it has already been remarked, that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term. to be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct. but the former, being matters of fact, may be the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact—namely, our senses, and our internal consciousness. can an appeal be made to the same faculties on questions of practical ends? or by what other faculty is cognizance taken of them?

questions about ends are, in other words, questions what things are desirable. the utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. what ought to be required of this doctrine—what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil—to make good its claim to be believed?

the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. the only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. in like manner, i apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. if the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. this, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.

but it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion. to do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. they desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. the desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. and hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of approbation and disapprobation.

but does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? the very reverse. it maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to utility, not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner—as a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue. this opinion is not, in the smallest degree, a departure from the happiness principle. the ingredients of happiness are very various, and each of them is desirable in itself, and not merely when considered as swelling an aggregate. the principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. they are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness.

to illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. what, for example, shall we say of the love of money? there is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. it may be then said truly, that money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. from being a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of happiness. the same may be said of the majority of the great objects of human life—power, for example, or fame; except that to each of these there is a certain amount of immediate pleasure annexed, which has at least the semblance of being naturally inherent in them; a thing which cannot be said of money. still, however, the strongest natural attraction, both of power and of fame, is the immense aid they give to the attainment of our other wishes; and it is the strong association thus generated between them and all our objects of desire, which gives to the direct desire of them the intensity it often assumes, so as in some characters to surpass in strength all other desires. in these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a more important part of it than any of the things which they are means to. what was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness, has come to be desired for its own sake. in being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness. the person is made, or thinks he would be made, happy by its mere possession; and is made unhappy by failure to obtain it. the desire of it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music, or the desire of health. they are included in happiness. they are some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. and the utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their being so. life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity. virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. there was no original desire of it, or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. but through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good; and with this difference between it and the love of money, of power, or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested, love of virtue. and consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things important to the general happiness.

it results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. if one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for.

we have now, then, an answer to the question, of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible. if the opinion which i have now stated is psychologically true—if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. if so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is included in the whole.

and now to decide whether this is really so; whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the absence is a pain; we have evidently arrived at a question of fact and experience, dependent, like all similar questions, upon evidence. it can only be determined by practised self-consciousness and self-observation, assisted by observation of others. i believe that these sources of evidence, impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.

so obvious does this appear to me, that i expect it will hardly be disputed: and the objection made will be, not that desire can possibly be directed to anything ultimately except pleasure and exemption from pain, but that the will is a different thing from desire; that a person of confirmed virtue, or any other person whose purposes are fixed, carries out his purposes without any thought of the pleasure he has in contemplating them, or expects to derive from their fulfilment; and persists in acting on them, even though these pleasures are much diminished, by changes in his character or decay of his passive sensibilities, or are outweighed by the pains which the pursuit of the purposes may bring upon him. all this i fully admit, and have stated it elsewhere, as positively and emphatically as any one. will, the active phenomenon, is a different thing from desire, the state of passive sensibility, and though originally an offshoot from it, may in time take root and detach itself from the parent stock; so much so, that in the case of an habitual purpose, instead of willing the thing because we desire it, we often desire it only because we will it. this, however, is but an instance of that familiar fact, the power of habit, and is nowise confined to the case of virtuous actions. many indifferent things, which men originally did from a motive of some sort, they continue to do from habit. sometimes this is done unconsciously, the consciousness coming only after the action: at other times with conscious volition, but volition which has become habitual, and is put into operation by the force of habit, in opposition perhaps to the deliberate preference, as often happens with those who have contracted habits of vicious or hurtful indulgence. third and last comes the case in which the habitual act of will in the individual instance is not in contradiction to the general intention prevailing at other times, but in fulfilment of it; as in the case of the person of confirmed virtue, and of all who pursue deliberately and consistently any determinate end. the distinction between will and desire thus understood, is an authentic and highly important psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this—that will, like all other parts of our constitution, is amenable to habit, and that we may will from habit what we no longer desire for itself, or desire only because we will it. it is not the less true that will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire; including in that term the repelling influence of pain as well as the attractive one of pleasure. let us take into consideration, no longer the person who has a confirmed will to do right, but him in whom that virtuous will is still feeble, conquerable by temptation, and not to be fully relied on; by what means can it be strengthened? how can the will to be virtuous, where it does not exist in sufficient force, be implanted or awakened? only by making the person desire virtue—by making him think of it in a pleasurable light, or of its absence in a painful one. it is by associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of either pleasure or pain. will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit. that which is the result of habit affords no presumption of being intrinsically good; and there would be no reason for wishing that the purpose of virtue should become independent of pleasure and pain, were it not that the influence of the pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring constancy of action until it has acquired the support of habit. both in feeling and in conduct, habit is the only thing which imparts certainty; and it is because of the importance to others of being able to rely absolutely on one's feelings and conduct, and to oneself of being able to rely on one's own, that the will to do right ought to be cultivated into this habitual independence. in other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.

but if this doctrine be true, the principle of utility is proved. whether it is so or not, must now be left to the consideration of the thoughtful reader.