soon after bernhardi published his second edition of “cavalry in future wars,” the russo-japanese war of 1904–5 broke out. like the boer war, it fulfilled to the letter all his prognostications as to the value of fire for cavalry and belied all his theories as to the “collision of cavalry masses.” whether he regarded it as abnormal, i do not know. but here, to our own arme blanche school, as we might have expected, is another “peculiar” war.
it was the second great land war between civilized races since the invention of the smokeless, long-range magazine rifle. it was attended by many circumstances which were absent in south africa. both armies were constructed on the european model; both were regular, not volunteer; both were in very large force; both possessed steel-armed cavalry. the war, in shorts, may be said to have been the complement of the boer war in illustrating all those conditions which were not present in south africa, but which are likely to be present in a european war. much of the terrain was even better than south africa for shock-tactics. though from the yalu to liao-yang the campaign was fought in a mountainous area, from the tai-tse-ho northward vast open plains, unfenced, unobstructed, of a character not to be met with in any likely european war-area, were the rule.
what happened? no shock. that is not quite 328literally true of inter-cavalry combats, for history records one almost laughably trivial case of pseudo-shock. there are said to have been others between patrols in the early days.[79] not a single charge against riflemen on foot. the lance and sword were nowhere. in combat the rifle was supreme, banishing the very thought of the sword even from the minds of those who carried it, and inspiring the only effective action for cavalry as for infantry.
i ventured to describe the boer war as presenting a mass of evidence, vast, various, cogent, against the steel, and in favour of the rifle. here is another mass of complementary evidence, equally vast, various, and cogent, drawn from the very type of war which our soldiers now envisage—namely, one waged between european armies—in a temperate climate, at any rate in the matter of heat, and in which both cavalries possess the arme blanche.
before he begins even to think about explanations, i want the reader to grasp the broad facts in all their naked simplicity. four years of war in all in south africa and manchuria, under every imaginable condition. no shock. in our war a few small cases of pseudo-shock, which belong strictly to the realm of the rifle. numerous rifle charges, some very deadly. in both wars the rifle supreme, the steel negligible. what miraculous combination of circumstances could warrant our calling the manchurian war in its turn “peculiar”?
in england, the arme blanche theory for a moment seemed to be in great danger. some prompt and decisive counter-stroke was indispensable. there could be no compromise here, nothing but a bold lunge straight at the heart would suffice to fell the now formidable heresy. 329what form did the stroke take? i give it in the words of general sir john french:
“that the cavalry on both sides in the recent war did not distinguish themselves or their arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite apparent. on the japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence were only enabled to fulfil generally the r?le of divisional cavalry, which they appear to have done very well. the cause of failure on the russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been trained on exactly the same principles which these writers” (i.e., advocates of mounted riflemen) “now advocate. they were devoid of real cavalry training, they thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display of the highest form of the ‘cavalry spirit’” (introduction to bernhardi, p. xxvii.).
it is true that these words were published in 1906, when information was still limited; but they appear unmodified in the edition of 1909, and they are in strict accordance with the theory on which our cavalry are at this moment trained. to bring them into line with the facts as now known would be to declare the arme blanche theory a myth, and to shatter the system based on it.
but before approaching the facts, i propose, as in chapter xii., to criticize the attitude of mind which permits a high cavalry authority to brush aside with such confidence another great war in which the sword and lance fell into complete oblivion. it seems to be perfectly useless for critics of those weapons to heap up masses of modern evidence against them and to prove that there is not a tittle of evidence for them, if we cannot also show to the public the kind of way in which the problem is viewed by those responsible for their retention.
general french held high command in a long, mainly mounted war. explain away the result as we may, this war did, in fact, produce by long evolution, under exacting stress, a certain type of soldier common to both 330belligerents—the mounted rifleman. it was a splendid type on both sides, and if we combine the best qualities of britons and boers we can, if we please, construct from it an ideal type. at any rate, what these troops did is on record. the greater their excellence in combining, for strenuous practical work, the rifle and the horse, the better the results. this was the criterion of success. herein lay “dash”; herein, to borrow general french’s words, lay the “highest form of the ‘cavalry spirit.’” it was by approximation to this standard, and by oblivion of all methods directly associated with the steel, that the regular cavalry acquitted themselves best. it was our glory, not our shame, that we were able to produce this type, and to make it attain, even in the case of raw volunteers, to such a high standard. it was the glory of our brave enemies that, by virtue of progressive excellence in this type, they were able to make the task of the stronger nation so long, costly, and laborious.
how does general french represent this type when he is deploring the failure of the hybrid type in manchuria? the russians, he says, “were devoid of real cavalry training. they thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting,” and had no “cavalry spirit,” and these, the general says, were “exactly the same principles” which admirers of mounted riflemen advocate. no wonder he resents such advocacy, if such are the “principles,” and no wonder he objects to mounted riflemen who are taught to regard their horses as checks, not helps, to mobility and dash. so far from being his opponents’ “principles,” these are the very principles upon which, under the blighting influence of the arme blanche school, our fine force of existing mounted infantry is starved—theoretically, at any rate, into a sort of humble subservience to the steel.
now, would it not be more natural and normal if, knowing what he knows by war-experience of what 331mounted riflemen can do, general french were to approach this manchurian question from a somewhat different standpoint? should he not consider the possibility that the russian cavalry, which was armed “on exactly the same principles” which he advocates—and was not, as he seems to imply, trained only in the firearm—might have failed through lack of excellence in the whole-hearted union of the rifle and the horse, as the joint constituents of that aggressive mobility which constitutes the “spirit” of the mounted rifleman? but no. he rushes at once to the conclusion least capable of proof, the conclusion for which there are no positive data since 1870, and very little then, since there were no smokeless, long-range rifles, nor any type of mounted rifleman to force the issue into prominence.
and to what strange conclusions his contemptuous definition of the mounted rifleman brings him! in the admirable colesberg operations, when the steel did nothing and inspired nothing, we know that his own cavalry, under his own direction, were “continually getting off their horses and shooting.” after their thirty-mile ride from kimberley (and the steel did not help them to ride) to intercept cronje, the same cavalry did well only through forgetting their “real cavalry training,” and taking what he regards as the discreditable step of “getting off their horses to shoot.” so did de wet’s men in their equally long rides to the fields of paardeberg and sannah’s post. it is true that on many occasions the cavalry, when in superior force, were too ready, not through lack of spirit but through inherent faults of training, to dismount prematurely and take to the carbine. but at whose compulsion? that of mounted riflemen. and why? precisely because they had not grasped “the highest form of the ‘cavalry spirit’”—reliance on horse and firearm in combination. the rifle charge, taught us by the boers, is, to say the least, not described in an 332illuminating way by the words “getting off their horses to shoot.” saddle-fire apart, the words, nevertheless, are perfectly accurate. but the boers shot to more terrible purpose than the cavalry shot. historical truth compels us to add that many of our own mounted riflemen excelled the cavalry in this respect. the handful of mounted infantry, who after a chase of many days pounced on and pinned down de wet at bothaville, were working, i submit, on the right “principles.” so were the australians who hung on the same leader’s heels in the desperate hunt of february, 1901.
if this is general french’s mental attitude towards the manchurian war, i am afraid we cannot expect to find him expressing himself lucidly and cogently on the subject. turn back to the passage i quoted. the japanese, he says, indifferently mounted, indifferent riders, and inferior in numbers—drawbacks, be it noted, which are as serious for genuine mounted riflemen as for cavalry—did very well, but only as divisional cavalry. the meaning is not very plain (for they never did well with the steel), but i take it to be this: in our own army the divisional cavalry consist, not of cavalry, but of mounted infantry. their duties, as officially laid down, are “to assist the infantry in the immediate protection of the division by supplying mounted men for divisional patrolling in connection with the advanced, flank, and rear guards and outposts; to maintain connection with the protective cavalry,” and other small duties. proceeding from this analogy, the general means, i gather, to convey that the japanese cavalry, acting in those minor capacities, did very well as mounted riflemen. that is all to the good, and presumably they would have done better still with better horses, better riding, and greater numbers.
is there not also a presumption that with these added advantages they would have done better still in larger r?les as mounted riflemen? but where is the argument 333leading us? here are the russians. no praise for them, even in minor r?les, and even with their better horses, better riding, immense numbers, and, above all, their “years of training” as mounted riflemen. surely the latter characteristic alone would have enabled them, qua mounted riflemen, to overcome the few and badly equipped japanese cavalry acting as mounted riflemen? overcome them, i mean, not merely in minor capacities, but in all the large and important functions of cavalry?
the general tacitly admits that neither side made use of the steel. and yet, why not? one can understand that with these manifold sources of weakness which he details they did not attack infantry with the steel, but why not attack one another? was the mutual “terror of cold steel” so great as to neutralize the steel? the two cavalries frequently met in different capacities and in different shades of numerical strength, strategically and tactically. surely when both sides carry steel weapons this second total disappearance of the “shock duel,” officially held to be an inevitable feature of modern war, both in the strategical and tactical phases, needs further explanation.
pursuing our scrutiny with an eye trained to detect the arme blanche bias in its myriad fleeting forms, we detect a clue in the word “enterprises” near the end. this suggests neither the battle-field nor reconnaissance, but distinctly the big raid. we recall mr. goldman’s complaint of the strategical mishandling of the cavalry in south africa, and his assumption that big raids must end in shock-tactics.
i do not know if this was in the general’s mind when he wrote of “enterprises which demanded before all a display of the highest form of the ‘cavalry spirit.’” if it was, i can only respectfully repeat my view, expressed frequently elsewhere, that there is here a radical confusion of thought between combat and strategy, between mobility in its broadest sense and tactics, and 334bernhardi would be the first to tell him so. fortunately, this question of raids is as open to positive demonstration by manchurian facts as any other point of cavalry practice. but before even approaching the manchurian facts, and taking my stand purely on south african lessons, i have shown, i hope, that prima facie the general’s reason for the comparative failure of the two cavalries is open to the strongest suspicion. the facts themselves dispose of the reason altogether.
it was never part of my scheme to deal in detail with the manchurian story. i believe that for englishmen, their own great war should be sufficient evidence. and yet, having reached this point, i feel inclined to regret that i did not begin with the asiatic war, hardly complete as the material still is, and briefly summarize our own, so exaggerated seems to be the craving in many minds for foreign precedents and foreign models, so reckless the disregard for british experience, even when that experience is most stimulating and glorious. happily, the manchurian data are simple, uniform, and as absolutely free from complications or apparent contradictions as the south african data whose lessons they confirm.
what is the salient point? with all respect to general french, the salient point for englishmen, who know by bitter experience that shock training has failed them, is not whether the russians or japanese were good shock horsemen, but whether they were good mounted riflemen. our own cavalry in south africa were good shock horsemen, but that did not save the friends of shock from the necessity of finding elaborate reasons for the disappearance of shock during that war. now for our salient point. were the russian cavalry, who were far the most numerous and in some ways the better equipped of the two cavalries, good mounted riflemen, by our proved standard of what is good? the answer, from all critics and observers, comes unanimously 335and emphatically, “no.” in the first place, they were of the hybrid type, carrying swords and, in the great majority of cases, lances as well. their legendary skill in fire-action proved to be a myth. the boers would have laughed at them. our own mounted riflemen would have regarded them as inefficient and ignorant. to the surprise of many people, they had none of the “habits and instincts” for modern war that the boers had, nothing of the stalking power, the scouting power, the genius for ground and surprise, much less the charging power developed. the historians of our general staff (part i., p. 29) supply the explanation: “the system of tactical training was not unlike that of other european armies. thus the cavalry was trained both for mounted and dismounted combat, but the musketry training necessary to make it efficient when on foot fell short of the requirements of modern war. the cossacks, who formed the greater part of the russian mounted force, were trained on lines similar to the regular cavalry, but did not attain to the standard laid down for the latter.”
we must allow, of course, for general causes. the whole russian army, by the testimony of its own leaders, was in a backward state, and the cavalry was as backward as other arms. its morale, by comparison with the japanese morale, was low. in every arm the officers—that vitally important element—were ill-educated; in every arm, together with much splendid devotion and zeal, some of the officers were neglectful of duty. the cavalry suffered as much as any arm. wrangel, the austrian critic, describes the greater part of the russian cavalry engaged in the manchurian field army, especially those cossack organizations which consisted of troops of the second and third class of reserves, as being in the general sense “inefficient mounted troops.”[80] our own official reports, however, give a more favourable impression. 336the older reserve men were, no doubt, unfit for the field, but among the don, orenburg, and trans-baikal cossacks there seems to have been some very good material.
mr. mccullagh, in his book, “with the cossacks,” gives an interesting description of the great variety of religions, races, languages, colours, and military types which were embodied in the troops known broadly as cossacks. the caucasians, though they carried carbines, appear to have been by tradition and choice steel horsemen pure and simple. but whatever the training, there is no dispute about the incompetence of all the cossacks as riflemen. captain spaits gives a distressing account of their failures.[81] mccullagh says: “they had no skill whatever in attacking entrenched infantry. once dismounted, they are lost.” (p. 182). both these writers accompanied them in the field. on man?uvre and general employment there is an equally general agreement. unlike the japanese, they were maintained for the most part in large independent bodies, in dim homage, we may presume, to that “collision of cavalry masses” which is the basis of the shock theory. so massed, they were generally idle, just as the cavalries of 1866, 1870, and 1877 were too often idle, by the admission of bernhardi, kuropatkin, and von moltke. there never appears a trace of talent for fire-tactics, or an attempt to play either the aggressive or the delaying r?le of the riflemen in south africa.
what effect had that war had upon russian cavalry? none. no more effect than the brilliant performances of the civil war leaders had upon the austrian, prussian, and french cavalries in the wars of 1866 and 1870, or upon our own cavalry in 1899. how many cossack privates had heard of our war? how many of their officers had studied it? truly those words, “trained for years on the very principles these writers advocate,” are a little hard on those cavalry leaders in south africa 337who led mounted riflemen with distinction. they are very hard, if he only knew it, on general french.
kuropatkin (vol. ii., p. 151) is cruelly illuminating. it is true he never mentions armaments or the tactics derived from it. nor did von moltke in his equally hard censure of the prussian cavalry of 1866 for the same grave delinquency—timidity on the battle-field. it was left for bernhardi to disclose the true cause and the true remedy. kuropatkin dwells on “training” and on commanders, most of whom he accuses of cowardice; for “the material of which our cavalry was composed was excellent” (with certain exceptions afterwards named). what “training” and “command” meant becomes apparent. the cavalry should have fought as “obstinately as infantry,” and by way of contrasting the two arms he gives pitiless statistics of relative casualties at the battles of mukden and telissu, where no observer or historian has ever suggested that there was any reason for or sense in shock. the single example he names of a good performance, that of the cossacks at yen-tai mines, was one of defensive fire-action pure and simple, where the cavalry “fought with greater bravery than some of orloff’s infantry.” surely it was knowledge, not courage, that the rest lacked.
look at the only large “enterprise” undertaken by the russian cavalry—mishchenko’s great raid, with 8,000 men and 34 guns, upon ying-kou in january, 1905. no better example could be found for proving the fallacy of associating the success of independent strategical enterprises with the steel weapon. of the conditions of success, one category has nothing to do with combat, but purely with mobility. the distance was 80 miles, as compared, for example, with the 100-mile raids imagined by mr. goldman for south africa. there was a slow-moving millstone of a convoy, requiring protection and limiting speed, exactly our own difficulty when our 338mounted troops, cavalry included, cut themselves completely adrift from their communications, exactly the difficulty which bernhardi insists on when dealing with the limitations to cavalry raids. scouting was bad. contrast the boer scouting. scouts, at any rate, do not have shock duels. passing to combat, we find no shadow of a suggestion in any narrative that there was the remotest opportunity for shock (except for a case mentioned by mccullagh, where a cossack brigade charged a few chinese brigands). the japanese troops met with were always infantry, and were always in great numerical inferiority. until actually reaching ying-kou, they were met with in the shape of small detachments guarding villages or railway-bridges. result, small fire-actions, in which the cossacks showed incompetence. contrast de wet’s skill in raiding similar posts. one of the three russian columns, several regiments strong, was kept back, says captain spaits, for three hours by half a company of infantry, which occupied a small trench—the history of dronfield and poplar grove repeating itself in manchuria. another column was defied by a handful of infantry at niu-chuang. finally, at ying-kou, after the repulse of one russian column by a precipitately de-trained batch of japanese infantry, mishchenko, with 1,500 men, made a night attack on the railway-station, held by 300 japanese infantry. his dispositions were painfully crude; he was repulsed with heavy loss, the retirement, says colonel shisnikoff, was “an utter rout,” and that was the end of the raid. contrast the boer night attacks, so rarely, even when unsuccessful, suffering serious loss, so often highly successful. the results of the raid, a few transports burnt and some trivial demolitions on the railway, may be regarded as nil. the retreat to the base was precipitate, headlong, and what was the reason for the retreat? the rumour that a force of japanese infantry was preparing to block the line of retreat. in view of what had happened, mishchenko 339was right not to risk that contingency. but is not all this a pitiful satire on the theory of hybrid training? observe that the conditions were strictly normal. raids on communications always have to meet stationary dismounted detachments of the enemy. what, then, is the use of a cavalry which cannot attack and defeat infantry by infantry methods? the only abnormality was the absence of any hostile japanese cavalry throughout the whole course of the raid. and we are asked to believe that the grand raison d’être for elaborate and perfect training in the steel is to overthrow the enemy’s cavalry, who are also, by our official hypothesis, “thoroughly efficient” in the rifle, and who, on this occasion, were not present at all! and after overthrowing them by shock, then there is to be, in general french’s words, “a brilliant field of enterprise for cavalry as mounted riflemen.” brilliant! “the story of the raid,” says colonel shisnikoff, “is a memory of shame to those who took part in it.” and to crown all, it is general french’s warning to our cavalry that the cossacks failed in the war owing to overtraining as mounted riflemen! quo non mortalia pectora cogis, ferri sacra fames?
these are the cavalry who, he suggests, were trained on our heretical principles. “continually getting off their horses!” is it a disgrace to dismount? does he regret that scobell’s lancers at bouwer’s hoek did not use shock with the lance in storming lotter’s laager? would mr. goldman have had these russians charge loop-holed buildings on horseback? once in the course of this raid, they are said to have charged a wall, and one account of the night attack on ying-kou represents some of the cossacks as having advanced on foot, “sword in hand.” the true fighting moral of this enterprise was that the cossacks should have been better riflemen. contrast the great raids of the civil war, when the firearm, although so imperfect, was the governing factor. why were 340there never any great raids in the franco-german war? study bernhardi, that unconscious satirist of the steel, and you will guess why. lastly, contrast the japanese raid (described fully in our “british officers’ reports,” ii.) by 172 men, under colonel naganuma, who, in the course of an expedition round the russian rear, beginning on january 9, 1905, lasting more than two months, covering a vast distance, and including several hotly contested fire-actions, achieved the substantial result of blowing up by night the great railway-bridge at hsin-kai-ho on february 12. the result was to cause kuropatkin to divert 8,000 men, including a division of cavalry, from the imminent battle of mukden for the defence of his communications. this raid and its fellow under hasegawa were in the style of stuart and de wet. compare, too, the ride of smuts to cape colony, and its subsequent results in diverting troops to that quarter and in actual damage to our forces and communications.[82]
few as the achievements of the russian cavalry were, whatever they did achieve was through fire-action. kuropatkin and all critics praise samsonoff’s defence of the yen-tai coal-mines during the battle of liao-yang, when he checked by fire the japanese pursuit of orloff’s beaten division. rennenkampf, another leader of cavalry who showed signs of ability, in the course of the great battle of the sha ho, led 1,500 cossacks against the japanese communications on the upper tai-tse-ho (october 8 to 12, 1904). wrangel commends his enterprise, but admits his complete failure. our “british officers’ reports,” vol. i., pp. 664–668, give a full account of the whole episode, and describe the brilliant success of the second japanese cavalry brigade under prince kanin, first in anticipating rennenkampf at chaotao, which had been defended by only seventy infantry for two days, then in driving the cossacks back and forcing them to 341uncover one of their own infantry brigades, which was attacking pen-hse-hu, on the northern bank of the tai-tse-ho. prince kanin, unmolested by the cossacks, proceeded to surprise the reserve battalions of this brigade, and in the space of a few minutes killed many hundreds with his six maxims. the result was the retirement of the russian left and stackelberg’s eventual retreat. needless to say, there was no question of shock between the two cavalries, nor any suggestion from any quarter that there was any reason for it or possibility of it.
wrangel credits the russians with having “adequately solved some strategical tasks”—for instance, the guarding of the passes of the fen-shui-ling mountains against kuroki and nodzu, and the discovery, but nothing more than the bare discovery, of kuroki’s flank movement at liao-yang, and of nogi’s terrible turning stroke at the battle of mukden. in other respects they showed the most pitiful weakness at that last great crisis. no less than 25,000 strong, they were outman?uvred and outfought by two brigades of japanese cavalry acting with infantry. of course no shock duel, and yet was the effect of the japanese cavalry “negative,” in the words of “cavalry training”? on the contrary, it was tremendously positive, and with larger numbers might have been as decisive as sheridan’s interception of lee in april, 1865. wrangel gravely remarks that if the cossacks had first overthrown the japanese cavalry a great r?le would have been open to them in resisting nogi’s main force—not, he goes out of his way to say, with the arme blanche, but with fire-action. the old story! if they could not overcome even the japanese hybrid cavalry with fire, how could they overcome japanese infantry? as for shock, it is cynical levity to breathe the word in connection with that titanic fire-struggle of march, 1905.
wrangel himself throws some light on these perplexing conundrums. it is on page 24. he has just been deploring 342the fiasco of mishchenko’s raid, and has added that throughout the war the russian cavalry showed none of that “desire for action” which “we recognize as the first and most important attribute of our arm.” (as though, forsooth, it was not the first attribute of infantry and artillery!) we await resignedly the usual cavalry dictum—that they were ill-trained for shock, and were “continually getting off their horses.” not a bit of it. he goes on thus:
“on the other hand, a just critic, without any further ado, must admit that the prevailing conditions made it extraordinarily difficult for the cavalry masses of kuropatkin to play the part of cavalry in battle. indeed, we do not mind openly declaring that, in our opinion, no other european cavalry, supported by the principles of the cavalry tactics of the day, would have been in a position to perform anything of note on the manchurian battle-fields” (“cavalry in the russo-japanese war,” p. 23).
he goes on to say that cavalry cannot attack “infantry masses” (but there were no masses during mishchenko’s raid) unless utterly demoralized, and that “as long as the two battle-fronts are struggling with one another, the cavalry arm is obliged to respect unrestrained the emptiness of the modern battle-field, ... which is ruled by the magazine rifle.”
really, what are we coming to? it was something of a shock to hear bernhardi saying that cavalry had been driven from their place of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, but that this arm, whose soul is offence, is to respect unrestrained the emptiness of the modern battle-field is surely a counsel of appalling levity. mounted riflemen, at any rate, do not carry respect for the dangers of the battle-field to this length. if they had, there would have been no war in south africa at all. our foes would have respected the emptiness of the veld from pretoria to cape town.
343wrangel marches cheerfully on towards the inevitable reductio ad absurdum:
“as the lion-hearted japanese infantry never gave the russian dragoons or cossacks the pleasure of retreating in disorder to exemplify the last-mentioned principles, it remained only for the latter to seek out the hostile cavalry. this also the russian cavalry divisions did not succeed in doing—whether through their own fault remains for the present undecided” (ibid., p. 29).
this is not sarcastic; it is the sincere thought of a serious cavalry soldier, who believes in the arme blanche. here is the admission, frank and unabashed, that cavalry, because they are deficient in fire-power, are only formidable to cavalry, who are equally deficient in fire-power; that nobody cares a snap of the fingers for the lance or sword but those who, choosing to carry those weapons, agree to fear them. clearly, even this exception is no exception, because one or both parties may by caprice or design break the compact and take to the firearm, which will then “rule the battle-field.” in another passage on page 17, when commenting on the failure of the russian cavalry to use an “active screen” in the phase of strategical reconnaissance—i.e., in non-battle-field encounters of the rival cavalries—he gives as a cause the fact that the “japanese cavalry seldom committed themselves to shock tactics”—precisely the opposite cause alleged by general french—namely, that the russians themselves were “continually getting off their horses.” wrangel perceives that the steel weapon is lost if this sort of thing goes on; so in his final conclusion, quoted in my last chapter (p. 316), he urges his own cavalry to remain deaf to the “so-called” intelligence of the advocates of fire training, which is impossible to combine with shock training, but to give the carbine an emphatically secondary place, and concentrate on shock. if all cavalries agree on this self-denying ordinance, 344then, he implies, ground permitting, and far from the unseemly fire-scuffles of the battle-fields, we shall have, if both sides play fair, some grand spectates of shock. there is less mental chaos in wrangel than in most exponents of shock, because he ignores the historical achievements of mounted riflemen, and therefore feels no need for compromise; but he cannot altogether escape self-contradiction. in order to proffer an illustration of the theory that shock should decide inter-cavalry combats, he instances the first in the war—at tschondschu (tiessu) on march 28, 1904 (pp. 51–53)—a small affair where six squadrons of cossacks were driven away from a walled town by the fire-action of three squadrons of japanese cavalry. we read that the russians, being in larger force, should have “obtained a brilliant result” with the arme blanche, and also that the japanese, after forcing the russians to accept fire-action, should have charged and defeated the russians. at the end we discover that the writer has no knowledge of the terrain beyond the fact that the town was situated in a “mountainous district,” from which fact he infers that there must have been “ground over which the japanese could have advanced unseen” for their charge. truly a startling variation of the usual complaint of lack of “cavalry” ground!
it is greatly to be regretted that count wrangel’s ignorance of the attainments of british cavalry permits him to class them among other european cavalries as equally incompetent to have succeeded better than the russians on the manchurian battle-fields. like de negrier’s biting criticism of the french cavalry, the pronouncement throws a strange light on our own theory of imitating the armament of continental armies. our cavalry have very good firearms, and are, so far as time allows, trained to use them a good deal better than the austrians permit. and they can use them well, as they showed in south africa, where they did engage 345in the “battle,” and as they have shown in our recent man?uvres. but, that point made clear, i make no apology whatever for quoting at length the austrian critic in a chapter starting originally from an appreciation of manchurian problems by our foremost cavalry authority, general french. the fundamental line of reasoning in both cases is precisely the same, but wrangel is ruthlessly logical and careless of the logical consequences. general french’s reasoning leads him inexorably to precisely the same conclusion as wrangel—namely, that steel-armed cavalry can be formidable only to steel-armed cavalry. both men believe in the indispensable shock duel, both underrate the rifle as a source of dash—for cavalry. general french sneers at it in the words “continually getting off their horses”; count wrangel does not sneer at it. he respects it so much as to banish cavalry from the sphere of fire altogether, for clean and decent encounters with a less formidable weapon. this is the inevitable tendency of the present reaction in england. “cavalry training” and bernhardi’s book admit, no doubt, of the most liberal interpretation in the right direction by officers who resolutely work out to their logical conclusion the directions given for fire-action, and ignore the conflicting directions for the steel. but whence is to come this liberal interpretation, when high cavalry authorities denounce leanings towards fire as a betrayal of the “cavalry spirit,” and, so far from depreciating the sword, add the lance?
let us turn to the japanese cavalry. they were a very small force. outside the thirteen, and eventually seventeen divisional regiments of 420 men apiece, which seem to have been in excess of divisional requirements (for infantry did much of the work required), there were only two independent brigades of three regiments apiece—2,300 sabres together. the troopers carried good firearms, though of too short a range, but were trained 346principally for shock, and used the antiquated german drill-books denounced by bernhardi. lances wisely had been left at home, and only swords taken to the war. the men, constitutionally, were bad horsemen. their horses were poor and were overloaded.[83] the astonishing thing is that they did so well under these conditions. as soon as they grasped the fact that fire governed action, the talent for fire which they shared with the infantry, coupled with great keenness, was their salvation. enormously outmatched in numbers, they overawed and outfought the enemy’s cavalry; they fulfilled sufficiently well, at any rate, in conjunction with the infantry, the task of reconnaissance, both protective and offensive—and, in short, took a substantial part in enabling japan to win the war. needless to say, they were just as “lion-hearted”—to use wrangel’s expression—as other arms, but, having been trained and armed on false principles, naturally did not win laurels as great as those of the infantry. nevertheless, there is truth, i believe, in what wrangel—always frank, at whatever cost—says in the following passage:
“the japanese cavalry, scarcely without exception, carried out their performances with the carbine, and in close touch with their own infantry. to this circumstance, without doubt, we have to ascribe the principal reason why there has been hesitation among military critics in giving full recognition to their activity. a certain narrow-mindedness obstructs the means used to gain the end, which in no way is inclined to further the interests of the arm” (pp. 49, 50).
extraordinary the words seem, in the face of wrangel’s ultimate conclusion about the arme blanche; but the topic breeds paradox. still stranger is what follows:
“‘to be victorious is the chief thing.’ under all circumstances this will remain our motto. if we do not succeed with the 347sword or lance, then let us try firearms. if we are too weak to gain success alone, then let us only be too thankful and accept without scruple the help of our infantry. accordingly, on these principles the japanese cavalry consistently acted. to reproach them because of this is extremely unjustifiable” (p. 50).
then, forgetting that he has previously explained the absence of shock in the russians by the japanese adoption of fire-tactics, he adds:
“besides, it must not be forgotten that they (the japanese), as the weakest force, had the manner of fighting dictated to them by their opponents.”
a whimsical side-light on all of which is thrown by general sir c. j. burnett (“british officers’ reports,” vol. ii., p. 543), who thinks the “much-maligned” japanese cavalry, “with their thorough knowledge of shock-tactics,” must have found it “gall and wormwood to hang on to the skirts of their infantry,” instead of “riding straight at the opposing cavalry whenever the opportunity offered.”
wrangel adds that men on “fast-galloping horses,” and on “not too unfavourable ground,” will be able to enjoy the “irresistible pleasure of charging home with the sword” against dismounted cavalry. elsewhere he speaks, in a passage i have quoted before, of the necessity of “eternally galloping.” our minds go back to the vast destruction of british horseflesh in south africa, to the wild chimera of the “eternally galloping” horse in any war, to the hard incessant work imposed on scouts and patrols (who have somehow to combine scouting and patrolling with battle duties), and lastly to the charges at the canter made by the ill-fed, undersized boer ponies. again, i make no apology for quoting these passages. wrangel is another of the enfants terribles, like bernhardi. he betrays his own case, and the more fatally because he 348does not seem to have studied our war at all; but his case au fond is the same as that of our own cavalry school.
among the achievements of the independent japanese cavalry i have mentioned the case of naganuma’s raid, of prince kanin’s important success at pen-hse-hu, and of the energetic co-operation with the second and third armies at mukden. in this latter case wrangel credits them with having pushed forward “in an extraordinarily quick and energetic manner,” driving the russian cavalry before them. that the praise is well deserved is shown by the “british officers’ reports” (vol. ii.). the russian cavalry are estimated at 25,000, the japanese at 3,240. the latter, both in obtaining information and in action, did extraordinarily well, especially with nogi’s third army. the information is not wholly complete. exactly how near the cavalry came to interception does not appear.
wrangel also gives high praise to the work of the first cavalry brigade at the battle of telissu on june 14–15, 1904. sir ian hamilton (vol. ii., p. 330, etc.) conveys the same impression in regard to the battle, though he, like kuropatkin, dwells principally on the feebleness of the russian cavalry in not using plain opportunities for delaying fire-action against oku’s turning force. a preliminary combat of advanced guards on may 30 had led to the only recorded case of an arme blanche charge in the war, when two squadrons of cossacks charged one japanese squadron and, not having room to gather speed, used their lances as quarter-staves. would not revolvers have done better? the squadron was defeated, but the “general results of the engagement were indecisive.”[84] in the culminating battle of the 15th the 349japanese brigade checked a critical counter-attack by glasko’s thirty-fifth infantry division, freed the flank of the third japanese division, and took an energetic part in the pursuit of the russians, driving back the rear-guard by fire.
all critics and historians mention the splendid behaviour of the second japanese cavalry brigade and of other divisional detachments at the battle of january 26 to 29, 1905, called by the russians shen-tan-pu, and by our historians hei-kou-tai (see “british officers’ reports,” vol. ii., pp. 45–58). it was a vehement attack of four divisions against the left of the japanese entrenched line, held by the second army, forty miles south of mukden. the japanese cavalry brigade occupied a cluster of villages near the junction of the hun and taitsu rivers, and in the course of a bitterly contested battle, lasting three days, had to take their share, sometimes with infantry support, in meeting attacks by greatly superior forces. in this case the work they had to do was precisely the work of infantry, and our minds go back once more to the directions of our “cavalry training”—that cavalry may be called upon to “occupy localities for defence,” but that their defences are on no account to be otherwise than of the “simplest description,” so as not to weaken the offensive instinct of an essentially offensive arm—in other words, so as not to compromise the steel weapon. this is to organize defeat. if the japanese had thought so lightly of fire and the concomitants of fire, they would never have had the offensive instinct which they showed at pen-hse-hu, telissu, and mukden.
everywhere the same moral. in screening, raiding, and battle, fire is master. no observer suggests on any definite occasion any definite opportunity for the use of steel by the cavalry engaged. sir ian hamilton, the senior of the large staff of british officers who watched the manchurian war, himself a successful leader in south 350africa, has given his opinion officially (“reports,” vol. ii., p. 526) and in his published diary. he does not miss or evade the point; he grapples with it directly, and is constantly contrasting south african mounted men and methods with manchurian men and methods, and his conclusion is unreservedly in favour of the rifle. his opinion began to be confirmed at the first battle of the war, the yalu, where neither cavalry had any effect on events. his japanese friends, he tells us, were very much surprised, and naturally, for they held german theories. but “the warmest advocate of shock must allow, when he follows the course of events on this occasion over the actual ground, that there was no place or opportunity where the horse could possibly have been of any value except to bring a rifleman rapidly up to the right spot” (vol. i., p. 137). throughout the manchurian campaign “the thought never” but once “occurred to him to long for cavalry to launch at the enemy during some crisis of the struggle. neither infantry has the slightest idea of permitting itself to be hustled by mounted men, and it has been apparent ... that the cavalry could not influence the fighting one way or another, except by getting off their horses and using their rifles.”
nevertheless, two of the officers who were present do succeed in concluding that the war proves the supreme value of the steel weapon; and if my readers wish to gauge the tyranny of a blind faith over the minds of accomplished practical men, whose reports on any other point are lucid and convincing, let him read, in close connection with count wrangel’s two contradictory explanations of the absence of shock, the remarks on the japanese cavalry by general sir c. j. burnett and colonel w. h. birkbeck (vol. ii., pp. 542–545). it would be a comedy, if such comedies did not have tragic consequences. colonel birkbeck seeks an interview with general akiyama. that vigorous employer of aggressive 351fire-action states that his cavalry learnt to draw their “greatest confidence” from the firearm. wincing, however, under a reminder from colonel birkbeck of the religious “cult of the sword” in japan, he pleads defensive necessities against the enormous numerical strength of the russians, who, however, were "incapable of forcing an issue at close quarters"! if they had been cavalry" truly trained as such," besides being enormously superior, then—but the general is too clever to court the reductio ad absurdum—then “the case would have been different.” general burnett’s comment i quoted on page 347, and to complete the comedy, colonel birkbeck, in a separate report (no. 10), has conjecturally attributed the inaction of the 25,000 russian cavalry at the battle of mukden to their lack of training for shock! in his interview with the more tactful colonel mcclernand, of the united states army, akiyama speaks the plain, unvarnished truth.
let the reader now take a bird’s-eye view of the historical chain of authoritative comment on the performances of cavalry.
here is von moltke reporting to the king of prussia, after the austro-prussian war of 1866:
“our cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence. all its initiative had been destroyed at man?uvres ... and it therefore shirked bold, independent action, and kept far in the rear, and as much as possible out of sight,” etc. (“taktisch-strategische-aufs?tze”).
general french, in his introduction to bernhardi (p. xxvii), actually quotes this view as a warning to our cavalry of the present day against “ultra-caution” with the steel in the presence of infantry fire; quotes it, i repeat, in the beginning of a volume whose central thesis is the futility of the steel in opposition to fire.
it may be added that an “austrian officer of high rank,” who is quoted in the french translation of the 352austrian official history of that same war of 1866, attributed what he calls the “success” of the prussian cavalry to their reliance on the support of infantry—that is, on fire. his compatriot wrangel, forty years later, says the same of the japanese cavalry.
bernhardi reminds his countrymen that in the war of 1870 their own cavalry, and in the russo-turkish war of 1877–78 the russian cavalry, only obtained the poor success they did obtain because “not even approximately equal cavalry” opposed them, criticizes their performances severely, and passionately advocates perfection in the use of the rifle.
we come to the south african war, where the firearm inspires the best achievements of cavalry and the steel weapon is discarded, and where we find even the most convinced upholders of the arme blanche forced to construct an elaborate and often self-contradictory scheme of explanation for the failure of the british cavalry—qua cavalry—in that campaign.
the japanese cavalry only approaches other arms in so far as it uses fire well. and we end with kuropatkin, who has condemned the russian cavalry in the war of 1877, and who, in the war of 1904–5, almost in the identical words used by von moltke, deplores the lack of confidence and dash in the cavalry, and regards them as having failed.
unanimity. censure and excuses always. of what other class of soldiers is this invariable complaint made? and what is the common element in all these censured cavalries? inefficiency in fire-action. of the wars prior to the invention of the deadly modern rifle, which is the war where cavalry are least censured and most praised? the american civil war, earlier than any of those i have named, where the cavalries learnt reliance on the firearm, though their example passed unnoticed in europe. after that invention, what type do we find 353winning its way to success in south africa? the mounted rifleman. which weapon succeeds in manchuria? the firearm.
i have carried the reader of this volume through a very wonderland of paradox. let him collect the threads of one more paradox in our own domestic history.
in 1899, deaf to history and its most brilliant english exponent, colonel henderson, our cavalry went to war equipped and trained like the present french cavalry.
they and the nation suffered accordingly. after the war, lord roberts embodied in a preface to the “cavalry training” manual of 1904 the ripe experience, not only of the south african war, but of a long life spent in military service. he inculcated reliance on the rifle as the principal weapon for all purposes of the cavalry soldier. two years later, although manchuria had confirmed his words in every particular, the injunction was forgotten, and our cavalry were sitting at the feet of a german writer who had nothing to tell them about the rifle which they had not already learnt by costly war experience, and who was addressing, not them, but a cavalry ignorant of the abc of modern fire-tactics. but, as a matter of theory, not of experience, he clung to shock, expounding it in terms irreconcilable with fire. our manual of 1904 was superseded by the manual of 1907, with the directions of lord roberts expunged and bernhardi’s self-contradictory counsels embodied. in the august number of the revue des deux mondes of 1908 many people were astonished to find set forth in full by general de negrier, as a model to the “dreaming” french cavalry, lord roberts’s preface to our manual of 1904. that manual is cancelled. so that to find in its living, authoritative form the verdict of our greatest living soldier, derived from facts, not from theory, on a technical and tactical question of vital importance, the student has to search the files of a french review.
