general jessup overthrows his own efforts in favor of peace.

mr. van buren’s advent to the office of president—follows the policy of his predecessor—general jessup’s stipulation in favor of the exiles—sustained by precedent, and by national law—not contrary to general jackson’s object in commencing the war—citizens of florida protest—compact ratified by war department—general jessup for a time endeavors to carry out articles of capitulation—begins to yield—promises to make arrangements with chiefs to deliver up slaves who had left their masters during the war—then declared he had done so—no such compact found by the author—subsequent history shows that he had made such arrangement, by parol, with co-hadjo only—he also uses army to seize and return exiles claimed by citizens of florida—revokes order no. 79—indians and exiles take alarm—flee to their fastnesses—general jessup acknowledges all is lost—the war renewed.

on the fourth of march, mr. van buren assumed the duties of president of the united states, and general jackson retired to private life. belonging to the same political party to which general jackson had attached himself, mr. van buren was not expected to make any particular change in the administration of the government. indeed so popular had general jackson been, that it would have required great boldness in his successor to attempt any very obvious change in our national policy; and so far as the florida war was concerned, there was none whatever.

it was therefore fortunate that, under the administration of general jackson, the existence of the exiles, as a distinct people, had been acknowledged. in the articles of capitulation, they were again recognized as the “allies” of the indians. in entering into this stipulation, general jessup went no farther than his legitimate powers extended. the peace of the country in that region was entrusted to his judgment, under the direction of the president. if necessary to secure peace, he had the undoubted right to send every slave, of whatever description, from the territory of florida; and it would appear, that no doubt whatever could arise as to his authority to transport to the western country, all who were engaged in actual hostilities against our nation, and that too without stopping to inquire whether one portion of the people were, or were not, claimed as property by the people of florida. general jackson had set a noble example on this subject which was well worthy of imitation. when new orleans was threatened by the british, in 1814, he proclaimed martial law—ordered men into service without inquiring whether they were slaves or freemen. many of them were slaves, and on the day of battle were emancipated by being captured or killed by the enemy. the same powers had been exercised by our officers almost constantly during the revolution. it is a principle understood by all intelligent men, that when war exists, peace may be obtained by the emancipation of all the slaves held by individuals, if necessary.[93]

these articles of capitulation were duly transmitted to the war department, and were regularly approved by the executive. it would appear impossible that general jessup, or any other person, could either misapprehend or fail to understand this stipulation, which was in no respect modified by other covenants.

but this solemn covenant was in direct conflict with the views and feelings of the slaveholders in florida and the adjoining states. they understood the war to have been commenced for the purpose of re?nslaving the exiles. these articles of capitulation constituted not only an abandonment of that policy, but actually operated as an emancipation of all the slaves who, having fled from service in florida, georgia and alabama, had joined the seminoles and taken up arms against their oppressors. the slaveholders were indignant at this stipulation, nor did they fail to express their indignation.

a few gentlemen of distinction, who, with their families, had been driven from the territory, were residing at charleston, south carolina. having learned the character of the capitulation from private sources, without waiting for its publication, they at once addressed the secretary of war, stating they had casually learned from a gentleman who was present, that a treaty of peace had been concluded with the seminole indians which contained “no stipulation for indemnity, on the part of the indians, for such property of the inhabitants as had been captured by said indians, and destroyed. nor (say they) is it, we are told, exacted from them that they should even make restitution of such stolen and other property, to wit, negroes, etc., as they now have in possession, or as has been invited into their country and allowed refuge from its owners. we respectfully conceive, that the termination of the war on such terms, anxiously as we desire peace, would be a sacrifice of the national dignity, and an absolute and clear triumph on the part of the indians, who cannot fail to view the proposition made to them, to close hostilities, followed up by a treaty permitting to them such extraordinary terms, as a virtual suing for peace on the part of the united states, and evidencing a want of confidence in their ability to conclude the war through the means of their belligerent and physical strength.”[94]

but the most singular portion of this memorial is the reference to the treaty of camp moultrie, by which the indians agreed to arrest and return fugitives; and the memorialists insisted that unless the indians be compelled to perform this stipulation the owners “may never regain their slaves.”

the gentlemen who thus attempted to control the action of our national government appear to have forgotten that the treaty of camp moultrie had been abrogated by that of payne’s landing, which our government was now professing to enforce. by this latter treaty, the indians agreed to pay seven thousand dollars as an indemnity for all slaves then in their territory. this was accepted as a full indemnity, and the slaves then resident with the indians became free in law.

this memorial, though written at charleston, south carolina, bears date only twelve days later than the articles of capitulation, entered into at “fort dade in florida.” of this movement of the slaveholders, general jessup appears not to have been informed at the time; nor is there any doubt that he then intended to carry out this solemn compact in good faith. on the nineteenth of march, we find his aid-de-camp colonel chambers, by order of general jessup, writing lieutenant colonel harney, stationed at fort mellon, directing him not to permit the friendly indians (the creeks) to pass into the country occupied by the seminoles, and to distinctly inform the creeks they “must make no more captures of property;” and if they had made any since the signing of the treaty, (meaning the capitulation,) harney was directed to take a list of such captures.

but the first serious difficulty suggested to general jessup, in carrying out his stipulations with the “allies,” appears to have been a letter from major thomas child, commanding at fort armstrong, informing him that a “colonel dill,” a citizen of florida, was at that post, wishing to pass into the indian country for the purpose of reclaiming certain negroes which he professed to have owned, but who were then supposed to have fled to the seminoles.

in reply to this note colonel chambers said: “i am instructed by the commanding general to say, that ‘colonel dill,’ the person whom you report having detained at fort armstrong, must not be permitted to pass, but be required to return from whence he came with all convenient dispatch. hereafter, no person, not in the employment of the government, or express rider, must be allowed to pass your post. the necessity of this order, and the strict enforcement of it, arise from the necessity, that, if persons come forward to urge their claims to negroes, it will evidently prevent the negroes from coming in; and if they do not come in, the commanding general is decidedly of opinion, that the indians themselves will be greatly delayed, if not entirely prevented, from compliance with the terms of capitulation.”

the termination of the war had been regarded as certain by the commanding officer, and by him so reported. the first article in the capitulation, provided for the cessation of hostilities. but they were renewed soon after, and the indians and exiles charged with a breach of faith, both by general jessup and by the executive. and it becomes important to the truth of history, that facts should be stated. the articles of capitulation pledged the faith of the nation for the safety of both persons and property of the “seminoles and their allies.” those “allies” could have been no other people than the black men who were with them contending against a common foe. it is also evident that abraham and the exiles who came in for the purpose of emigrating so understood it. it is equally certain that the people of florida who memorialized the secretary of war so understood it; and we need only read the letters and orders of general jessup to learn that he surely so understood it: and the whole conduct of the indians shows that they put the same construction upon it. while, therefore, justice should be done to general jessup, we should be careful to do no injustice to either the seminoles or the exiles. as further evidence of general jessup’s good faith at the time, we quote an extract from a letter, bearing date six days later than the one last referred to. it was addressed to lieutenant colonel miller, commanding at tampa bay, and is dated march twenty-seventh, 1837. it is signed by general jessup himself, who says: “i have also been informed that mr. cooley’s business at tampa bay is to look after negroes. if that be so, he must be sent away; a trifling circumstance would light up the war again. any interference with the negroes which would produce alarm on their part would inevitably deprive us of all the advantages we have gained. i sympathize with mr. cooley in his afflictions and losses; but responsible as i am for the peace of the country, i cannot and will not permit that peace to be jeopardized by his imprudence.”

but these demands for slaves increased. the slaveholders were indignant at the loss of slaves, and it soon became apparent that the stipulation of safety to the “allies” of the seminoles was unpopular in florida.

on the twenty-ninth of march, general jessup wrote colonel warner, of the florida militia, saying, “there is no disposition on the part of the great body of the indians to renew hostilities; and they will, i am sure, faithfully fulfill their engagements, if the inhabitants of florida be prudent: but any attempt to seize their negroes, or other property, would be followed by an instant resort to arms. i have some hopes of inducing both indians and indian negroes to unite in bringing in the negroes taken from the citizens during the war.”

in this letter, general jessup begins to modify his former position. he still entertains no fear of the indians, if their negroes or other property be not interfered with, and suggests the hope that he may effect an arrangement with the indians and indian negroes to bring in (that is, to surrender up,) the negroes taken during the war. this letter gives the first evidence, which we find on record, of general jessup’s intention to modify or disregard the solemn compact he had made, or to make another with the indians and indian negroes by which they should betray those who had fled to them during the war.

but that he did make some arrangement of that character with the chiefs, we are led to infer from a letter bearing date may fifth, 1837, addressed to general jessup by the commissioner of indian affairs, informing him that his articles of capitulation with the seminoles had been submitted to the secretary of war, “together with his letters of the first and fifteenth of april, and had been approved;” and the writer then adds: “in relation to the negroes captured by the seminoles and to be surrendered, i am directed to say, that your arrangement for having them delivered to officers of posts on the st. john’s river, is approved.”[95]

this letter also directs general jessup to keep a registry of all negroes delivered to citizens, showing their names, age, sex, etc.

a general order, dated tampa bay, april fifth, and numbered seventy-nine, announces first, “the commanding general has reason to believe that the interference of unprincipled white men with the negro property of the seminole indians will prevent their emigration, and lead to a renewal of the war. responsible as he is for the peace and security of the country, he will not permit such interference under any pretense whatsoever. and he therefore orders that no white man, not in the service of the united states, be allowed to enter any part of the territory, between the st. john’s and the gulf of mexico, south of fort drane.”

on the eighth of april, general jessup wrote colonel harney, saying, “i have made an arrangement with the chiefs to-day to surrender the negroes of white men, particularly those taken during the war.”

with what particular chiefs this arrangement was made, or what were the terms of the arrangement, the author has not learned; yet, as we shall see hereafter, he represented it to have been made at “fort king” with co-hadjo, an unimportant chief, and then attempted to hold the seminole nation responsible for co-hadjo’s promise. but under these circumstances, the reader will ask what consideration was paid co-hadjo to bribe him to enter into such a contract? that chief and general jessup and general cass, secretary of war, must have known he possessed no power to bind the seminole nation, nor to surrender those persons to slavery. it will long remain a subject of inquiry. why did the war department sanction this violation of the solemn articles of capitulation, which these officers termed a treaty, and which certainly possessed all the solemnity and binding force of a treaty?

there is also an inexplicable obscurity attending this subject. general jessup wrote colonel harney, on the eighth of april, that he had that day made the arrangement, etc.; while the secretary of war states that he had learned of this arrangement by general jessup’s two letters, dated the first and fifteenth of april. one of these letters appears to bear date seven days before, and the other seven days after, the day on which he declares the arrangement was made. the withholding of such fact seven days from the war department would be as incompatible with military duty as the giving it seven days before its existence, is irreconcilable with the common perceptions of mankind.

in several instances, general jessup had foretold that a renewal of the war would follow any attempt to deliver up negroes to the claimants in florida, and it would appear that he must have expected that result; but he communicated to the commandants of nearly all the different posts, that he had made arrangements with the chiefs for returning slaves captured during the war. but, up to the twenty-sixth of april, he steadily insisted that no obligation rested upon the indians to bring in runaway negroes who had fled to them before the war.

on the twenty-sixth, he wrote colonel brown, of st. augustine, saying:—“i have made arrangements with the indians for the delivery of the negroes captured during the war. they are to be delivered, if they can be taken without delaying the indians in their movements, at the posts on the st. john’s. the indians are not bound to surrender runaway negroes. they must, and shall, give up those taken during the war: at all events, they shall not take them out of the country. further than that, i shall not interfere.”

but while relating facts on this subject, we should be unfaithful to the truth of history were we to omit the letter which this officer wrote, on the following day, to hon. j. l. smith, a citizen of florida. this letter, bearing date at tampa bay on the twenty-seventh of april, 1837, says:

“i received, yesterday, your letter of the eighteenth, with a list of the slaves which you claim. ansel is the only one of the three who has been taken. i have him employed, at one of the interior posts, as an interpreter. the negroes generally have taken the alarm, and but few of them come in; and those who remain out, prevent the indians from coming. but for the premature attempts of some citizens of florida to obtain possession of their slaves, a majority of those taken by the indians during the war, as well as those who absconded previous to it, would have been secured before this time. more than thirty negro men were in and near my camp, when some of the citizens, who had lost negroes, came to demand them. the indian-negroes immediately disappeared, and have not been heard of since.”

it is believed that, in the conducting of this second seminole war, no act of any public officer will hereafter appear more inexplicable than the conduct of general jessup, in regard to this stipulation in favor of the exiles. no person can suppose there was any doubt in regard to the original design of this stipulation. he at first appears determined to carry it out in good faith; this was before he learned the complaint of the slaveholders of florida, made to the secretary of war. he next expressed his intention to make an arrangement with the chiefs to surrender negroes captured during the war—as though the chiefs were authorized to consign “their allies” to slavery. he next says he had made such an arrangement, but fails to say with whom. at length it comes out, in the future history, that he alleges it to have been made with co-hadjo, an obscure chief, in no way a party to the capitulation, or connected with it. and finally, in this letter to judge smith, he intimates that he would have betrayed many of those allies to slavery, if the people of the territory had been quiet.

our present duty, however, is to record facts, without asking attention to the intended treachery or fraud of individuals; but this avowed intention of entrapping the negroes by inducing them to come in under the expectation of emigrating west with their seminole friends, and then consign them to bondage, must attract the attention and excite the wonder of christian men. this wonder is increased by the fact, that language is constantly used by slaveholders apparently intended to mislead the northern reader. for instance, general jessup speaks of slaves “captured during the war,” as though the indians made prisoners of slaves. this is believed to be entirely without foundation. slaves being regarded by southern men as property, incapable of thought, whenever they fled from their masters and sought an asylum with the indians, the masters spoke of them as captured.

soon us it was known that slaves were to be seized and returned, claims were preferred from all quarters. the correspondence on this subject, now in the department of war, would of itself form a volume, if quoted at length. spaniards sent in claims for slaves lost while the territory was in possession of spain, in 1802 and 1803. claims from south carolina, from georgia, alabama and florida, and from creek indians, were presented to the commandants of different posts. slaveholders evidently felt that they were to be permitted to seize such colored prisoners as they could lay their hands upon, and enslave them. they no longer waited for black prisoners to be brought to the st. john’s, or other posts, but like wolves greedy for their prey, they hurried into the indian country, and risked their lives in order to secure victims for the slave-markets.

the legislative council of florida became affected with this general mania, and in the most formal manner declared the right of masters to regain possession of their slaves, without regard to the federal government or its officers.

finding general jessup incapable of resisting the popular clamor, the claimants for slaves openly demanded a revocation of the general order, by which they were prohibited from entering the indian territory for the purpose of seizing slaves. a public meeting of the citizens of various parts of florida, was held at san augustine, and a committee appointed to remonstrate with general jessup, and procure a rescission of his order, no. 79, prohibiting them from entering the territory, between the st. john’s river and the gulf of mexico, south of fort drane. the committee addressed him in a long, written protest, in which they declare, “the regaining of their slaves constitutes an object of scarcely less moment than that of peace to the country.”[96]

general jessup now began to modify his order, no. 79, so as to admit citizens to enter the territory as far south as the road leading from withlacoochee to volusi; and, on the first of may, so informed major mcclintock, commanding at fort drane. on the day following, he addressed a letter to brig. general armistead, directing that officer to “consider order no. 79 so far modified, that citizens will be permitted to visit any of the posts on the st. john’s, and to traverse or remain in any part of the country south of withlacoochee. there are large herds of cattle in that part of the country which no doubt belong to the citizens, and by allowing them to go into the country, they may perhaps secure a large portion of them.”

it will be recollected, that general scott would not permit the people of florida to interfere in the discharge of his official duties, and that they, through their representative in congress, had demanded his removal from command of the army. they now applied directly to the secretary of war, remonstrating against the action of general jessup; and it is possible that officer deemed it prudent to yield to their dictation. be that as it may, it is certain that he now lent the power of the army to carry out the wishes of the citizens. officers and men were detailed to take black prisoners—who had come in and surrendered with the expectation of emigrating west—from their places of rendezvous to certain points where it would be most convenient for claimants to receive them.

on the seventeenth of april, major churchill, aid to general jessup, wrote colonel harney, saying, “i am instructed by the commanding general to acknowledge the receipt to-day of your letter of the seventh instant, and to inform you that the negro prisoners captured from the indians, and supposed to belong to the white people, were sent from this place, on the eleventh instant, to lieutenant d. h. vinton, at st. marks, for the purpose of being returned to their owners. the indians have agreed to send all slaves, taken from white people during the war, to fort mellon and volusi; and runners are now employed in the interior on that service.” on the same day, information was given to william de payster, that seven of the number sent to volusi probably belonged to him. on the same day also, “a. forrester” was informed of the fact, that those slaves “had been sent to st. marks, and that six of the number probably belonged to him.”

other plans were devised for securing slaves, as we are informed by a letter from general jessup to e. k. call, governor of florida, dated eighteenth of april, 1837, in which he says: “if the citizens of the territory be prudent, the war may be considered at an end; but any attempt to interfere with the indian negroes, or to arrest any of the chiefs or warriors as debtors or criminals, would cause an immediate resort to arms. the negroes control their masters; and have heard of the act of your legislative council. thirty or more of the indian negro men were near my camp on the withlacoochee in march last; but the arrival of two or three citizens of florida, said to be in search of negroes, caused them to disperse, and i doubt whether they will come in again; at all events the emigration will be delayed a month i apprehend in consequence of this alarm among the negroes.”

the emigration of those indians who had come in to fort brooke, and registered themselves as ready for emigration, was delayed in consequence of the difficulty of collecting those who were expected; and general jessup began to see the effects which his violation of the articles of capitulation had wrought on the minds of both indians and negroes. indeed, he had in plain and distinct language repeatedly affirmed that the negroes controlled the indians; that any interference with the negroes would cause a resort to arms; yet he himself subsequently ordered negroes to be sought out, separated from their friends, and delivered over to slavery.

the ships were yet lying in the harbor. about seven hundred indians were encamped ready for emigration, and had been waiting for others to join them. impatient at delay and disappointment, on the twenty fifth of may, he wrote colonel harney, as follows:

“if you see powell (osceola) again, i wish you to tell him that i intend to send exploring and surveying parties into every part of the country during the summer, and that i shall send out and take all the negroes who belong to the white people, and he must not allow the indians or indian negroes to mix with them. tell him i am sending to cuba for bloodhounds to trail them, and i intend to hang every one of them who does not come in.”

this intention to re?nslave the exiles who had recently taken up their residence with the seminoles became known, and created general alarm. many of the blacks, who had come in for the purpose of emigrating, became alarmed and fled; and general jessup, doubtful whether more could be obtained by peaceful means, seized about ninety exiles who were confined within the pickets at tampa bay, on the second of june, and at once ordered them to new orleans, under the charge of lieutenant g. h. trevitt, of the united states marines.

this struck the indians and exiles with astonishment. the chiefs, warriors and families, numbering some seven hundred, who had collected at tampa bay for the purpose of emigrating to the western country, thinking themselves betrayed, now fled to their former fastnesses, far in the interior, and once more determined to defend their liberties or die in the attempt. a few, however, were secured at other posts, and sent to new orleans, where they were delivered over to quarter-master clark, and confined at “fort pike.”

on the fourteenth of june, general jessup, writing general gadsden of south carolina, says: “all is lost, and principally, i fear, by the influence of the negroes—the people who were the subject of our correspondence. * * * i seized, and sent off to new orleans, about ninety indian negroes, and i have about seventeen here. i have captured ninety, the property of citizens; all of whom have been sent to st. marks and st. augustine, except four at this place, twelve at fort mellon, and six who died.”

general jessup now saw that both seminole indians and negroes had clear conceptions of justice and honor. that his efforts to deliver over negroes to slavery had defeated the entire object of the articles of capitulation of the eighteenth of march. the indians had fled. the negroes, except those who were imprisoned, had fled. the twenty-six vessels, collected at tampa bay to transport them to new orleans, were yet idle; and, to use his own words, “all was lost!”

abraham, acting for his brethren while west, in 1833, had caused the article to be inserted in the supplemental treaty, giving the seminoles a separate country for their settlement.

in forming the articles of capitulation with general jessup, he again exhibited his capacity for negotiation; obtaining the insertion of an article which, if carried out, would have proved a triumphant vindication of their cause. but from this second manifestation of his powers for negotiation, the government of the united states found it necessary to recede, in order to maintain its designs of enslaving the exiles.