further difficulties in prosecuting the war.
emigrants under captain morrison—feeling among the regular troops—they detest the practice of catching negroes—another party emigrate—still further emigration—situation of the exiles—deep depravity of the administration—general mccomb’s treaty—his general order—peace cheers the nation—citizens of florida return to their homes—administration congratulates its friends—more murders perpetrated—planters flee to villages for protection—massacre of colonel harney’s party—indians seized at fort mellon—exiles refuse to participate in those massacres—they would make no treaty—administration paralyzed—report of secretary of war—its character—barbarous sentiments of governor reid—resolution of legislature of florida in favor of employing blood-hounds—original object in obtaining them—the effort proves a failure—general taylor retires from command of army—is succeeded by general armistead.
we now resume our chronological narration of events connected with the exiles of florida, during the year 1838.
on the fourteenth of june, captain morrison arrived at new orleans from tampa bay in charge of some three hundred indians and thirty negroes, on their way to the west; he having been assigned to that particular duty. these indians and exiles had most of them come to fort jupiter by advice of the cherokees, and surrendered under the capitulation of march, 1837. at the time they reached new orleans, lieutenant reynolds was absent with his first emigrating party; and the thirty-one negroes left at new orleans were at that time in the hands of the sheriff. captain morrison felt it his duty to hasten the emigration of those whom he had in charge, and on the sixteenth, he left that city with his prisoners for the indian country without waiting the return of lieutenant reynolds. on reaching fort gibson, he delivered them over to the officer acting as seminole agent for the western country, and they soon rejoined their friends who were located on the cherokee lands.
it may not be improper to state, that, in several of our recent chapters, we have quoted from official documents pretty freely, for the reason that many living statesmen, as well as many who have passed to their final rest, were deeply involved in those transactions, and we desired to make them speak for themselves as far as the documents would enable us to do so. but as we have narrated most of the scenes involving individuals in transactions of such deep moral turpitude, we hope to be more brief in our future history.
when general taylor assumed the command of the army, there was a feeling of deep disgust prevalent among the regular troops at the practice of seizing and enslaving the exiles.
we have already noticed the fact, that the citizens of florida supposed the war to have been commenced principally to enable them to get possession of negroes whom they might enslave. indeed, they appear not to have regarded it as material, that the claimant should have previously owned the negro. if they once obtained control of his person, he was hurried into the interior of georgia, alabama, or south carolina, where he was sold and held as a slave. and the florida volunteers, while nominally in service, appear to have been far more anxious to catch negroes than to meet the enemy in battle.
this feeling was so general among the people and troops of florida, that general call, governor of the territory, recommended to the secretary of war that military expeditions should be fitted out for the purpose of going into the indian country, in order to capture negroes, who, when captured, should be sold, and the avails of such sales applied to defray the expenses of the war.
it is easy to see that this feeling would lead the regular troops to entertain great contempt for the volunteers of florida; and a corresponding feeling of hostility would arise on the part of such volunteers toward the regular troops.
these feelings operated upon president jackson in ordering the withdrawal of general scott; and general jessup sought to appease this hostility by obeying the dictates of the slave power. indeed, whatever appears like a violation of pledged faith, or bears the evidence of treachery on the part of general jessup, may probably with great justice be attributed to the popular sentiment of the territory. he had assiduously captured, and delivered over to bondage, hundreds of persons whom he had most solemnly covenanted to “protect in their persons and property.”
general taylor discarded this entire policy. his first efforts were to make the indians and exiles understand that he sought their emigration to the western country, for the advancement of their own interest and happiness. owing to these circumstances there was scarcely any blood shed in florida while he had command. the army was no longer employed to hunt and to chase down women and children, who had been reared in freedom among the hommocks and everglades of that territory.
there were yet remaining several small bands of indians upon the appalachicola river, and in its vicinity. most of the exiles who had a few years previously resided with these bands, had been captured by pirates from georgia, and taken to the interior of that state and sold, as the reader has been already informed. those of e-con-chattimico’s and of blunt’s and of walker’s bands were nearly all kidnapped; but of the number of exiles who remained with the other remnants of indian tribes, resident upon the appalachicola river, we have no reliable information. we are left in doubt on this point, as general taylor drew no distinctions among his prisoners; he neither constituted himself nor his officers a tribunal for examining the complexion or the pedigree of his captives. he denied the right of any citizen to inspect the people captured by the army under his command, or to interfere in any way with the disposal of his prisoners. he repaired to the apalachee towns with a small force about the first of october. neither the indians nor exiles made any resistance; nor did they oppose emigration. they readily embarked for new orleans on their way westward. their emigration was not delayed in order to give planters an opportunity to examine the negroes. under the general term of “apalachees,” two hundred and twenty persons were quietly emigrated to the western country; but, as we have already stated, how many of them were negroes, we have no information. these people were also delivered over to the agent, acting for the western indians, and settled with their brethren upon the cherokee lands.
general taylor now entered upon a new system for prosecuting the war, by establishing posts and manning them, and by assigning to each a particular district of country, over which their scouts and patroles were to extend their daily reconnoisances.
1839.
small parties of indians and negroes occasionally came in at different posts, and surrendered under the articles of capitulation of march, 1837; and, on the twenty-fifth of february, one hundred and ninety-six indians and negroes were embarked at tampa bay for the western country. but the proportion of negroes, compared with the whole number, is not stated in any official report. general taylor, in his communications, speaks of them as prisoners, and occasionally uses the terms “indians and negroes”.
thus, in less than a year, general taylor shipped more than four hundred prisoners for the western country without bloodshed. these prisoners were also delivered over to the indian agent of the western country, and immediately reunited with their brethren already located on the cherokee lands. there were, at that time, a colony of more than sixteen hundred of these people living upon the territory assigned to the cherokees. they were without homes, or a country of their own: whereas the government had constantly held out to them the assurance that, if they emigrated west, they should have a country assigned to their separate use, on which they could repose in safety.
at this point in our history, mr. van buren’s administration exhibited its deepest depravity. since the ratification of the supplemental treaty of 1833, the executive, through all its officers, had assured the indians and exiles that they should enjoy its full benefits, by having a territory set off to their separate use, where they could live independent of creek laws. under these assurances they had received the pledged faith of the nation, that they should be protected by the united states in their persons and property.
with these pledges, and with these expectations, a weak and friendless people had emigrated to that western region; and when thus separated from their friends and country, with the slave-catching vultures of the creek nation watching and intending to make them their future victims, the president deliberately refused to abide by either the treaty or the articles of capitulation. he left them unprotected, without homes, and without a country which they could call their own. true, many of them had been betrayed, treacherously seized and compelled to emigrate; but this was done in violation of the existing treaty and pledged faith of the nation, which they were constantly assured should be faithfully observed; and these circumstances enhanced the guilt of those who wielded the executive power to oppress them.
major general mccomb arrived in florida (may 20) for the purpose of effecting a new treaty with the seminoles upon the basis of permitting them to remain in their native land. the war had been waged with the intent and for the purpose of compelling the indians to emigrate west and settle with the creeks, and become subject to the creek laws. it had continued three years at a vast expenditure of treasure and of national reputation. many valuable lives had also been sacrificed; and, although some two thousand indians and exiles had emigrated west, not one exile had settled in the creek country, or become subject to creek laws. some hundreds had been enslaved and sold in florida, georgia, alabama and south carolina; but a remnant of that people, numbering some hundreds, yet maintained their liberties against all the machinations and efforts of government to re?nslave them.[122]
the vast expenditure of national treasure had called forth severe animadversion in congress; while the entire policy of the slave power forbid all explanation of the real cause of this war, and of the objects for which its prosecution was continued.
thus, while the nation was involved in a most expensive and disastrous contest for the benefit of slavery, the house of representatives had adopted resolutions for suppressing all discussion and all agitation of questions relating to that institution.
general scott, a veteran officer of our army, had exhausted his utmost science; had put forth all his efforts to conquer this indomitable people; or rather to subdue the love of liberty, the independence of thought and of feeling, which stimulated them to effort; but he had failed. the power of our army, aided by deception, fraud and perfidy, had been tried in vain. general jessup, the most successful officer who had commanded in florida, had advised peace upon the precise terms which the allies demanded at the commencement of the war; and general mccomb, commander-in-chief of the army of the united states, was now commissioned to negotiate peace on those terms. but the first difficulty was to obtain a hearing with the chiefs who remained in florida, in order to enter upon negotiations touching a pacification. to effect this object, recourse was had to a negro, one of the exiles who knew general taylor, and in whom general taylor confided. at the request of general mccomb, this man was dispatched with a friendly message to several chiefs, requesting them to come into the american camp for the purpose of negotiation. his mission proved successful. a council of several chiefs, and some forty head men and warriors, was convened at fort king, on the sixteenth of may, 1839, and the terms of peace agreed upon; but no treaty appears to have been drawn up in form. on the eighteenth of may, general mccomb, at fort king, his head-quarters, issued the following general orders:
“head quarters of the army of the united states,}
fort king, florida, may 18, 1839. }
“the major general, commanding in chief, has the satisfaction of announcing to the army in florida, to the authorities of the territory, and to the citizens generally, that he has this day terminated the war with the seminole indians by an agreement entered into with chitto-tustenuggee, principal chief of the seminoles and successor to arpeika, commonly called sam. jones, brought to this post by lieutenant colonel harney, 2d dragoons, from the southern part of the peninsula. the terms of the agreement are—that hostilities immediately cease between the parties; that the troops of the united states and the seminole and mickasukie chiefs and warriors, now at a distance, be made acquainted with the fact, that peace exists, and that all hostilities are forthwith to cease on both sides—the seminoles and mickasukies agreeing to retire into a district of country in florida, below pease creek, the boundaries of which are as follows: viz, beginning at the most southern point of land between charlotte harbor and the sanybel or cooloosahatchee river, opposite to sanybel island; thence into charlotte harbor by the southern pass between pine island and that point along the eastern shore of said harbor to toalkchopko or pease creek; thence up said creek to its source; thence easterly to the northern point of lake istokopoga; thence along the eastern outlet of said lake, called istokopoga creek, to the kissimee river; thence southerly down the kissimee to lake okeechobee; thence south through said lake to ecahlahatohee or shark river; thence down said river westwardly to its mouth; thence along the seashore northwardly to the place of beginning; that sixty days be allowed the indians, north and east of that boundary, to remove their families and effects into said district, where they are to remain until further arrangements are made under the protection of the troops of the united states, who are to see that they are not molested by intruders, citizens or foreigners; and that said indians do not pass the limits assigned them, except to visit the posts, which will be hereafter indicated to them. all persons are, therefore, forbidden to enter the district assigned to the indians without written permission of some commanding officer of a military post.”
“by command of the general: alexander mccomb,
major general commanding.
edmond shriver,
captain and a. a. general.”
the country now again rejoiced at what the people regarded as the restoration of peace. by the terms agreed upon, the indians retained as large a territory in proportion to the number left in florida as was held by them at the commencement of the war.
the people of florida had originally petitioned general jackson for the forcible removal of the indians, because they would not seize and bring in their fugitive slaves. they had protested against peace upon any terms that should leave the negroes, whom they claimed, in the indian country. these citizens of florida had long since been driven from their homes and firesides by the enemy whom they so much despised; and they now desired peace. the indians and exiles were also anxious to cultivate corn and potatoes for the coming winter, and were glad to be able to do so in peace.
thus, the people of florida, as they supposed, in perfect safety, returned to their plantations, and resumed their former habits of life. and the political party in possession of the government, congratulated themselves and the country upon the fortunate conclusion of a war which had involved them in difficulties that were inexplicable.
but this quiet continued for a short time only. early in july, travelers and express-riders were killed by small parties of indians; plantations were attacked and the occupants murdered; buildings burned and crops destroyed; families fled from their homes, leaving all their property, in order to assemble in villages in such numbers as to insure safety to their persons; and the florida war again raged with accumulated horrors. as an illustration of the manner in which it was carried on, we quote the following:
“assistant adjutant general’s office, army of the south,}
fort brooke, east florida, july 29, 1839. }
“sir: it becomes my painful duty to inform you of the assassination of the greater part of lieutenant colonel harney’s detachment, by the indians, on the morning of the 23d instant, on the coloosahatchee river, where they had gone, in accordance with the treaty at fort king, to establish a trading-house. the party consisted of about twenty-eight men, armed with colt’s rifles; they were encamped on the river, but unprotected by defenses of any kind, and, it is said, without sentinels. the indians, in large force, made the attack before the dawn of day, and before reveillé; and it is supposed that thirteen of the men were killed, among whom were major dalham and mr. morgan, sutlers. the remainder, with colonel harney, escaped, several of them severely wounded. it was a complete surprise. the commanding general, therefore, directs that you instantly take measures to place the defenses at fort mellon in the most complete state of repair, and be ready at all times to repel attack, should one be made. no portion of your command will, in future, be suffered to leave the garrison except under a strong escort. the detachment will be immediately withdrawn. should fort mellon prove unhealthy, and the surgeon recommend its abandonment, you are authorized to transfer the garrison, and reinforce some of the neighboring posts.
“i am, sir,
geo. h. griffin,
assistant adjutant general.
lieutenant w. k. hanson,
commanding at fort mellon.”
the indians killed ten men belonging to the military service, and eight citizens, employed by the sutlers; while colonel harney and fourteen others escaped. the indians obtained fourteen rifles, six carbines, some three or four kegs of powder, and about three thousand dollars worth of goods.
lieutenant hanson, commanding at fort mellon, on receiving the order which we have quoted, seized some thirty indians at that time visiting fort mellon, and sent them immediately to charleston, south carolina; whence they were embarked for the indian country, west of arkansas, where they joined their brethren, who still resided upon the cherokee territory.
in these transactions, the exiles who remained in florida appear to have taken no part, at least so far as we are informed. they labored to obtain the treaty of peace; but such was the treachery with which they had been treated, that they would not subject themselves to the power of the white people, and were not of course present at the treaty; nor were they recognized by general mccomb as a party to the treaty, or in any way interested in its provisions. indeed, we are led to believe that general mccomb adopted the policy on which general taylor usually practiced, of recognizing no distinctions among prisoners or enemies.
the administration appeared to be paralyzed under this new demonstration of the power and madness of the seminoles. at the commencement of the war, some officers had estimated the whole number of seminoles at fifteen hundred, and the negroes as low as four hundred. they had now sent some two thousand indians and negroes to the western country; and yet those left in florida, renewed the war with all the savage barbarity which had characterized the seminoles in the days of their greatest power. indeed, they exhibited no signs of humiliation.
the secretary of war, mr. poinsett, a south carolinian, probably exerted more influence with the president in regard to this war than any other officer of government. his predecessor, general cass, had treated the exiles as mere chattels, having “no rights.” he had advised the employment of creek indians, giving them such negroes as they might capture; he had officially approved the contract made with them by general jessup. after he left the office, his successor, mr. poinsett, approved the order purchasing some ninety of them on account of government. he had advised watson to purchase them; had done all in his power to consign them to slavery in georgia. he was, however, constrained to make an official report upon the state of this war, at the opening of the first session of the twenty-sixth congress, which assembled on the first monday of december, 1839.
that report, when considered in connection with the events which gave character to the florida war, constitutes a most extraordinary paper. notwithstanding all the difficulties which he had encountered in his efforts to enslave the exiles, to prevent at least ninety of them from going west, and the complaints of the seminoles who had emigrated to the western country, at finding themselves destitute of homes and of territory on which to settle, he made no allusion to their troubles; nor did he give any intimation of the difficulties arising on account of the exiles; nor did he even intimate that such a class of people existed in florida.
1840.
he declared the result of general mccomb’s negotiation had been the loss of many valuable lives. “our people (said he) fell a sacrifice to their confidence in the good faith and promises of the indians, and were entrapped and murdered with all the circumstances of cruelty and treachery which distinguish indian warfare. * * * the experience of the last summer brings with it the painful conviction, that the war must be prosecuted until florida is freed from these ruthless savages. their late, cruel and treacherous conduct is too well known to require a repetition of the revolting recital; it has been such as is calculated to deprive them of the sympathy of the humane, and convince ‘the most peaceable of the necessity of subduing them by force.”
it appeared necessary to raise the cry of treachery and cruelty against the indians and exiles. they had no friend who was acquainted with the facts, that could call attention of the nation to the treachery which had been practiced on them by the order, and with the approval, of the secretary of war. no man was able to say how many fathers and mothers and children were, by the influence of that officer, consigned to a fate far more cruel than that which awaited the men, under colonel harney, at coloosahatchee.
in his report the secretary most truly remarked: “if the indians of florida had a country to retire to, they would have been driven out of the territory long ago; but they are hemmed in by the sea, and must defend themselves to the uttermost, or surrender to be transported beyond it.” and he might well have added: when they shall be thus transported, they will have no country—no home. indeed, the whole report shows that he relied on physical force to effect an extermination of the indians and their allies; he looked not to justice, nor to the power of truth, for carrying out the designs of the executive.
men in power appear to forget that justice sits enthroned above all human greatness; that it is omnipotent, and will execute its appropriate work upon mankind. thus, while the people of florida and georgia had provoked the war, by kidnapping and enslaving colored men and women, to whom they had no more claim than they had to the people of england; while they had sent their petition to general jackson, asking him to compel the indians to seize and bring in their negroes, and had protested against the peace negotiated by general jessup, in 1837;—mr. reid, governor of florida, in an official message to the territorial legislature, in december, 1839, used language so characteristic of those who supported the florida war, that we feel it just to him and his coadjutors to give the following extract:
“the efforts of the general and territorial governments to quell the indian disturbances which have prevailed through four long years, have been unavailing, and it would seem that the prophecy of the most sagacious leader of the indians will be more than fulfilled; the close of the fifth year will still find us struggling in a contest remarkable for magnanimity, forbearance and credulity on the one side, and ferocity and bad faith on the other. we are waging a war with beasts of prey; the tactics that belong to civilized nations are but shackles and fetters in its prosecution; we must fight ‘fire with fire;’ the white man must, in a great measure, adopt the mode of warfare pursued by the red man, and we can only hope for success by continually harrassing and pursuing the enemy. if we drive him from hommock to hommock, from swamp to swamp, and penetrate the recesses where his women and children are; if, in self-defense, we show as little mercy to him as he has shown to us, the anxiety and surprise produced by such operations will not fail, it is believed, to produce prosperous results. it is high time that sickly sentimentality should cease. ‘lo, the poor indian!’ is the exclamation of the fanatic, pseudo-philanthropist; ‘lo, the poor white man!’ is the ejaculation which all will utter who have witnessed the inhuman butchery of women and children, and the massacres that have drenched the territory in blood.
“in the future prosecution of the war, it is important that a generous confidence should be reposed in the general government. it may be that mistakes and errors have been committed on all hands; but the peculiar adaptation of the country to the cowardly system of the foe, and its inaptitude to the operations of a regular army; the varying and often contradictory views and opinions of the best informed of our citizens, and the embarrassments which these cases must have produced to the authorities at washington, furnish to the impartial mind some excuse, at least, for the failures which have hitherto occurred. it is our duty to be less mindful of the past than the future. convinced that the present incumbent of the presidential chair regards with sincere and intense interest the afflictions we endure; relying upon the patriotism, talent and sound judgment of the distinguished carolinian who presides over the department of war, and confident in the wisdom of congress, let us prepare to second, with every nerve, the measures which may be devised for our relief. feeling as we do the immediate pressure of circumstances, let us exert, to the extremest point, all our powers to rid us of the evil by which we are oppressed. let us, by a conciliatory course, endeavor to allay any unkindnesses of feeling which may exist between the united states army and the militia of florida, and by union of sentiment among ourselves, advance the happy period when the territory shall enjoy what she so much needs—a long season of peace and tranquillity.”
perhaps no vice is more general among mankind than a desire to represent ourselves, and our country and government, to mankind and to posterity as just and wise, whatever real truth may dictate. surely, if general jessup’s official reports be regarded as correct, the people of florida should have been the last of all who were concerned in that war, to claim the virtue of magnanimity or forbearance, or to charge the seminoles or exiles with ferocity or bad faith. the expression that “it is high time that sickly sentimentality should cease,” manifests the ideas which he entertained of strict, equal and impartial justice to all men.
this message was an appropriate introduction to the legislative action which immediately succeeded its publication. it was that legislative body which first gave official sanction to the policy of obtaining blood-hounds from cuba to aid our troops in the prosecution of this war. of this atrocious and barbarous policy much has been said and written, and its authorship charged upon various men and officers of government. at the time of the transaction, it was represented that the blood-hounds were obtained for the purpose of trailing the indians, and historians have so stated;[123] but for various reasons, we are constrained to believe they were obtained for the purpose of trailing negroes. it was well known that these animals were trained to pursue negroes, and only negroes. they would no more follow the track of a white man than they would that of a horse or an ox. it was the peculiar scent of the negro that they had been trained and accustomed to follow. no man concerned in obtaining these animals, could have been ignorant that they had, in all probability, never seen an indian, or smelt the track of any son of the forest.
every slaveholder well understood the habits of those ferocious dogs, and the manner of training them, and could not have supposed them capable of being rendered useful in capturing indians. the people of florida appear to have been stimulated in the commencement and continuance of this war solely by a desire to obtain slaves, rather than to fight indians; and while acting as militia or as individuals, they were far more efficient in capturing negroes and claiming those captured by other troops than in facing them on the field of battle. nor can we resist the conviction, that catching negroes constituted, in the mind of general jessup, the object for which those animals were to be obtained. such was evidently his purpose when he wrote colonel harney, as quoted in a former chapter, “if you see powell (osceola), tell him that i intend to send exploring and surveying parties into every part of the country during the summer; and that i shall send out and take all the negroes who belong to white people, and he must not allow the indians or indian negroes to mix with them. tell him i am sending to cuba for blood-hounds to trail them, and i intend to hang every one of them who does not come in.”
we cannot close our eyes to the fact, that general jessup intended the blood-hounds to be used in catching “the negroes belonging to the white people,” as he said. those white people were mostly slaveholders of florida; those who proposed in the legislative assembly of that territory the obtaining of the animals, and adopted a resolution authorizing their purchase. they did not wait for the president to act, nor for the “secretary of war,” whom the governor of florida characterized as “that distinguished carolinian” on whose judgment and patriotism the people of florida so much relied.[124]
by resolution, colonel fitzpatrick was “authorized to proceed to havana, and procure a kennel of blood-hounds, noted for tracking and pursuing negroes.” he was fortunate in his mission. he not only obtained the animals, but he accomplished the journey, and reached st. augustine as early as the sixth of january, 1840, with a reinforcement for the army of the united states of thirty-three blood-hounds well trained to the work of catching negroes. they cost precisely one hundred and fifty-one dollars seventy-two cents, each, when landed in florida. he also procured five spaniards who were accustomed to using the animals in capturing negroes; and as the dogs had been trained to the spanish language, they would have been useless under the control of persons who could only speak the dialect of our own country.
the very general error that existed throughout the country, at the time of this transaction, arose from a misapprehension of the facts. there had been much said in regard to these blood-hounds before they were actually obtained. when the report of the war department, under the resolution of the house of representatives of the twenty-eighth of january, 1839, was published, containing the letter of general jessup addressed to colonel harney, which we have quoted, many members of congress appeared indignant at what they regarded as a stain upon our national honor in obtaining and employing blood-hounds to act in concert with our troops and our indian allies in this war. party feelings ran high, and southern members of congress, who were acting with the whig party, were willing to seize upon any circumstance that would reflect discreditably upon the then existing administration.
on the twenty-seventh day of december, 1839, the hon. henry a. wise, a member of the house of representatives from virginia, addressed a letter to the secretary of war, inquiring as to facts relating to the employment of blood-hounds in aid of our troops.[125]
to this letter mr. poinsett, the secretary of war, replied on the thirtieth of december, as follows:
“war department, december 20, 1839.
“sir: i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the twenty-seventh instant, inquiring into the truth of the assertion made by the public papers, that the government had determined to use blood-hounds in the war against the florida indians; and beg to assure you it will give me great pleasure to give you all the information on this subject in possession of the department.
“from the time i first entered upon the duties of the war department, i continued to receive letters from officers commanding in florida, as well as from the most enlightened citizens in that territory, urging the employment of blood-hounds as the most efficient means of terminating the atrocities daily perpetrated by the indians on the settlers in that territory. to these proposals no answer was given, until in the month of august, 1838, while at the virginia springs, there was referred to me, from the department, a letter, addressed to the adjutant general by the officer commanding the forces in florida (general taylor), to the following effect:
“head quarters army of the south,}
fort brooke, july 28, 1838. }
“sir: i have the honor to inclose you a communication this moment received, on the subject of procuring blood-hounds from the island of cuba to aid the army in its operations against the hostiles in florida. i am decidedly in favor of the measure, and beg leave to urge it as the only means of ridding the country of the indians, who are now broken up into small parties that take shelter in swamps and hommocks, making it impossible for us to follow or overtake them without the aid of such auxiliaries. should this measure meet the approbation of the department, and the necessary authority be granted, i will open a correspondence with mr. evertson on the subject, through major hunt, assistant quarter master at savannah, and will authorize him, if it can be done on reasonable terms, to employ a few dogs with persons who understand their management.
“i wish it distinctly understood, that my object in employing dogs is only to ascertain where the indians can be found, not to worry them.
“i have the honor to be, sir,
your obedient servant,
z. taylor,
brev. brig. gen. u. s. a. commanding.
general r. jones,
washington, d. c.”
“on this letter i indorsed the following decision, which was communicated to general taylor: ‘i have always been of opinion that dogs ought to be employed in this warfare to protect the army from surprises and ambuscades, and to track the indian to his lurking place; but supposed if the general believed them to be necessary, he would not hesitate to take measures to secure them. the cold-blooded and inhuman murders lately perpetrated upon helpless women and children by these ruthless savages, render it expedient that every possible means should be resorted to, in order to protect the people of florida, and to enable the united states forces to follow and capture or destroy the savage and unrelenting foe. general taylor is therefore authorized to procure such number of dogs as he may judge necessary: it being expressly understood that they are to be employed to track and discover the indians, not to worry or destroy them.’
“this is the only action or correspondence, on the part of the department, that has ever taken place in relation to the matter. the general took no measures to carry into effect his own recommendation, and this department has never since renewed the subject. i continue, however, to entertain the opinion expressed in the above decision. i do not believe that description of dog, called the blood-hound, necessary to prevent surprise or track the indian murderer; but still i think that every cabin, every military post, and every detachment, should be attended by dogs. that precaution might have saved dade’s command from massacre, and by giving timely warning have prevented many of the cruel murders which have been committed by the indians in middle florida. the only successful pursuit of indian murderers that i know of, was, on a late occasion, when the pursuers were aided by the sagacity of their dogs. these savages had approached a cabin of peaceful and industrious settlers so stealthily, that the first notice of their presence was given by a volley from their rifles, thrust between the logs of the house; and the work of death was finished by tomahawking the women, after tearing from them their infant children, and dashing their brains out against the door posts.
“are these ruthless savages to escape and repeat such scenes of blood, because they can elude our fellow citizens in florida, and our regular soldiers, and baffle their unaided efforts to overtake or discover them? on a late occasion, three of our estimable citizens were killed in the immediate neighborhood of st. augustine, and one officer of distinguished merit mortally wounded. it is in evidence, that these murders were committed by two indians, who, after shooting down the father and beating out the son’s brains with the butts of their rifles, upon hearing the approach of the volunteers, retired a few yards into the woods and secreted themselves, until the troops returned to town with the dead bodies of those who had been thus inhumanly and wantonly butchered.
“it is to be regretted that this corps had not been accompanied with one or two hunters, who, with their dogs, might have tracked the blood-stained footsteps of those indians; have restored to liberty the captives they were dragging away with them, and have prevented them from ever again repeating such atrocities; nor could the severest casuist object to our fellow citizens in florida resorting to such measures, in order to protect the lives of their women and children.”
“very respectfully,
your most obedient servant,
j. r. poinsett.
hon. henry a. wise,
house of representatives.”
it is no part of our present duties to comment on the code of morals which the secretary of war had adopted. he undoubtedly felt, that neither the indians nor negroes “possessed any rights which white men were bound to respect.” he was not, he could not, have been ignorant of the cold-blooded massacre of nearly three hundred exiles and indians at blount’s fort, in 1816; nor of the manner in which the present war had been brought on; nor of the objects for which it was prosecuted; nor does it appear possible that he, a large slaveholder of south carolina, could have expected these blood-hounds would follow the trail of indians. but we must bear in mind that he had been exceedingly vexed with the indomitable resistance of the exiles. they appeared perfectly determined not to be enslaved, and that determination had given him much trouble; and he must have foreseen the defeat of his party in the next presidential contest, should all these facts become known to the public. with these feelings, he was prepared to apply almost any epithets to the indians, as the friends and allies of a people to whose real character he dared not publicly allude, although they were occasioning the administration so much trouble.
having shown that no blood-hounds had been previously employed, he proceeded to argue the propriety of employing them in future, by adopting the policy proposed by the legislature of florida, who, as we have already seen, had taken measures to obtain them some twenty days prior to the date of this communication.
the secretary of war thus exonerated himself and the federal executive from the responsibility of employing blood-hounds, on the thirtieth of december; and the animals arrived in florida, under charge of colonel fitzpatrick, just one week subsequently to that date.
one feature was most obvious, in the commencement and prosecution of this war: we allude to the very respectful, almost obsequious obedience of the executive to the popular feeling in favor of slavery, in every part of the country where that institution existed. this war had been commenced at the instance of the people of florida. general jessup attempted to change the articles of capitulation which he had signed, when the people of florida protested against peace, unless attended by a restoration of slaves; and now, when the popular voice of the nation had paralyzed the executive arm in regard to obtaining blood-hounds, the people of florida, in their legislature, took up the subject and carried the policy into practice, so far as to obtain the animals; but that would be of no use unless they could be employed by the army of the united states. preparatory to this adoption of the purchase made by the legislature of florida, mr. poinsett had argued the propriety of their employment, in his letter to mr. wise; and twenty-six days afterwards, he wrote general taylor as follows:
“war department, jan’y 26, 1840.
“sir: it is understood by the department, although not officially informed of the fact, that the authorities of the territory have imported a pack of blood-hounds from the island of cuba. and i think it proper to direct, in the event of those dogs being employed by any officer or officers under your command, that their use be confined altogether to tracking the indians; and in order to insure this, and to prevent the possibility of their injuring any person whatever, that they be muzzled and held with a leash while following the track of the enemy.
“very respectfully,
your most obedient servant,
j. r. poinsett.
brig. gen’l z. taylor,
com’d’g army of the south, florida.”
from the commencement of this war, the officers of our army had found it necessary to employ persons who could communicate with the indians in their own tongue. this was usually done through negroes, who could safely approach both exiles and indians; they were, in fact, the only class of persons who could safely go from our posts to those of the enemy. no indians could do it unless by arrangement made through those negroes; inasmuch as creeks, chickasaws and choctaws were employed to act with our troops in hunting down the seminoles, who shot those creeks, choctaws and chickasaws, when opportunity permitted, with just as little ceremony as they did white men.
when those negroes visited the seminoles, they were supposed to convey to them as accurate intelligence in regard to our troops, as they brought back respecting the enemy’s forces; they were, therefore, supposed to have put their brethren, the exiles, upon their guard in respect to the blood-hounds. understanding perfectly the nature and education of those animals, it does not appear very extraordinary to us that the exiles remained for a time in the interior, where neither blood-hounds nor civilized troops were accustomed to penetrate. this policy of the exiles rendered useless the whole expenditure of money and honor, made in the purchase of blood-hounds and spaniards, with a view to their capture.
but the animals had been obtained, and authority given to our officers to employ them. the spaniards attended them. the dogs were attached to different regiments, and fed liberally on bloody meat; young calves were provided, and driven with each scouting party, to supply food for them. the spaniards were supplied with a sufficient number of assistants to keep the dogs in their leashes. thus provided, several parties, composed of regular troops, militia, indians, spaniards, dogs and calves, started for the interior. their marches continued in some instances for days before they found even the track of an enemy; but when they found foot-prints of indians, and the dogs were looked to with confidence to lead on the warlike host, while some more humble officer, following the canine leaders, spaniards and indians, was expected to bear aloft the glorious stars and stripes, as they engaged in deadly conflict with the wily foe;—lo! just at that moment, when all hearts were palpitating; while hope was at its height; when the stern resolve clothed each brow with the dark scowl of battle, the dogs were blithe and frolicsome, but paid no more attention to the tracks of the indians than to those of the ponies on which they sometimes rode.
this grand experiment for closing the florida war was now pronounced a dead failure; and the use of dogs, and calves, and spaniards, was discarded; and the whole affair served no other purpose than to bring odium upon the administration, and ridicule upon the officers who proposed the employment of blood-hounds to act as allies of the american army.
general taylor, having had command of the army in florida nearly two years, and the sickly season having commenced, requested to be relieved from that responsible station. his request was granted, and he left florida for his plantation in louisiana. brevet brigadier general armistead, by order of the war department, assumed the position from which general taylor retired.
