the long succession of events, of which i have attempted to give some account, has not hitherto affected to any great extent other countries than those which are drained by the nile. but this chapter demands a wider view, since it must describe an incident which might easily have convulsed europe, and from which far-reaching consequences have arisen. it is unlikely that the world will ever learn the details of the subtle scheme of which the marchand mission was a famous part. we may say with certainty that the french government did not intend a small expedition, at great peril to itself, to seize and hold an obscure swamp on the upper nile. but it is not possible to define the other arrangements. what part the abyssinians were expected to play, what services had been rendered them and what inducements they were offered, what attitude was to be adopted to the khalifa, what use was to be made of the local tribes: all this is veiled in the mystery of intrigue. it is well known that for several years france, at some cost to herself and at a greater cost to italy, had courted the friendship of abyssinia, and that the weapons by which the italians were defeated at adowa had been mainly supplied through french channels. a small quick-firing gun of continental manufacture and of recent make which was found in the possession of the khalifa seems to point to the existence or contemplation of similar relations with the dervishes. but how far these operations were designed to assist the marchand mission is known only to those who initiated them, and to a few others who have so far kept their own counsel.
the undisputed facts are few. towards the end of 1896 a french expedition was despatched from the atlantic into the heart of africa under the command of major marchand. the re-occupation of dongola was then practically complete, and the british government were earnestly considering the desirability of a further advance. in the beginning of 1897 a british expedition, under colonel macdonald, and comprising a dozen carefully selected officers, set out from england to uganda, landed at mombassa, and struck inland. the misfortunes which fell upon this enterprise are beyond the scope of this account, and i shall not dwell upon the local jealousies and disputes which marred it. it is sufficient to observe that colonel macdonald was provided with soudanese troops who were practically in a state of mutiny and actually mutinied two days after he assumed command. the officers were compelled to fight for their lives. several were killed. a year was consumed in suppressing the mutiny and the revolt which arose out of it. if the object of the expedition was to reach the upper nile, it was soon obviously unattainable, and the government were glad to employ the officers in making geographical surveys.
at the beginning of 1898 it was clear to those who, with the fullest information, directed the foreign policy of great britain that no results affecting the situation in the soudan could be expected from the macdonald expedition. the advance to khartoum and the reconquest of the lost provinces had been irrevocably undertaken. an anglo-egyptian force was already concentrating at berber. lastly, the marchand mission was known to be moving towards the upper nile, and it was a probable contingency that it would arrive at its destination within a few months. it was therefore evident that the line of advance of the powerful army moving south from the mediterranean and of the tiny expedition moving east from the atlantic must intersect before the end of the year, and that intersection would involve a collision between the powers of great britain and france.
i do not pretend to any special information not hitherto given to the public in this further matter, but the reader may consider for himself whether the conciliatory policy which lord salisbury pursued towards russia in china at this time—a policy which excited hostile criticism in england—was designed to influence the impending conflict on the upper nile and make it certain, or at least likely, that when great britain and france should be placed in direct opposition, france should find herself alone.
with these introductory reflections we may return to the theatre of the war.
on the 7th of september, five days after the battle and capture of omdurman, the tewfikia, a small dervish steamer—one of those formerly used by general gordon—came drifting and paddling down the river. her arab crew soon perceived by the egyptian flags which were hoisted on the principal buildings, and by the battered condition of the mahdi's tomb, that all was not well in the city; and then, drifting a little further, they found themselves surrounded by the white gunboats of the 'turks,' and so incontinently surrendered. the story they told their captors was a strange one. they had left omdurman a month earlier, in company with the steamer safia, carrying a force of 500 men, with the khalifa's orders to go up the white nile and collect grain. for some time all had been well; but on approaching the old government station of fashoda they had been fired on by black troops commanded by white officers under a strange flag—and fired on with such effect that they had lost some forty men killed and wounded. doubting who these formidable enemies might be, the foraging expedition had turned back, and the emir in command, having disembarked and formed a camp at a place on the east bank called reng, had sent the tewfikia back to ask the khalifa for instructions and reinforcements. the story was carried to the sirdar and ran like wildfire through the camp. many officers made their way to the river, where the steamer lay, to test for themselves the truth of the report. the woodwork of the hull was marked with many newly made holes, and cutting into these with their penknives the officers extracted bullets—not the roughly cast leaden balls, the bits of telegraph wire, or old iron which savages use, but the conical nickel-covered bullets of small-bore rifles such as are fired by civilised forces alone. here was positive proof. a european power was on the upper nile: which? some said it was the belgians from the congo; some that an italian expedition had arrived; others thought that the strangers were french; others, again, believed in the foreign office—it was a british expedition, after all. the arab crew were cross-examined as to the flag they had seen. their replies were inconclusive. it had bright colours, they declared; but what those colours were and what their arrangement might be they could not tell; they were poor men, and god was very great.
curiosity found no comfort but in patience or speculation. the camp for the most part received the news with a shrug. after their easy victory the soldiers walked delicately. they knew that they belonged to the most powerful force that had ever penetrated the heart of africa. if there was to be more war, the government had but to give the word, and the grand army of the nile would do by these newcomers as they had done by the dervishes.
on the 8th the sirdar started up the white nile for fashoda with five steamers, the xith and xiiith battalions of soudanese, two companies of the cameron highlanders, peake's battery of artillery, and four maxim guns. three days later he arrived at reng, and there found, as the crew of the tewfikia had declared, some 500 dervishes encamped on the bank, and the safia steamer moored to it. these stupid fellows had the temerity to open fire on the vessels. whereat the sultan, steaming towards their dem, replied with a fierce shell fire which soon put them to flight. the safia, being under steam, made some attempt to escape—whither, it is impossible to say—and commander keppel by a well-directed shell in her boilers blew her up, much to the disgust of the sirdar, who wanted to add her to his flotilla.
after this incident the expedition continued its progress up the white nile. the sudd which was met with two days' journey south of khartoum did not in this part of the nile offer any obstacle to navigation, as the strong current of the river clears the waterway; but on either side of the channel a belt of the tangled weed, varying from twelve to twelve hundred yards in breadth, very often prevented the steamers from approaching the bank to tie up. the banks themselves depressed the explorers by their melancholy inhospitality. at times the river flowed past miles of long grey grass and swamp-land, inhabited and habitable only by hippopotami. at times a vast expanse of dreary mud flats stretched as far as the eye could see. at others the forest, dense with an impenetrable undergrowth of thorn-bushes, approached the water, and the active forms of monkeys and even of leopards darted among the trees. but the country—whether forest, mud-flat, or prairie—was always damp and feverish: a wet land steaming under a burning sun and humming with mosquitoes and all kinds of insect life.
onward and southward toiled the flotilla, splashing the brown water into foam and startling the strange creatures on the banks, until on the 18th of september they approached fashoda. the gunboats waited, moored to the bank for some hours of the afternoon, to allow a message which had been sent by the sirdar to the mysterious europeans, to precede his arrival, and early in the morning of the 19th a small steel rowing-boat was observed coming down stream to meet the expedition. it contained a senegalese sergeant and two men, with a letter from major marchand announcing the arrival of the french troops and their formal occupation of the soudan. it, moreover, congratulated the sirdar on his victory, and welcomed him to fashoda in the name of france.
a few miles' further progress brought the gunboats to their destination, and they made fast to the bank near the old government buildings of the town. major marchand's party consisted of eight french officers or non-commissioned officers, and 120 black soldiers drawn from the niger district. they possessed three steel boats fitted for sail or oars, and a small steam launch, the faidherbe, which latter had, however, been sent south for reinforcements. they had six months' supplies of provisions for the french officers, and about three months' rations for the men; but they had no artillery, and were in great want of small-arm ammunition. their position was indeed precarious. the little force was stranded, without communications of any sort, and with no means of either withstanding an attack or of making a retreat. they had fired away most of their cartridges at the dervish foraging party, and were daily expecting a renewed attack. indeed, it was with consternation that they had heard of the approach of the flotilla. the natives had carried the news swiftly up the river that the dervishes were coming back with five steamers, and for three nights the french had been sleeplessly awaiting the assault of a powerful enemy.
their joy and relief at the arrival of a european force were undisguised. the sirdar and his officers on their part were thrilled with admiration at the wonderful achievements of this small band of heroic men. two years had passed since they left the atlantic coast. for four months they had been absolutely lost from human ken. they had fought with savages; they had struggled with fever; they had climbed mountains and pierced the most gloomy forests. five days and five nights they had stood up to their necks in swamp and water. a fifth of their number had perished; yet at last they had carried out their mission and, arriving at fashoda on the 10th of july, had planted the tricolour upon the upper nile.
moved by such reflections the british officers disembarked. major marchand, with a guard of honour, came to meet the general. they shook hands warmly. 'i congratulate you,' said the sirdar, 'on all you have accomplished.' 'no,' replied the frenchman, pointing to his troops; 'it is not i, but these soldiers who have done it.' and kitchener, telling the story afterwards, remarked, 'then i knew he was a gentleman.'
into the diplomatic discussions that followed, it is not necessary to plunge. the sirdar politely ignored the french flag, and, without interfering with the marchand expedition and the fort it occupied, hoisted the british and egyptian colours with all due ceremony, amid musical honours and the salutes of the gunboats. a garrison was established at fashoda, consisting of the xith soudanese, four guns of peake's battery, and two maxims, the whole under the command of colonel jackson, who was appointed military and civil commandant of the fashoda district.
at three o'clock on the same afternoon the sirdar and the gunboats resumed their journey to the south, and the next day reached the mouth of the sobat, sixty-two miles from fashoda. here other flags were hoisted and another post formed with a garrison of half the xiiith soudanese battalion and the remaining two guns of peake's battery. the expedition then turned northwards, leaving two gunboats—the sultan and the abu klea—at the disposal of colonel jackson.
i do not attempt to describe the international negotiations and discussions that followed the receipt of the news in europe, but it is pleasing to remember that a great crisis found england united. the determination of the government was approved by the loyalty of the opposition, supported by the calm resolve of the people, and armed with the efficiency of the fleet. at first indeed, while the sirdar was still steaming southward, wonder and suspense filled all minds; but when suspense ended in the certainty that eight french adventurers were in occupation of fashoda and claimed a territory twice as large as france, it gave place to a deep and bitter anger. there is no power in europe which the average englishman regards with less animosity than france. nevertheless, on this matter all were agreed. they should go. they should evacuate fashoda, or else all the might, majesty, dominion, and power of everything that could by any stretch of the imagination be called 'british' should be employed to make them go.
those who find it difficult to account for the hot, almost petulant, flush of resolve that stirred the nation must look back over the long history of the soudan drama. it had always been a duty to reconquer the abandoned territory. when it was found that this might be safely done, the duty became a pleasure. the operations were watched with extravagant attention, and while they progressed the earnestness of the nation increased. as the tides of barbarism were gradually driven back, the old sea-marks came one after another into view. names of towns that were half forgotten—or remembered only with sadness—re-appeared on the posters, in the gazettes, and in the newspapers. we were going back. 'dongola,' 'berber,' 'metemma'—who had not heard of them before? now they were associated with triumph. considerable armies fought on the indian frontier. there was war in the south and the east and the west of africa. but england looked steadfastly towards the nile and the expedition that crawled forward slowly, steadily, unchecked, apparently irresistible.
when the final triumph, long expected, came in all its completeness it was hailed with a shout of exultation, and the people of great britain, moved far beyond their wont, sat themselves down to give thanks to their god, their government, and their general. suddenly, on the chorus of their rejoicing there broke a discordant note. they were confronted with the fact that a 'friendly power' had, unprovoked, endeavoured to rob them of the fruits of their victories. they now realised that while they had been devoting themselves to great military operations, in broad daylight and the eye of the world, and prosecuting an enterprise on which they had set their hearts, other operations—covert and deceitful—had been in progress in the heart of the dark continent, designed solely for the mischievous and spiteful object of depriving them of the produce of their labours. and they firmly set their faces against such behaviour.
first of all, great britain was determined to have fashoda or fight; and as soon as this was made clear, the french were willing to give way. fashoda was a miserable swamp, of no particular value to them. marchand, lord salisbury's 'explorer in difficulties upon the upper nile,' was admitted by the french minister to be merely an 'emissary of civilisation.' it was not worth their while to embark on the hazards and convulsions of a mighty war for either swamp or emissary. besides, the plot had failed. guy fawkes, true to his oath and his orders, had indeed reached the vault; but the other conspirators were less devoted. the abyssinians had held aloof. the negro tribes gazed with wonder on the strangers, but had no intention of fighting for them. the pride and barbarism of the khalifa rejected all overtures and disdained to discriminate between the various breeds of the accursed 'turks.' finally, the victory of omdurman and its forerunner—the desert railway—had revolutionised the whole situation in the nile valley. after some weeks of tension, the french government consented to withdraw their expedition from the region of the upper nile.
meanwhile events were passing at fashoda. the town, the site of which had been carefully selected by the old egyptian government, is situated on the left bank of the river, on a gentle slope of ground which rises about four feet above the level of the nile at full flood. during the rainy season, which lasts from the end of june until the end of october, the surrounding country is one vast swamp, and fashoda itself becomes an island. it is not, however, without its importance; for it is the only spot on the west shore for very many miles where landing from the river is possible. all the roads—mere camel-tracks—from lower kordofan meet at the government post, but are only passable in the dry season. the soil is fertile, and, since there is a superabundance of sun and water, almost any crop or plant can be grown. the french officers, with the adaptive thrift of their nation, had already, in spite of the ravages of the water-rats, created a good vegetable garden, from which they were able to supplement their monotonous fare. the natives, however—aboriginal negroes of the dinka and shillook tribes—are unwilling to work, except to provide themselves with the necessaries of life; and since these are easily obtained, there is very little cultivation, and the fertility of the soil may be said to increase the poverty of the country. at all seasons of the year the climate of fashoda is pestilential, and the malarial fever attacks every european or egyptian, breaking down the strongest constitutions, and in many cases causing death. [the place is most unhealthy, and in march 1899 (the driest season of the year) out of a garrison of 317 men only 37 were fit for duty.—sir william garstin's report: egypt, no. 5, 1899.]
on this dismal island, far from civilisation, health, or comfort, the marchand mission and the egyptian garrison lived in polite antagonism for nearly three months. the french fort stood at the northern end. the egyptian camp lay outside the ruins of the town. civilities were constantly exchanged between the forces, and the british officers repaid the welcome gifts of fresh vegetables by newspapers and other conveniences. the senegalese riflemen were smart and well-conducted soldiers, and the blacks of the soudanese battalion soon imitated their officers in reciprocating courtesies. a feeling of mutual respect sprang up between colonel jackson and major marchand. the dashing commandant of the xith soudanese, whose egyptian medals bear no fewer than fourteen clasps, was filled with a generous admiration for the french explorer. realising the difficulties, he appreciated the magnificence of the achievement; and as he spoke excellent french a good and almost cordial understanding was established, and no serious disagreement occurred. but, notwithstanding the polite relations, the greatest vigilance was exercised by both sides, and whatever civilities were exchanged were of a formal nature.
the dinkas and shillooks had on the first arrival of the french made submission, and had supplied them with provisions. they knew that white men were said to be coming, and they did not realise that there were different races among the whites. marchand was regarded as the advance guard of the sirdar's army. but when the negroes gradually perceived that these bands of white men were at enmity with each other—were, in fact, of rival tribes—they immediately transferred their allegiance to the stronger force, and, although their dread of the egyptian flag was at first very marked, boycotted the french entirely.
in the middle of october despatches from france arrived for marchand by steamer; and that officer, after reading them, determined to proceed to cairo. jackson, who was most anxious that no disagreement should arise, begged him to give positive orders to his subordinate to maintain the status quo, as had been agreed. marchand gladly consented, and departed for omdurman, where he visited the battlefield, and found in the heaps of slain a grim witness of the destruction from which he had been saved, and so on to cairo, where he was moved to tears and speeches. but in his absence captain germain, who succeeded to the command, diverged from his orders, no sooner had marchand left than germain, anxious to win distinction, embarked upon a most aggressive policy. he occupied the dinka country on the right bank of the river, pushed reconnoitring parties into the interior, prevented the dinka sheikhs from coming to make their submission at fashoda, and sent his boats and the faidherbe steam launch, which had returned from the south, beyond the northern limits which the sirdar had prescribed and marchand had agreed to recognise.
colonel jackson protested again and again. germain sent haughty replies, and persisted in his provoking policy. at last the british officer was compelled to declare that if any more patrols were sent into the dinka country, he would not allow them to return to the french post. whereat germain rejoined that he would meet force with force. all tempers were worn by fever, heat, discomfort, and monotony. the situation became very difficult, and the tact and patience of colonel jackson alone averted a conflict which would have resounded in all parts of the world. he confined his troops strictly to their lines, and moved as far from the french camp as was possible. but there was one dark day when the french officers worked in their shirts with their faithful senegalese to strengthen the entrenchments, and busily prepared for a desperate struggle. on the other side little activity was noticeable. the egyptian garrison, although under arms, kept out of sight, but a wisp of steam above the funnels of the redoubtable gunboats showed that all was ready.
at length in a fortunate hour marchand returned, reproved his subordinate, and expressed his regrets to colonel jackson. then it became known that the french government had ordered the evacuation of fashoda. some weeks were spent in making preparations for the journey, but at length the day of departure arrived. at 8.20 on the morning of the 11th of december the french lowered their flag with salute and flourish of bugle. the british officers, who remained in their own camp and did not obtrude themselves, were distant but interested spectators. on the flag ceasing to fly, a sous-officier rushed up to the flagstaff and hurled it to the ground, shaking his fists and tearing his hair in a bitterness and vexation from which it is impossible to withhold sympathy, in view of what these men had suffered uselessly and what they had done. the french then embarked, and at 9.30 steamed southward, the faidherbe towing one oblong steel barge and one old steel boat, the other three boats sailing, all full of men. as the little flotilla passed the egyptian camp a guard of honour of the xith soudanese saluted them and the band struck up their national anthem. the french acknowledged the compliment by dipping their flag, and in return the british and egyptian flags were also lowered. the boats then continued their journey until they had rounded the bend of the river, when they came to land, and, honour being duly satisfied, marchand and his officers returned to breakfast with colonel jackson. the meeting was very friendly. jackson and germain exchanged most elaborate compliments, and the commandant, in the name of the xith soudanese, presented the expedition with the banner of the emir who had attacked them, which had been captured at reng. marchand shook hands all round, and the british officers bade their gallant opponents a final farewell.
once again the eight frenchmen, who had come so far and accomplished so much, set out upon their travels, to make a safe though tedious journey through abyssinia to the coast, and thence home to the country they had served faithfully and well, and which was not unmindful of their services.
let us settle the international aspect of the reconquest of the soudan while we are in the way with it. the disputes between france and england about the valley of the upper nile were terminated, as far as material cause was concerned, by an agreement, signed in london on the 21st of march, 1899, by lord salisbury and m. cambon. the declaration limiting the respective spheres of influence of the two powers took the form of an addition to the ivth article of the niger convention, concluded in the previous year. its practical effect is to reserve the whole drainage system of the nile to england and egypt, and to engage that france shall have a free hand, so far as those powers are concerned, in the rest of northern africa west of the nile valley not yet occupied by europeans. this stupendous partition of half a continent by two european powers could scarcely be expected to excite the enthusiasm of the rest. germany was, however, soothed by the promise of the observance of the 'open door' policy upon the upper nile. italy, protesting meekly, followed germany. russia had no interests in this quarter. france and england were agreed. the rest were not consulted: and the declaration may thus be said to have been recognised by the world in general.
it is perhaps early to attempt to pronounce with which of the contracting powers the advantage lies. france has acquired at a single stroke, without any serious military operations, the recognition of rights which may enable her ultimately to annex a vast african territory. at present what she has gained may be described as a recognised 'sphere of aspiration.' the future may convert this into a sphere of influence, and the distant future may witness the entire subjugation of the whole region. there are many difficulties to be overcome. the powerful influence of the senussi has yet to be overthrown. the independent kingdom of wadai must be conquered. many smaller potentates will resist desperately. altogether france has enough to occupy her in central africa for some time to come: and even when the long task is finished, the conquered regions are not likely to be of great value. they include the desert of the great sahara and wide expanses of equally profitless scrub or marsh. only one important river, the shari, flows through them, and never reaches the sea: and even lake chad, into which the shari flows, appears to be leaking through some subterranean exit, and is rapidly changing from a lake into an immense swamp.
great britain and egypt, upon the other hand, have secured a territory which, though smaller, is nevertheless of enormous extent, more fertile, comparatively easy of access, practically conquered, and containing the waterway of the nile. france will be able to paint a great deal of the map of africa blue, and the aspect of the continent upon paper may please the patriotic eye; but it is already possible to predict that before she can develop her property—can convert aspiration into influence, and influence into occupation—she will have to work harder, pay more, and wait longer for a return than will the more modest owners of the nile valley. and even when that return is obtained, it is unlikely that it will be of so much value.
it only remains to discuss the settlement made between the conquerors of the soudan. great britain and egypt had moved hand in hand up the great river, sharing, though unequally, the cost of the war in men and money. the prize belonged to both. the direct annexation of the soudan by great britain would have been an injustice to egypt. moreover, the claim of the conquerors to fashoda and other territories rested solely on the former rights of egypt. on the other hand, if the soudan became egyptian again, it must wear the fetters of that imprisoned country. the capitulations would apply to the upper nile regions, as to the delta. mixed tribunals, ottoman suzerainty, and other vexatious burdens would be added to the difficulties of soudan administration. to free the new country from the curse of internationalism was a paramount object. the soudan agreement by great britain and egypt, published on the 7th of march, 1899, achieves this. like most of the best work done in egypt by the british agency, the agreement was slipped through without attracting much notice. under its authority a state has been created in the nile valley which is neither british nor ottoman, nor anything else so far known to the law of europe. international jurists are confronted with an entirely new political status. a diplomatic 'fourth dimension' has been discovered. great britain and egypt rule the country together. the allied conquerors have become the joint-possessors. 'what does this soudan agreement mean?' the austrian consul-general asked lord cromer; and the british agent, whom twenty-two years' acquaintance with egyptian affairs bad accustomed to anomalies, replied, 'it means simply this'; and handed him the inexplicable document, under which the conquered country may some day march to peace and plenty.
