and return to france at the head of the austrians and emigrés, to make him marshal of france and governor of alsace. he offered to give him:

first. the red ribbon.

second. the chateau of chambord, with its park and its twelve cannon taken from the austrians.

third. a million in ready money.

fourth. two hundred thousand francs' income, of which a hundred thousand, in case he should marry, would revert to his wife, and fifty thousand to each of his children until the family should become extinct.

fifth. a hotel in paris.

sixth. and lastly, the town of arbois, general pichegru's native place, should be re-christened pichegru, and should be exempt from all taxes for twenty-five years.

pichegru had flatly refused to give up huningue.

[pg 451]

"i will never enter into a conspiracy," he said. "i do not wish to become a third edition of la fayette and dumouriez. my resources are as sure as they are great. they have roots, not only in the army but in paris, in the departments and in the generals who are my colleagues, and who think as i do. i ask nothing for myself. when i have succeeded i shall take my reward. but i am not ambitious. you may make your minds easy on that score at once. but to induce my soldiers to shout 'long live the king!' they must each have a full glass in their right hand and six livres in the left.

"i will cross the rhine, and enter france with the white flag; i will march upon paris; and, for the benefit of his majesty louis xviii., i will overturn whatever government may be there when i arrive.

"but my soldiers must receive their pay every day, at least until we have made our fifth day's march upon french soil.

"they will give me credit for the rest."

the negotiations had fallen through on account of the prince de condé's obstinacy in insisting that pichegru should proclaim the king on the other side of the rhine, and give up the town of huningue.

although he possessed this precious document, bonaparte had refused to use it. it would have cost him too much to betray a general of pichegru's renown, whose military talent he admired and who had been his master at brienne.

but he was reckoning none the less on what pichegru could accomplish as a member of the council of the ancients, when, on that very morning, just as he was about to make a military reconnoissance in the neighborhood of milan, he had received a letter from his brother joseph, telling him that not only had pichegru been elected a member of the five hundred, but that by unanimous choice he had been made their president.

he was therefore doubly armed with his former popularity with his soldiers and his new civic power.

[pg 452]

hence bonaparte's sudden decision to send a messenger to augereau informing him that he wished to see him.

the duel which he had witnessed and the cause which had led to it had not been without their weight in the scale of his ambition. but the two combatants little dreamed that they had largely contributed toward making augereau a marshal of france, murat a prince, and bonaparte an emperor.

nor would aught of this have come to pass, had not the 18th fructidor, like the 13th vendémiaire, destroyed the hopes of the royalists.