the army in india: (a) the east india company, its rise—1600–1825

it was not until the year 1600 that the attention of english merchants was seriously turned to india. long before that, portugal first, then its conqueror, spain, next the dutch, and finally the french, had gained a footing in hindustan, and with factories had established trade. the beginnings were small enough. surat near bombay and bantam in java were first occupied by us, and in 1640 a footing was obtained on the mainland, and madras came into being. this replaced bantam, as the cession of bombay did surat. similarly, a factory, higher up the hooghley, was transferred to fort-william, around which grew up calcutta. by 1708 the various rival companies which had been formed were united under one head; and while the privileges of the company were continually renewed and extended, the foreign opposition of our rivals in india, save france established at chandernagore and pondicherry on the madras side, gradually died away and disappeared.

in 1744 the two opposing forces came into active antagonism. on the french side, dupleix, already at the head of the french “raj,” a man of considerable ability, had gained enormous influence over the factions that made up the mogul empire. he, with labourdonnais, from mauritius, had even captured, and held to ransom, madras; while, by fighting and diplomacy, the french completely controlled the policy of the carnatic and deccan.

but rising into note on the opposing side was robert265 clive; who, after defeating the french and their allies at arcot and conjeveram, raised the siege of trichinopoly. both french leaders had failed, and both died in france in suffering and comparative poverty; but clive, after a journey home, returned to india, to find that surajah dowlah, nabob of bengal, had captured calcutta and caused the death of the majority of the survivors by their imprisonment in the “black hole.”

the intricate, and not very creditable, diplomacy that ensued culminated in the battle of plassy, notorious as being won against extraordinary odds, and as leading directly to the destruction of the french power in india.

the european, or at first largely half-caste army employed there was not numerous. the remains of the garrison that had been sent to take possession of the bombay dowry formed the nucleus of the “bombay regiment,” which became the bengal fusiliers, or “old toughs,” and is now the 2nd battalion royal dublin fusiliers. they behaved gallantly in the early fighting at cuddalore and davicottah, but did not come on the strength of the home army until 1858. in 1754 the first true european regiment, the 39th, was despatched to hold madras. for this it is distinguished by the motto “primus in indis.” it is most curious to note, therefore, in all these early efforts at dominion in india, the madras sepoy took a most important part, and behaved manfully.

two smaller “affairs,” the capture of fort hooghley and chandernagore, preceded the more important battle of plassy, where the indian army numbered 50,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 50 guns, and met clive in the “groves of plassy,” with a force roughly estimated at 1000 europeans, namely, the 39th, the 1st bengal and 1st bombay fusiliers (now the 1st battalion royal munster and 2nd battalion royal dublin fusiliers), with 2000 sepoys and 8 six-pounders, with 2 howitzers. the battle lasted from the 22nd till the morning of the 23rd june, and resulted in the dispersion of the enemy with a loss in killed and wounded on the british side of but seventy-two men. but though far reaching in its results, it,266 however decisive, cannot be classed among the great battles of history. the insignificant numbers of clive’s army on the one side, the treachery displayed by most of the great chieftains of surajah dowlah, even the small cost of the victory, show that the fighting itself could not have been severe. but for the disloyalty of mir jafar and others, the british army must have been driven into the river they had crossed in order to engage the enemy. had this been otherwise, the history of india might have been differently written. as it was, the moral effect was great. it was the first real military footing the british had in the indian peninsula. “it was plassy which forced her to become one of the main factors in the settlement of the burning eastern question; plassy which necessitated the conquest and colonisation of the cape of good hope, of the mauritius, and the protectorship over egypt.”

by 1761, therefore, the french power was but a name; and, reinforced now from home by three more battalions, of which the 79th was one, the british defeated the french at wandewash, where only european troops were engaged on the british side. there the old 79th behaved magnificently; and later on, the war led to the addition of the names of buxar and carnatic (as well as that of plassy) to the colours of the 103rd.

outline map of india.

if plassy had been the turning-point in the early days of british effort at conquest, so wandewash showed the natives the fighting strength of other foreign aspirants for political power in india besides france, and led as directly to the expulsion of the french from the indian peninsula, as did the capture of quebec settle for ever the rivalry for supreme power in north america. with this victory the fear of british power among the natives arose and strengthened. during all this time, the power of the east india company had been gradually extending, and in 1773 was appointed the first governor-general of india, warren hastings. meanwhile, as the years crept on, a new native state was rising, that would also seek by a french alliance to check the political advance of great britain in india.267 hyder ali, a mahometan chieftain in the army of mysore, had succeeded in establishing himself on the throne of his hindu predecessor. commanding an irregular army estimated at 150,000 men, he was disposed to be threatening; and on the principle of divide et impera, hastings proposed to play off, by alliance, the deccan and oudh against this new disturbing element, which was fast spreading its influence over western and northern india. in 1780 the chance arose. hyder took the offensive, defeated and massacred the small army under colonel baillie at conjeveram, and attacked madras, but he was checked finally by sir eyre coote, and in 1783 the general peace put an end to hostilities, though not for long, and though hyder himself was dead.

by this time the european army had slightly increased. to the troops already there had been added the 71st (then the 73rd), the 72nd (then the 78th), and the old 73rd, and a second battalion of the 42nd; and these had furnished the backbone of the resistance against hyder ali’s son tippoo saib.

there was hard fighting at mangalore, which gained for the 73rd the honour of bearing the name on its colours for bravery during the seven months of a dreadful siege; and against the french at cuddalore, where colonel wagenheim of the 15th hanoverian regiment made prisoner a young french sergeant, and, struck by his appearance, personally directed his wounds to be dressed. many years after, when the victorious french, under marshal bernadotte, entered hanover, wagenheim, by that time an aged general, attended his levée. bernadotte asked him if he recollected the wounded french sergeant to whom he had been so kind at cuddalore. the general replied in the affirmative. “that young sergeant,” replied the future king of sweden, “was the person who has now the honour to address you, and who rejoices in having this public opportunity of acknowledging his debt of gratitude to general wagenheim.”

here also were engaged some 300 marines under major monson, and in the ranks of his command served a certain hannah snell. “she behaved with conspicuous courage,268 and received a ball in the groin, which she herself extracted two days afterwards. eleven other wounds in both legs rendered her removal to the hospital at cuddalore absolutely necessary, and, having returned home, her sex was not discovered until she obtained her discharge. she afterwards wore the marine dress, and, having presented a petition to h.r.h. the duke of cumberland, obtained a pension of ￡30 a year for life.”

for a time hostilities languished, but they were resumed against the mysoreans in 1789, when cannanore was taken; and finally, in 1792, tippoo’s capital, seringapatam, fell, and his two sons were left as hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty of peace that followed.

all this led to increased interest in indian affairs by the home government, and a corresponding increase in the number of european troops employed. in india there were by now the 23rd light dragoons, a regiment of hanoverians, the 74th, 75th, 76th, and 77th regiments of the line, together with the 98th, and the european regiments of the east india company; so that in 1784 the white troops numbered nearly 18,000 men. hostilities recommenced in 1799 with tippoo, and this time finally. with all his savage cruelty, he was a man of some military genius, as far as his education went. he does not seem to have lacked personal bravery; and notwithstanding the want of communication with england, he watched with interest the contests his british enemy in india was waging elsewhere. he corresponded with the french authorities in mauritius; therefore, in 1797, with a view to a french alliance, he entered into negotiations with the nizam and the ameer of afghanistan to help him, as mahometans, against the “feringhi” foe. but the governor-general, lord mornington, was not prepared to wait till the war-clouds had fully gathered.

warning tippoo first, he assembled an army against him. the bombay troops, under stuart, were despatched to the coromandel coast; at malavelly, the madras army under haes, composed of sepoys stiffened by the 33rd regiment, at that time under the command of lieutenant-colonel269 arthur wellesley, won a victory; and finally, after a brief siege, seringapatam was carried by storm. here the flank companies of the 12th, 33rd, 73rd, and 74th gallantly led the way, supported by the 12th and 75th, some 1200 native infantry, and 1000 british and 1800 native cavalry; a force which, with 60 field and 40 siege guns and their crews, numbered nearly 22,000 men. two other armies co-operated more or less with the above; the one the troops of the nizam, with some sepoys, under wellesley, the other under stuart, formed of sepoys and 1600 europeans, including the old 103rd. the attack on seringapatam was made at night, and fiercely resisted, war rockets being freely used by the defenders. but the british troops were not to be denied. the place was carried with much slaughter, and tippoo fell, sword in hand, in the gateway of his capital, surrounded by his faithful followers, of whose dead bodies there lay seventy “in a space 4 yards wide by 12 long.”

it was to sir david baird that the chief credit of the assault was due, but none the less he was superseded in the government of the city by colonel wellesley, the brother of the governor-general. “and thus, before the sweat was dry on my brow, i was superseded by an inferior officer.” these are his own words. but he lived to do distinguished work later, in egypt, whither wellesley was to have gone also, had not fever checked him.

thus the whole kingdom of mysore was practically added to the increasing empire of great britain, but brought her into hostile contact with the empire of the mahrattas. this was founded by sivagi in the previous century, and extended from delhi to a tributary of the krishna, and from gujerat to the bay of bengal. its leading chieftains were, speaking generally, the peishwa at poona, the rajah of berar, scindia in the northern deccan, holkar about malwa, and the guikowar about gujerat. touching these were the tributary state of the nizam, the conquered mysore, and the rest of the carnatic and other territories that had succumbed to the growing land-hunger of the british company.

270 the former governor of seringapatam, now lord wellesley, was governor-general of india. the perpetual antagonism of the native rulers among themselves gave him the same opportunity of assisting the one against the other as had fallen to his predecessors. he availed himself of the political chance as they had, but not to the same extent. there was a greater knowledge arising of indian affairs, due possibly to the former action of warren hastings, and the prominency his impeachment by burke in the house of commons had given to these matters, and possibly also a growing popular interest in the political conduct of our rule in the great peninsula.

there was still the danger of french intervention and assistance. france, in those days, stood as an always possibly active opponent of the east india company, as russia does now of the imperial government of the same land.

wellesley’s policy was rather one of subsidised alliances with the native princes than the active assistance of one against the other in local wars. doubtless the practical result was much the same. the dominant power, in the long-run, absorbed the feeble units, to all intents and purposes, as fully as clive and his successors had by war brought vast territories under the british rule.

the peishwa made the first overtures. he wanted to regain his lost pre-eminence, and by the treaty of bassein it was agreed to restore him. “it was the greatest diplomatic triumph which the world has ever witnessed. on the eve of a contest impending, which could not have been long delayed, between the máráthá confederacy and the british, it broke up the máráthá confederacy, it relieved the english of the danger which had long threatened them of having to face at one and the same time the united power of a league whose territories comprehended the north-west provinces of india, central india, and the greater part of western india, and allowed them to meet and conquer each section of that league singly.”55

271 so the natural results followed. the rest of the mahratta leaders formed common cause against the peishwa and his new ally. they had, directly and indirectly, the assistance of their former ally, the french. scindia had the aid and counsel of perron, who had organised the former’s army after european methods. pondicherry, restored to france by the treaty of amiens, was a base of operations should that nation be at war with us, and had temporary command of the eastern seas. wellesley made the first move, and restored the peishwa by the capture of poona; but it was evident the “restoration” was but a sham.

for a combined movement was organised. wellesley took charge of the deccan, lake that of the ganges, while other minor columns, under stevenson, murray, campbell, and harcourt, threatened other points of the mahratta confederacy.

the struggle was of no long duration. wellesley and stevenson moved in two columns against scindia, and took ahmednuggur; but, unable to concentrate in time, only wellesley’s column was engaged in the battle of assaye that followed, so that only 4500 british troops were opposed to some 30,000 of the enemy. disproportionate as the numbers were, the soundest policy was to attack. to stand on the defensive would have been but to increase the enemy’s morale, and to betray a weakness, or rather a hesitation, that with asiatics is fatal. the battle was short, sanguinary, and successful. the mahrattas were badly beaten, a hundred guns being captured, but at a loss of some 600 killed, and 1500 wounded.

the 74th and 78th regiments bore the brunt of the battle, to the success of which the charge of the 19th light dragoons largely contributed. here it was that the general’s quick eye for ground was evidenced. with so small an army, to get protection for the flanks was essential, especially bearing in mind the threatening masses of the enemy’s cavalry. so, through noticing that there were two houses directly opposite to one another on either bank of the river krishna, he surmised that this indicated a ford, and, crossing272 there, advanced against the enemy with the flanks of his two lines resting on the river and a tributary stream. he recognised, too, that though weak in numbers and not concentrated, to fight was wiser than retreat, and that in such a terrain a small, determined, well-directed army could act victoriously, if vigorously handled, against an unwieldy mass, which such ground cramped. none the less it was running a grave risk; but his own coolness and steadiness, and, above all, his power of directing a battle, were never more clearly shown.

so the battle was won, and well won, by skill against the brute force of numbers. it was wellesley’s first battle as a general in command, and with the battle of argaum which followed, the mahratta power was completely broken. the war in south-west india was over.

meanwhile, lake had not been idle in the northern theatre of war. he had captured alighur, and had won a brilliant victory at delhi. his whole force there numbered but 4500 as against 13,000 infantry, 60 guns, and 6000 cavalry, led in many cases by french officers, but the infantry marched up to within eighty yards of the enemy with their “firelocks” at the shoulder, covered by the cavalry, who by a feigned retreat drew the enemy from his entrenchments, and then, wheeling to either flank, exposed the would-be pursuing enemy to the fire of the infantry line, which, having repulsed them, re-formed column for the cavalry to complete the rout. it is a very good illustration of the tactical formation of the time against such adversaries.

restoring shah allum to the throne of the moguls, lake speedily followed up his victory by seizing agra, and then still more decisively defeated scindia’s army at laswarree. in the preliminary skirmish the cavalry brigade, composed of the royal irish hussars, the 27th and 29th dragoons, and the native regiments, showed the greatest gallantry in checking the enemy’s retreat. during a long night march of nearly twenty-five miles, and in the battle itself, the 76th distinguished itself by its coolness and gallantry as throughout the campaign. the fighting in this battle showed more273 desperate tenacity than in any other previous battle in india. the loss to the british was about one-fifth of a force of some 4000 men, and the enemy stubbornly contested the ground, foot by foot and gun by gun. the operations of the other column had been equally successful, and though holkar still fought on, the war ceased in 1805, and cuttack was annexed. during these operations the 8th, 27th, and 29th light dragoons, and the 22nd, 65th, 75th, 76th, and 86th regiments had been employed in india. thus practically terminated wellesley’s active indian career; as did that of lake, not long after, by death.

to both men is largely due the extension of our own empire by the destruction of those of the indian princelets. lake’s bravery, his boldness even to rashness, is everywhere remarkable. on more than one occasion in this very war he had personally led the attacks, as wellesley had, in his battles, directed them. he “was a man whose influence with his soldiers was unbounded, whose calmness in danger, whose self-reliance, and whose power of commanding confidence have never been surpassed. he had but one way of dealing with the native armies of india, that of moving straight forward, of attacking them wherever he found them. he never was so great as on the battlefield. he could think more clearly under the roar of bullets than in the calmness and quiet of his tent. in this respect he resembled clive. it was this quality which enabled him to dare the almost impossible. that which in others would have been rash, in lake was prudent daring.”56

of course in all such cases much depends on the arms and tactical system of the adversary. with most, if not all, of the native levies it seems to have been an axiom to avoid a decisive engagement save in overwhelming numbers; and rather to seek, by retiring before and ravaging the country, to deprive the enemy of supplies, while at the same time his flank and rear were harassed by cavalry masses.

such seems to have been the tactical method of the armies both lake and wellesley had to meet. of lake’s274 own views in the matter there is nothing especially recorded; but of the last-mentioned general it is stated that he gave the following advice to his coadjutor in the mahratta war:—“suppose that you determine to have a brush with the enemy, do not attack their positions, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access, for which the banks of rivers afford them facilities. do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have entrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on the march to attack you, secure your baggage and move out of your camp. you will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. at all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they have not chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged, and you will gain an easy victory.”

this was sound advice, and obtained for many years after the writer had returned to europe, where this “general of sepoys,” as napoleon dubbed him, was to see harder work and a different style of fighting than assaye.

war broke out with the ghoorkas in nepal in 1813–15; other hostilities occurred with the pindari freebooters in 1815, when the enemy, arrogant and blustering, were defeated by the 24th, 66th, and 87th, with indian troops in addition under ochterlony, and converted into friends. they had no great opinion of us at first. we had “been driven from bhurtpore, which was the work of man: how should they then storm the mountain citadel, which was built by the hands of god?” but they took their punishment with good humour, and having appealed to china, as the suzerain power, to help them, after all requested our assistance if the relieving army entered their territories. thus this little frontier state of india first brought us within measureable distance of war with the celestial empire.

finally, there was fighting with the mahrattas again, at nagpore (where the second battalion of the royal scots behaved with exemplary steadiness), at maheidpore and275 corregaum, at soonee and talnere, and lastly, at the capture of the fortress of assirghur, “the gibraltar of the east.”

in this latter “affair,” the royal scots, the flank companies of the 38th, 67th, and madras european regiments, vied with each other in the siege and storm of this most formidable fortress. the result of all these operations was that the bulk of our late enemy’s possessions was annexed to the empire.

the strength of the european army, both imperial and local, had steadily grown. in 1817 there were four cavalry regiments, the 8th, 17th, 22nd, and 24th light dragoons, and the 7th, 8th, 14th, 65th, 67th, 87th, and 47th regiments of the line, serving in india.

with the exception of some punitive expeditions against the wahabees in the persian gulf, and against the kandians in ceylon, little occurred for many years, except the second and successful siege of bhurtpore; though the ameers of scinde were at times restless, and their action foreshadowed at no distant period a serious campaign.

but the capture of bhurtpore is an important epoch in our military history in india. it was the capital of the jauts, who boasted that neither the english nor the mogul had been able to subdue them. but their self-confidence had a rude awakening. for lord combermere assembled an army in november 1825, among which were the 11th dragoons, 16th lancers, and the 14th and 59th regiments, with the future 101st, and this force brilliantly carried the hitherto impregnable fortress by storm. the 16th lancers, who had only recently been armed with the lance, especially distinguished themselves, and slew or took prisoners 3000 cavalry and infantry of the enemy, when attempting to escape after the great breach was carried, this latter duty falling mainly to the 14th and 59th.

a curious bit of superstition gathers round the fall of bhurtpore. the native tradition was, that the place would only fall when an alligator, or kumbhir, “drank up the waters of the city ditch.” when, therefore, lord combermere invested the place, and, by cutting the banks of lake276 “mootee jheel,” prevented the ditch from being filled with water, the old prediction was in native eyes awfully fulfilled.

among the spoil, amounting in value to ￡500,000, was found, singularly enough, a small cannon of brass, bearing the inscription, “jacobus monteith me fecit, edinburgh, anno dom. 1642.”

this important victory not only confirmed the conquest of india, but, by wiping out the remembrance of lord lake’s failure to carry the place in 1805 with the flank companies of the 22nd, 57th, and 76th line regiments, and the company’s european regiment, it restored the british prestige among the natives, and prevented the occurrence of a general rising against our rule, which the absence of so large a number of troops in ava rendered possible, if not from positive dislike to us, from a desire for plunder. in this gallant siege hand grenades were used for the last time in india.