at an early period in their intellectual development the greeks reached that critical point in the history of every civilised nation, when speculative invades the domain of revealed truth, when the spiritual ideas of the people can no longer be satisfied by the lower, material conceptions of their inspired writers, and when men find it impossible to pour the new wine of free thought into the old bottles of a narrow and a trammelling creed.
from their aryan ancestors they had received the fatal legacy of a mythology stained with immoral and monstrous stories which strove to hide the rational order of nature in a chaos of miracles, and to mar by imputed wickedness the perfection of god’s nature—a very shirt of nessos in which the heracles of rationalism barely escaped annihilation. now while undoubtedly the speculations of thales, and the alluring analogies of law and order afforded by physical science, were most important forces in encouraging the rise of the spirit of scepticism, yet it was on its ethical side that the greek mythology was chiefly open to attack.
it is difficult to shake the popular belief in miracles, but no man will admit sin and immorality as attributes of the ideal he worships; so the first symptoms of a new order of thought are shown in the passionate outcries of xenophanes and heraclitos against the evil things said by homer of the sons of god; and in the story told of pythagoras, how that he saw tortured in hell the ‘two founders of greek theology,’ we can recognise the rise of the aufkl?rung as clearly as we see the reformation foreshadowed in the inferno of dante.
any honest belief, then, in the plain truth of these stories soon succumbed before the destructive effects of the a priori ethical criticism of this school; but the orthodox party, as is its custom, found immediately a convenient shelter under the ?gis of the doctrine of metaphors and concealed meanings.
to this allegorical school the tale of the fight around the walls of troy was a mystery, behind which, as behind a veil, were hidden certain moral and physical truths. the contest between athena and ares was that eternal contest between rational thought and the brute force of ignorance; the arrows which rattled in the quiver of the ‘far darter’ were no longer the instruments of vengeance shot from the golden bow of the child of god, but the common rays of the sun, which was itself nothing but a mere inert mass of burning metal.
modern investigation, with the ruthlessness of philistine analysis, has ultimately brought helen of troy down to a symbol of the dawn. there were philistines among the greeks also who saw in the ?ναξ ?δρ?ν a mere metaphor for atmospheric power.
now while this tendency to look for metaphors and hidden meanings must be ranked as one of the germs of historical criticism, yet it was essentially unscientific. its inherent weakness is clearly pointed out by plato, who showed that while this theory will no doubt explain many of the current legends, yet, if it is to be appealed to at all, it must be as a universal principle; a position he is by no means prepared to admit.
like many other great principles it suffered from its disciples, and furnished its own refutation when the web of penelope was analysed into a metaphor of the rules of formal logic, the warp representing the premises, and the woof the conclusion.
rejecting, then, the allegorical interpretation of the sacred writings as an essentially dangerous method, proving either too much or too little, plato himself returns to the earlier mode of attack, and re-writes history with a didactic purpose, laying down certain ethical canons of historical criticism. god is good; god is just; god is true; god is without the common passions of men. these are the tests to which we are to bring the stories of the greek religion.
‘god predestines no men to ruin, nor sends destruction on innocent cities; he never walks the earth in strange disguise, nor has to mourn for the death of any well-beloved son. away with the tears for sarpedon, the lying dream sent to agamemnon, and the story of the broken covenant!’ (plato, republic, book ii. 380; iii. 388, 391.)
similar ethical canons are applied to the accounts of the heroes of the days of old, and by the same a priori principles achilles is rescued from the charges of avarice and insolence in a passage which may be recited as the earliest instance of that ‘whitewashing of great men,’ as it has been called, which is so popular in our own day, when catiline and clodius are represented as honest and far-seeing politicians, when eine edle und gute natur is claimed for tiberius, and nero is rescued from his heritage of infamy as an accomplished dilettante whose moral aberrations are more than excused by his exquisite artistic sense and charming tenor voice.
but besides the allegorising principle of interpretation, and the ethical reconstruction of history, there was a third theory, which may be called the semi-historical, and which goes by the name of euhemeros, though he was by no means the first to propound it.
appealing to a fictitious monument which he declared that he had discovered in the island of panchaia, and which purported to be a column erected by zeus, and detailing the incidents of his reign on earth, this shallow thinker attempted to show that the gods and heroes of ancient greece were ‘mere ordinary mortals, whose achievements had been a good deal exaggerated and misrepresented,’ and that the proper canon of historical criticism as regards the treatment of myths was to rationalise the incredible, and to present the plausible residuum as actual truth.
to him and his school, the centaurs, for instance, those mythical sons of the storm, strange links between the lives of men and animals, were merely some youths from the village of nephele in thessaly, distinguished for their sporting tastes; the ‘living harvest of panoplied knights,’ which sprang so mystically from the dragon’s teeth, a body of mercenary troops supported by the profits on a successful speculation in ivory; and act?on, an ordinary master of hounds, who, living before the days of subscription, was eaten out of house and home by the expenses of his kennel.
now, that under the glamour of myth and legend some substratum of historical fact may lie, is a proposition rendered extremely probable by the modern investigations into the workings of the mythop?ic spirit in post-christian times. charlemagne and roland, st. francis and william tell, are none the less real personages because their histories are filled with much that is fictitious and incredible, but in all cases what is essentially necessary is some external corroboration, such as is afforded by the mention of roland and roncesvalles in the chronicles of england, or (in the sphere of greek legend) by the excavations of hissarlik. but to rob a mythical narrative of its kernel of supernatural elements, and to present the dry husk thus obtained as historical fact, is, as has been well said, to mistake entirely the true method of investigation and to identify plausibility with truth.
and as regards the critical point urged by palaiphatos, strabo, and polybius, that pure invention on homer’s part is inconceivable, we may without scruple allow it, for myths, like constitutions, grow gradually, and are not formed in a day. but between a poet’s deliberate creation and historical accuracy there is a wide field of the mythop?ic faculty.
this euhemeristic theory was welcomed as an essentially philosophical and critical method by the unscientific romans, to whom it was introduced by the poet ennius, that pioneer of cosmopolitan hellenicism, and it continued to characterise the tone of ancient thought on the question of the treatment of mythology till the rise of christianity, when it was turned by such writers as augustine and minucius felix into a formidable weapon of attack on paganism. it was then abandoned by all those who still bent the knee to athena or to zeus, and a general return, aided by the philosophic mystics of alexandria, to the allegorising principle of interpretation took place, as the only means of saving the deities of olympus from the titan assaults of the new galilean god. in what vain defence, the statue of mary set in the heart of the pantheon can best tell us.
religions, however, may be absorbed, but they never are disproved, and the stories of the greek mythology, spiritualised by the purifying influence of christianity, reappear in many of the southern parts of europe in our own day. the old fable that the greek gods took service with the new religion under assumed names has more truth in it than the many care to discover.
having now traced the progress of historical criticism in the special treatment of myth and legend, i shall proceed to investigate the form in which the same spirit manifested itself as regards what one may term secular history and secular historians. the field traversed will be found to be in some respects the same, but the mental attitude, the spirit, the motive of investigation are all changed.
there were heroes before the son of atreus and historians before herodotus, yet the latter is rightly hailed as the father of history, for in him we discover not merely the empirical connection of cause and effect, but that constant reference to laws, which is the characteristic of the historian proper.
for all history must be essentially universal; not in the sense of comprising all the synchronous events of the past time, but through the universality of the principles employed. and the great conceptions which unify the work of herodotus are such as even modern thought has not yet rejected. the immediate government of the world by god, the nemesis and punishment which sin and pride invariably bring with them, the revealing of god’s purpose to his people by signs and omens, by miracles and by prophecy; these are to herodotus the laws which govern the phenomena of history. he is essentially the type of supernatural historian; his eyes are ever strained to discern the spirit of god moving over the face of the waters of life; he is more concerned with final than with efficient causes.
yet we can discern in him the rise of that historic sense which is the rational antecedent of the science of historical criticism, the φυσικ?ν κριτ?ριον, to use the words of a greek writer, as opposed to that which comes either τ?χνη or διδαχ?.
he has passed through the valley of faith and has caught a glimpse of the sunlit heights of reason; but like all those who, while accepting the supernatural, yet attempt to apply the canons of rationalism, he is essentially inconsistent. for the better apprehension of the character of this historic sense in herodotus it will be necessary to examine at some length the various forms of criticism in which it manifests itself.
such fabulous stories as that of the phoenix, of the goat-footed men, of the headless beings with eyes in their breasts, of the men who slept six months in the year (το?το ο?κ ?νδ?χομαι η?ν ?ρχ?ν), of the wer-wolf of the neuri, and the like, are entirely rejected by him as being opposed to the ordinary experience of life, and to those natural laws whose universal influence the early greek physical philosophers had already made known to the world of thought. other legends, such as the suckling of cyrus by a bitch, or the feather-rain of northern europe, are rationalised and explained into a woman’s name and a fall of snow. the supernatural origin of the scythian nation, from the union of hercules and the monstrous echidna, is set aside by him for the more probable account that they were a nomad tribe driven by the massaget? from asia; and he appeals to the local names of their country as proof of the fact that the kimmerians were the original possessors.
but in the case of herodotus it will be more instructive to pass on from points like these to those questions of general probability, the true apprehension of which depends rather on a certain quality of mind than on any possibility of formulated rules, questions which form no unimportant part of scientific history; for it must be remembered always that the canons of historical criticism are essentially different from those of judicial evidence, for they cannot, like the latter, be made plain to every ordinary mind, but appeal to a certain historical faculty founded on the experience of life. besides, the rules for the reception of evidence in courts of law are purely stationary, while the science of historical probability is essentially progressive, and changes with the advancing spirit of each age.
now, of all the speculative canons of historical criticism, none is more important than that which rests on psychological probability.
arguing from his knowledge of human nature, herodotus rejects the presence of helen within the walls of troy. had she been there, he says, priam and his kinsmen would never have been so mad (φρενοβλαβε??) as not to give her up, when they and their children and their city were in such peril (ii. 118); and as regards the authority of homer, some incidental passages in his poem show that he knew of helen’s sojourn in egypt during the siege, but selected the other story as being a more suitable motive for an epic. similarly he does not believe that the alcm?onid? family, a family who had always been the haters of tyranny (μισοτ?ραννοι), and to whom, even more than to harmodios and aristogeiton, athens owed its liberty, would ever have been so treacherous as to hold up a shield after the battle of marathon as a signal for the persian host to fall on the city. a shield, he acknowledges, was held up, but it could not possibly have been done by such friends of liberty as the house of alcm?on; nor will he believe that a great king like rhampsinitus would have sent his daughter κατ?σαι ?π’ ο?κ?ματο?.
elsewhere he argues from more general considerations of probability; a greek courtesan like rhodopis would hardly have been rich enough to build a pyramid, and, besides, on chronological grounds the story is impossible (ii. 134).
in another passage (ii. 63), after giving an account of the forcible entry of the priests of ares into the chapel of the god’s mother, which seems to have been a sort of religious faction fight where sticks were freely used (μ?χη ξ?λοισι καρτερ?), ‘i feel sure,’ he says, ‘that many of them died from getting their heads broken, notwithstanding the assertions of the egyptian priests to the contrary.’ there is also something charmingly na?ve in the account he gives of the celebrated greek swimmer who dived a distance of eighty stadia to give his countrymen warning of the persian advance. ‘if, however,’ he says, ‘i may offer an opinion on the subject, i would say that he came in a boat.’
there is, of course, something a little trivial in some of the instances i have quoted; but in a writer like herodotus, who stands on the borderland between faith and rationalism, one likes to note even the most minute instances of the rise of the critical and sceptical spirit of inquiry.
how really strange, at base, it was with him may, i think, be shown by a reference to those passages where he applies rationalistic tests to matters connected with religion. he nowhere, indeed, grapples with the moral and scientific difficulties of the greek bible; and where he rejects as incredible the marvellous achievements of hercules in egypt, he does so on the express grounds that he had not yet been received among the gods, and so was still subject to the ordinary conditions of mortal life (?τι ?νθρωπον ??ντα).
even within these limits, however, his religious conscience seems to have been troubled at such daring rationalism, and the passage (ii. 45) concludes with a pious hope that god will pardon him for having gone so far, the great rationalistic passage being, of course, that in which he rejects the mythical account of the foundation of dodona. ‘how can a dove speak with a human voice?’ he asks, and rationalises the bird into a foreign princess.
similarly he seems more inclined to believe that the great storm at the beginning of the persian war ceased from ordinary atmospheric causes, and not in consequence of the incantations of the magians. he calls melampos, whom the majority of the greeks looked on as an inspired prophet, ‘a clever man who had acquired for himself the art of prophecy’; and as regards the miracle told of the ?ginetan statues of the primeval deities of damia and auxesia, that they fell on their knees when the sacrilegious athenians strove to carry them off, ‘any one may believe it,’ he says, ‘who likes, but as for myself, i place no credence in the tale.’
so much then for the rationalistic spirit of historical criticism, as far as it appears explicitly in the works of this great and philosophic writer; but for an adequate appreciation of his position we must also note how conscious he was of the value of documentary evidence, of the use of inscriptions, of the importance of the poets as throwing light on manners and customs as well as on historical incidents. no writer of any age has more vividly recognised the fact that history is a matter of evidence, and that it is as necessary for the historian to state his authority as it is to produce one’s witnesses in a court of law.
while, however, we can discern in herodotus the rise of an historic sense, we must not blind ourselves to the large amount of instances where he receives supernatural influences as part of the ordinary forces of life. compared to thucydides, who succeeded him in the development of history, he appears almost like a medi?val writer matched with a modern rationalist. for, contemporary though they were, between these two authors there is an infinite chasm of thought.
the essential difference of their methods may be best illustrated from those passages where they treat of the same subject. the execution of the spartan heralds, nicolaos and aneristos, during the peloponnesian war is regarded by herodotus as one of the most supernatural instances of the workings of nemesis and the wrath of an outraged hero; while the lengthened siege and ultimate fall of troy was brought about by the avenging hand of god desiring to manifest unto men the mighty penalties which always follow upon mighty sins. but thucydides either sees not, or desires not to see, in either of these events the finger of providence, or the punishment of wicked doers. the death of the heralds is merely an athenian retaliation for similar outrages committed by the opposite side; the long agony of the ten years’ siege is due merely to the want of a good commissariat in the greek army; while the fall of the city is the result of a united military attack consequent on a good supply of provisions.
now, it is to be observed that in this latter passage, as well as elsewhere, thucydides is in no sense of the word a sceptic as regards his attitude towards the truth of these ancient legends.
agamemnon and atreus, theseus and eurystheus, even minos, about whom herodotus has some doubts, are to him as real personages as alcibiades or gylippus. the points in his historical criticism of the past are, first, his rejection of all extra-natural interference, and, secondly, the attributing to these ancient heroes the motives and modes of thought of his own day. the present was to him the key to the explanation of the past, as it was to the prediction of the future.
now, as regards his attitude towards the supernatural he is at one with modern science. we too know that, just as the primeval coal-beds reveal to us the traces of rain-drops and other atmospheric phenomena similar to those of our own day, so, in estimating the history of the past, the introduction of no force must be allowed whose workings we cannot observe among the phenomena around us. to lay down canons of ultra-historical credibility for the explanation of events which happen to have preceded us by a few thousand years, is as thoroughly unscientific as it is to intermingle preternatural in geological theories.
whatever the canons of art may be, no difficulty in history is so great as to warrant the introduction of a spirit of spirit θε?? ?π? μηχαν??, in the sense of a violation of the laws of nature.
upon the other point, however, thucydides falls into an anachronism. to refuse to allow the workings of chivalrous and self-denying motives among the knights of the trojan crusade, because he saw none in the faction-loving athenian of his own day, is to show an entire ignorance of the various characteristics of human nature developing under different circumstances, and to deny to a primitive chieftain like agamemnon that authority founded on opinion, to which we give the name of divine right, is to fall into an historical error quite as gross as attributing to atreus the courting of the populace (τεθεραπευκ?τα τ?ν δ?μον) with a view to the mycenean throne.
the general method of historical criticism pursued by thucydides having been thus indicated, it remains to proceed more into detail as regards those particular points where he claims for himself a more rational method of estimating evidence than either the public or his predecessors possessed.
‘so little pains,’ he remarks, ‘do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, satisfied with their preconceived opinions,’ that the majority of the greeks believe in a pitanate cohort of the spartan army and in a double vote being the prerogative of the spartan kings, neither of which opinions has any foundation in fact. but the chief point on which he lays stress as evincing the ‘uncritical way with which men receive legends, even the legends of their own country,’ is the entire baselessness of the common athenian tradition in which harmodios and aristogeiton were represented as the patriotic liberators of athens from the peisistratid tyranny. so far, he points out, from the love of freedom being their motive, both of them were influenced by merely personal considerations, aristogeiton being jealous of hipparchos’ attention to harmodios, then a beautiful boy in the flower of greek loveliness, while the latter’s indignation was aroused by an insult offered to his sister by the prince.
their motives, then, were personal revenge, while the result of their conspiracy served only to rivet more tightly the chains of servitude which bound athens to the peisistratid house, for hipparchos, whom they killed, was only the tyrant’s younger brother, and not the tyrant himself.
to prove his theory that hippias was the elder, he appeals to the evidence afforded by a public inscription in which his name occurs immediately after that of his father, a point which he thinks shows that he was the eldest, and so the heir. this view he further corroborates by another inscription, on the altar of apollo, which mentions the children of hippias and not those of his brothers; ‘for it was natural for the eldest to be married first’; and besides this, on the score of general probability he points out that, had hippias been the younger, he would not have so easily obtained the tyranny on the death of hipparchos.
now, what is important in thucydides, as evinced in the treatment of legend generally, is not the results he arrived at, but the method by which he works. the first great rationalistic historian, he may be said to have paved the way for all those who followed after him, though it must always be remembered that, while the total absence in his pages of all the mystical paraphernalia of the supernatural theory of life is an advance in the progress of rationalism, and an era in scientific history, whose importance could never be over-estimated, yet we find along with it a total absence of any mention of those various social and economical forces which form such important factors in the evolution of the world, and to which herodotus rightly gave great prominence in his immortal work. the history of thucydides is essentially one-sided and incomplete. the intricate details of sieges and battles, subjects with which the historian proper has really nothing to do except so far as they may throw light on the spirit of the age, we would readily exchange for some notice of the condition of private society in athens, or the influence and position of women.
there is an advance in the method of historical criticism; there is an advance in the conception and motive of history itself; for in thucydides we may discern that natural reaction against the intrusion of didactic and theological considerations into the sphere of the pure intellect, the spirit of which may be found in the euripidean treatment of tragedy and the later schools of art, as well as in the platonic conception of science.
history, no doubt, has splendid lessons for our instruction, just as all good art comes to us as the herald of the noblest truth. but, to set before either the painter or the historian the inculcation of moral lessons as an aim to be consciously pursued, is to miss entirely the true motive and characteristic both of art and history, which is in the one case the creation of beauty, in the other the discovery of the laws of the evolution of progress: il ne faut demander de l’art que l’art, du passé que le passé.
herodotus wrote to illustrate the wonderful ways of providence and the nemesis that falls on sin, and his work is a good example of the truth that nothing can dispense with criticism so much as a moral aim. thucydides has no creed to preach, no doctrine to prove. he analyses the results which follow inevitably from certain antecedents, in order that on a recurrence of the same crisis men may know how to act.
his object was to discover the laws of the past so as to serve as a light to illumine the future. we must not confuse the recognition of the utility of history with any ideas of a didactic aim. two points more in thucydides remain for our consideration: his treatment of the rise of greek civilisation, and of the primitive condition of hellas, as well as the question how far can he be said really to have recognised the existence of laws regulating the complex phenomena of life.
