the british and egyptian cavalry, supported by the camel corps and horse artillery, trotted out rapidly, and soon interposed a distance of eight miles between them and the army. as before, the 21st lancers were on the left nearest the river, and the khedivial squadrons curved backwards in a wide half-moon to protect the right flank. meanwhile the gunboat flotilla was seen to be in motion. the white boats began to ascend the stream leisurely. yet their array was significant. hitherto they had moved at long and indefinite intervals—one following perhaps a mile, or even two miles, behind the other. now a regular distance of about 300 yards was observed. the orders of the cavalry were to reconnoitre omdurman; of the gunboats to bombard it.
as soon as the squadrons of the 21st lancers had turned the shoulder of the steep kerreri hills, we saw in the distance a yellow-brown pointed dome rising above the blurred horizon. it was the mahdi's tomb, standing in the very heart of omdurman. from the high ground the field-glass disclosed rows and rows of mud houses, making a dark patch on the brown of the plain. to the left the river, steel-grey in the morning light, forked into two channels, and on the tongue of land between them the gleam of a white building showed among the trees. before us were the ruins of khartoum and the confluence of the blue and white niles.
a black, solitary hill rose between the kerreri position and omdurman. a long, low ridge running from it concealed the ground beyond. for the rest there was a wide-rolling, sandy plain of great extent, surrounded on three sides by rocky hills and ridges, and patched with coarse, starveling grass or occasional bushes. by the banks of the river which framed the picture on the left stood a straggling mud village, and this, though we did not know it, was to be the field of omdurman. it was deserted. not a living creature could be seen. and now there were many who said once and for all that there would be no fight; for here we were arrived at the very walls of omdurman, and never an enemy to bar our path. then, with four squadrons looking very tiny on the broad expanse of ground, we moved steadily forward, and at the same time the egyptian cavalry and the camel corps entered the plain several miles further to the west, and they too began to trot across it.
it was about three miles to the last ridge which lay between us and the city. if there was a dervish army, if there was to be a battle, if the khalifa would maintain his boast and accept the arbitrament of war, much must be visible from that ridge. we looked over. at first nothing was apparent except the walls and houses of omdurman and the sandy plain sloping up from the river to distant hills. then four miles away on our right front emerged a long black line with white spots. it was the enemy. it seemed to us, as we looked, that there might be 3,000 men behind a high dense zeriba of thorn-bushes. that, said the officers, was better than nothing. it is scarcely necessary to describe our tortuous movements towards the dervish position. looking at it now from one point of view, now from another, but always edging nearer, the cavalry slowly approached, and halted in the plain about three miles away—three great serpents of men—the light-coloured one, the 21st lancers; a much longer and a blacker one, the egyptian squadrons; a mottled one, the camel corps and horse artillery. from this distance a clearer view was possible, and we distinguished many horsemen riding about the flanks and front of the broad dark line which crowned the crest of the slope. a few of these rode carelessly towards the squadrons to look at them. they were not apparently acquainted with the long range of the lee-metford carbine. several troops were dismounted, and at 800 yards fire was made on them. two were shot and fell to the ground. their companions, dismounting, examined them, picked up one, let the other lie, and resumed their ride, without acknowledging the bullets by even an increase of pace.
while this passed, so did the time. it was now nearly eleven o'clock. suddenly the whole black line which seemed to be zeriba began to move. it was made of men, not bushes. behind it other immense masses and lines of men appeared over the crest; and while we watched, amazed by the wonder of the sight, the whole face of the slope became black with swarming savages. four miles from end to end, and, as it seemed, in five great divisions, this mighty army advanced—swiftly. the whole side of the hill seemed to move. between the masses horsemen galloped continually; before them many patrols dotted the plain; above them waved hundreds of banners, and the sun, glinting on many thousand hostile spear-points, spread a sparkling cloud.
it is now known that the khalifa had succeeded in concentrating at omdurman an army of more than 60,000 men. he remembered that all the former victories over the egyptians had been won by the dervishes attacking. he knew that in all the recent defeats they had stood on the defensive. he therefore determined not to oppose the advance at the shabluka or on the march thence to omdurman. all was to be staked on the issue of a great battle on the plains of kerreri. the mahdi's prophecy was propitious. the strength of the dervish army seemed overwhelming. when the 'turks' arrived, they should be driven into the river. accordingly the khalifa had only watched the advance of the expeditionary force from wad hamed with a patrol of cavalry about 200 strong. on the 30th he was informed that the enemy drew near, and on the 31st he assembled his bodyguard and regular army, with the exception of the men needed for the river batteries, on the omdurman parade ground. he harangued the leaders; and remained encamped with his troops during the night. the next day all the male population of the city were compelled to join the army in the field, and only the gunners and garrisons on the river-face remained within. in spite, however, of his utmost vigilance, nearly 6,000 men deserted during the nights of the 31st of august and the 1st of september. this and the detachments in the forts reduced the force actually engaged in the battle to 52,000 men. the host that now advanced towards the british and egyptian cavalry was perhaps 4,000 stronger.
their array was regular and precise, and, facing northeast, stretched for more than four miles from flank to flank. a strong detachment of the mulazemin or guard was extended in front of the centre. ali-wad-helu, with his bright green flag, prolonged the line to the left; and his 5,000 warriors, chiefly of the degheim and kenana tribes, soon began to reach out towards the egyptian cavalry. the centre and main force of the army was composed of the regular troops, formed in squares under osman sheikh-ed-din and osman azrak. this great body comprised 12,000 black riflemen and about 13,000 black and arab spearmen. in their midst rose the large, dark green flag which the sheikh-ed-din had adopted to annoy ali-wad-helu, of whose distinctive emblem he was inordinately jealous. the khalifa with his own bodyguard, about 2,000 strong, followed the centre. in rear of all marched yakub with the black flag and 13,000 men—nearly all swordsmen and spearmen, who with those extended in front of the army constituted the guard. the right wing was formed by the brigade of the khalifa sherif, consisting of 2,000 danagla tribesmen, whose principal ensign was a broad red flag. osman digna, with about 1,700 hadendoa, guarded the extreme right and the flank nearest omdurman, and his fame needed no flag. such was the great army which now moved swiftly towards the watching squadrons; and these, pausing on the sandy ridge, pushed out a fringe of tentative patrols, as if to assure themselves that what they saw was real.
the egyptian cavalry had meanwhile a somewhat different view of the spectacle. working on the right of the 21st lancers, and keeping further from the river, the leading squadrons had reached the extreme western end of the kerreri ridge at about seven o'clock. from here the mahdi's tomb was visible, and, since the rocks of surgham did not obstruct the view from this point, the british officers, looking through their field-glasses, saw what appeared to be a long column of brown spots moving south-westwards across the wide plain which stretches away to the west of omdurman. the telescope, an invaluable aid to reconnaissance, developed the picture. the brown objects proved to be troops of horses grazing; and beyond, to the southward, camels and white flapping tents could be distinguished. there were no signs that a retreat was in progress; but from such a distance—nearly four miles—no certain information could be obtained, and colonel broadwood decided to advance closer. he accordingly led his whole command south-westward towards a round-topped hill which rose about four miles from the end of the kerreri ridge and was one of the more distant hill features bounding the plain on the western side. the egyptian cavalry moved slowly across the desert to this new point of observation. on their way they traversed the end of the khor shambat, a long depression which is the natural drainage channel of the plains of kerreri and omdurman, and joins the nile about four miles from the city. the heavy rain of the previous night had made the low ground swampy, and pools of water stood in the soft, wet sand. the passage, however, presented no great difficulty, and at half-past eleven the egyptian squadrons began to climb the lower slopes of the round-topped hill. here the whole scene burst suddenly upon them. scarcely three miles away the dervish army was advancing with the regularity of parade. the south wind carried the martial sound of horns and drums and—far more menacing—the deep murmur of a multitude to the astonished officers. like the 21st lancers—three miles away to their left, at the end of the long sandy ridge which runs westward from surgham—the soldiers remained for a space spell-bound. but all eyes were soon drawn from the thrilling spectacle of the dervish advance by the sound of guns on the river.
at about eleven o'clock the gunboats had ascended the nile, and now engaged the enemy's batteries on both banks. throughout the day the loud reports of their guns could be heard, and, looking from our position on the ridge, we could see the white vessels steaming slowly forward against the current, under clouds of black smoke from their furnaces and amid other clouds of white smoke from the artillery. the forts, which mounted nearly fifty guns, replied vigorously; but the british aim was accurate and their fire crushing. the embrasures were smashed to bits and many of the dervish guns dismounted. the rifle trenches which flanked the forts were swept by the maxim guns. the heavier projectiles, striking the mud walls of the works and houses, dashed the red dust high into the air and scattered destruction around. despite the tenacity and courage of the dervish gunners, they were driven from their defences and took refuge among the streets of the city. the great wall of omdurman was breached in many places, and a large number of unfortunate non-combatants were killed and wounded.
meanwhile the arab irregulars, under major wortley, had been sharply engaged. that officer's orders were to co-operate with the flotilla by taking in rear the forts and fortified villages on the east bank of the river. as soon as the gunboats had silenced the lower forts, major wortley ordered the irregulars to advance on them and on the houses. he placed the jaalin, who were practically the only trustworthy men in his force, in reserve, and formed the tribes according to their capabilities and prejudices. on the order to attack being given, the whole force, some 3,000 strong, advanced on the buildings, from which the dervishes at once opened fire. arrived within 500 yards they halted, and began to discharge their rifles in the air; they also indulged in frantic dances expressive of their fury and valour, but declined to advance any further.
major wortley then ordered the jaalin to attack. these—formed in a long column, animated by the desire for vengeance, and being besides brave men—moved upon the village at a slow pace, and, surrounding one house after another, captured it and slew all its defenders; including the dervish emir and 350 of his followers. the jaalin themselves suffered a loss of about sixty killed and wounded.
the village being captured, and the enemy on the east bank killed or dispersed, the gunboats proceeded to engage the batteries higher up the river. the howitzer battery was now landed, and at 1.30 began to bombard the mahdi's tomb. this part of the proceedings was plainly visible to us, waiting and watching on the ridge, and its interest even distracted attention from the dervish army. the dome of the tomb rose tall and prominent above the mud houses of the city. a lyddite shell burst over it—a great flash, a white ball of smoke, and, after a pause, the dull thud of the distant explosion. another followed. at the third shot, instead of the white smoke, there was a prodigious cloud of red dust, in which the whole tomb disappeared. when this cleared away we saw that, instead of being pointed, it was now flat-topped. other shells continued to strike it with like effect, some breaking holes in the dome, others smashing off the cupolas, all enveloping it in dust.
all this time the dervishes were coming nearer, and the steady and continuous advance of the great army compelled the egyptian cavalry to mount their horses and trot off to some safer point of view. colonel broadwood conceived his direct line of retreat to camp threatened, and shortly after one o'clock he began a regular retirement. eight squadrons of egyptian cavalry and the horse artillery moved off first. five companies of the camel corps, a maxim gun section, and the ninth squadron of cavalry followed as a rear-guard under major tudway. the dervish horsemen contented themselves with firing occasional shots, which were replied to by the camel corps with volleys whenever the ground was suited to dismounted action. from time to time one of the more daring arabs would gallop after the retreating squadrons, but a shot from a carbine or a threatened advance always brought the adventurous horseman to a halt. the retirement was continued without serious interference, and the boggy ground of the khor shambat was recrossed in safety.
as soon as the egyptian squadrons—a darker mass under the dark hills to the westward—were seen to be in retirement, the 21st lancers were withdrawn slowly along the sandy ridge towards the rocks of surgham—the position whence we had first seen the dervish army. the regiment wheeled about and fell back by alternate wings, dropping two detached troops to the rear and flanks to make the enemy's patrols keep their distance. but when the arab horsemen saw all the cavalry retiring they became very bold, and numerous small groups of fives and sixes began to draw nearer at a trot. accordingly, whenever the ground was favourable, the squadrons halted in turn for a few minutes to fire on them. in this way perhaps half-a-dozen were killed or wounded. the others, however, paid little attention to the bullets, and continued to pry curiously, until at last it was thought necessary to send a troop to drive them away. the score of lancers galloped back towards the inquisitive patrols in the most earnest fashion. the dervishes, although more numerous, were scattered about in small parties, and, being unable to collect, they declined the combat. the great army, however, still advanced majestically, pressing the cavalry back before it; and it was evident that if the khalifa's movement continued, in spite of it being nearly one o'clock, there would be a collision between the main forces before the night.
from the summit of the black hill of surgham the scene was extraordinary. the great army of dervishes was dwarfed by the size of the landscape to mere dark smears and smudges on the brown of the plain. looking east, another army was now visible—the british and egyptian army. all six brigades had passed the kerreri hills, and now stood drawn up in a crescent, with their backs to the nile. the transport and the houses of the village of egeiga filled the enclosed space. neither force could see the other, though but five miles divided them. the array of the enemy was, without doubt, both longer and deeper. yet there seemed a superior strength in the solid battalions, whose lines were so straight that they might have been drawn with a ruler.
the camp presented an animated appearance. the troops had piled arms after the march, and had already built a slender hedge of thorn-bushes around them. now they were eating their dinners, and in high expectation of a fight. the whole army had been ordered to stand to arms at two o'clock in formation to resist the attack which it seemed the dervishes were about to deliver. but at a quarter to two the dervish army halted. their drill was excellent, and they all stopped as by a single command. then suddenly their riflemen discharged their rifles in the air with a great roar—a barbaric feu de joie. the smoke sprang up along the whole front of their array, running from one end to the other. after this they lay down on the ground, and it became certain that the matter would not be settled that day. we remained in our position among the sandhills of the ridge until the approach of darkness, and during the afternoon various petty encounters took place between our patrols and those of the enemy, resulting in a loss to them of about a dozen killed and wounded, and to us of one corporal wounded and one horse killed. then, as the light failed, we returned to the river to water and encamp, passing into the zeriba through the ranks of the british division, where officers and men, looking out steadfastly over the fading plain, asked us whether the enemy were coming—and, if so, when. and it was with confidence and satisfaction that we replied, and they heard, 'probably at daylight.'
when the gunboats had completed their bombardment, had sunk a dervish steamer, had silenced all the hostile batteries, and had sorely battered the mahdi's tomb, they returned leisurely to the camp, and lay moored close to the bank to lend the assistance of their guns in case of attack. as the darkness became complete they threw their powerful searchlights over the front of the zeriba and on to the distant hills. the wheeling beams of dazzling light swept across the desolate, yet not deserted, plain. the dervish army lay for the night along the eastern slope of the shambat depression. all the 50,000 faithful warriors rested in their companies near the flags of their emirs. the khalifa slept in rear of the centre of his host, surrounded by his generals. suddenly the whole scene was lit by a pale glare. abdullah and the chiefs sprang up. everything around them was bathed in an awful white illumination. far away by the river there gleamed a brilliant circle of light—the cold, pitiless eye of a demon. the khalifa put his hand on osman azrak's shoulder—osman, who was to lead the frontal attack at dawn—and whispered, 'what is this strange thing?' 'sire,' replied osman, 'they are looking at us.' thereat a great fear filled all their minds. the khalifa had a small tent, which showed conspicuously in the searchlight. he had it hurriedly pulled down. some of the emirs covered their faces, lest the baleful rays should blind them. all feared that some terrible projectile would follow in the path of the light. and then suddenly it passed on—for the sapper who worked the lens could see nothing at that distance but the brown plain—and swept along the ranks of the sleeping army, rousing up the startled warriors, as a wind sweeps over a field of standing corn.
the anglo-egyptian army had not formed a quadrilateral camp, as on other nights, but had lain down to rest in the formation for attack they had assumed in the afternoon. every fifty yards behind the thorn-bushes were double sentries. every hundred yards a patrol with an officer was to be met. fifty yards in rear of this line lay the battalions, the men in all their ranks, armed and accoutred, but sprawled into every conceivable attitude which utter weariness could suggest or dictate. the enemy, twice as strong as the expeditionary force, were within five miles. they had advanced that day with confidence and determination. but it seemed impossible to believe that they would attack by daylight across the open ground. two explanations of their advance and halt presented themselves. either they had offered battle in a position where they could not themselves be attacked until four o'clock in the afternoon, and hoped that the sirdar's army, even though victorious, would have to fight a rear-guard action in the darkness to the river; or they intended to make a night attack. it was not likely that an experienced commander would accept battle at so late an hour in the day. if the dervishes were anxious to attack, so much the worse for them. but the army would remain strictly on the defensive—at any rate, until there was plenty of daylight. the alternative remained—a night attack.
here lay the great peril which threatened the expedition. what was to be done with the troops during the hours of darkness? in the daytime they recked little of their enemy. but at night, when 400 yards was the extreme range at which their fire could be opened, it was a matter of grave doubt whether the front could be kept and the attack repelled. the consequences of the line being penetrated in the darkness were appalling to think of. the sudden appearance of crowds of figures swarming to the attack through the gloom; the wild outburst of musketry and artillery all along the zeriba; the crowds still coming on in spite of the bullets; the fire getting uncontrolled, and then a great bunching and crumpling of some part of the front, and mad confusion, in which a multitude of fierce swordsmen would surge through the gap, cutting and slashing at every living thing; in which transport animals would stampede and rush wildly in all directions, upsetting every formation and destroying all attempts to restore order; in which regiments and brigades would shift for themselves and fire savagely on all sides, slaying alike friend and foe; and out of which only a few thousand, perhaps only a few hundred, demoralised men would escape in barges and steamers to tell the tale of ruin and defeat.
the picture—true or false—flamed before the eyes of all the leaders that night; but, whatever their thoughts may have been, their tactics were bold. whatever advice was given, whatever opinions were expressed, the responsibility was sir herbert kitchener's. upon his shoulders lay the burden, and the decision that was taken must be attributed solely to him. he might have formed the army into a solid mass of men and animals, arranged the infantry four deep all round the perimeter, and dug as big a ditch or built as high a zeriba as time allowed. he might have filled the numerous houses with the infantry, making them join the buildings with hasty entrenchments, and so enclose a little space in which to squeeze cavalry, transport, and guns. instead he formed his army in a long thin curve, resting on the river and enclosing a wide area of ground, about which baggage and animals were scattered in open order and luxurious accommodation. his line was but two deep; and only two companies per battalion and one egyptian brigade (collinson's) were in reserve. he thus obtained the greatest possible development of fire, and waited, prepared if necessary to stake everything on the arms of precision, but hoping with fervour that he would not be compelled to gamble by night.
the night was, however, undisturbed; and the moonlit camp, with its anxious generals, its weary soldiers, its fearful machinery of destruction, all strewn along the bank of the great river, remained plunged in silence, as if brooding over the chances of the morrow and the failures of the past. and hardly four miles away another army—twice as numerous, equally confident, equally brave—were waiting impatiently for the morning and the final settlement of the long quarrel.
