bellowing, there groan’d a noise
as of a sea in tempest torn
by warring winds. the stormy blast of hades
with restless fury drives the spirits on.
—dante
during the first half of the present century there was a tremendous growth in population, industry, truck-farming, citrus-growing, boating, and aviation on the gulf and south atlantic coasts of the united states. this brought new worries to the hurricane hunters and forecasters.
by the beginning of the century, most of the older cities and port towns in this region had been hit repeatedly by tropical blasts. insecure buildings had been eliminated. from bitter experience, the natives knew what to do when a storm threatened. they had built houses and other structures to withstand hurricane winds, placing nearly all of them above the highest storm tides within their memories. down in the hurricane belt of texas and louisiana, a sixty-penny 104 nail was known as a “burrwood finishing nail.” the town of burrwood, at the water’s edge on the southern tip of louisiana, had no frame buildings that had survived its ravaging winds and overwhelming tides except those which were put together with spikes driven through heavy timbers.
learning to deal with hurricanes takes a lot of time. most places on these coasts have a really bad tropical storm about once in ten or twenty years. and so it happened that while the population was increasing rapidly in the years from 1920 to 1940, many thousands of flimsy buildings were constructed in the intervals between hurricanes. too many were built near the sea, where they would be wrecked by the first big storm wave. to build near the water is tempting in a hot climate. and so it happened that after 1920, widespread destruction of property and great loss of life attended the first violent blow in many of these rapidly growing communities.
newcomers—and there were many—didn’t know what to do to protect life and property. after the first calamity, they were alarmed by the winds which came with every local thundershower and they were likely to flee inland in great numbers whenever there was a rumor of a hurricane. here they became refugees, to be fed and sheltered by the red cross and local welfare organizations. by the middle thirties, this had become a heavy burden on all concerned. to get things under control, local chapters of the red cross were formed and other civic leaders joined in seeing that precautions were taken when required, and panics were averted at times when no storm was known to exist. but when warnings were issued by the weather bureau, coastal towns were almost deserted. the greatest organized mass exodus from shore areas in advance of a tropical storm occurred in texas, in 1942. on august 30, a big hurricane with a tremendous storm wave struck the coast between corpus christi and 105 galveston. it had been tracked across the caribbean and gulf, and ample warnings had been issued. more than fifty thousand persons were systematically evacuated from the threatened region and though every house was damaged in many towns, only eight lives were lost.
all of this brought heavy pressure on the hurricane hunters and forecasters to be more accurate in the warnings, to “pinpoint” the area to be seriously affected, and to defer the hoist of the black-centered red hurricane flags until those responsible were reasonably sure of the path the storm would take across the coast line. thus, the warnings actually became more precise, but in some instances the time available for protective action was correspondingly reduced.
precautionary measures must be carefully planned. the force of the wind on a surface placed squarely across the flow of air increases roughly with the square of the wind speed. for this reason, it is a good approximation to say that an eighty-mile wind is four times as destructive as a forty-mile wind. a 120-mile wind is nine times as destructive. in order to lessen property damage, residents of florida and other states in the hurricane belt prepared wooden frames which could be quickly nailed over windows and other glassed openings. these devices proved to be very effective. in some cases it was a dramatic fact that, if two houses were located side by side, the one with protective covers on windows and other openings escaped serious damage while the other house soon lost a window pane and then the roof went off as powerful gusts built up strong pressures within the building. at the same time that this protection was applied on the windward side, openings on the leeward side (away from the wind) helped to reduce any pressures that built up in the interior.
as these experiences became common after 1930, wood and metal awnings were manufactured so that they could be 106 lowered quickly into position to protect windows of residences. business houses stocked wooden frames that could be fastened in place quickly to prevent wholesale damage to plate glass windows.
many other measures were taken hastily when the emergency warnings were sent out. one, for example, was a check by home owners to make sure that they had tools and timbers ready to brace doors and windows from the inside if they began to give way under the terrific force of hurricane gusts. they had learned that with a wind averaging eighty miles an hour, say, the gusts are likely to go as high as 120 miles an hour and it is in these brief violent blasts, so characteristic of the hurricane, that the major part of the wind damage occurs.
in addition, the experienced citizen prepares for hours when water, lights, and electric refrigeration will fail. he knows, too, that these storms have a central region, or eye, where it is calm or nearly so, and he does not make the often-fatal mistake of assuming that the storm is over when the calm suddenly succeeds the roaring gales. he wisely remains indoors and closes the openings on the other side of the house, for the first great gusts will come from a direction nearly opposite that of the most violent winds which preceded the center.
in the early thirties, the hurricane forecasts for the entire susceptible region were still being made in washington, having been begun there in 1878. weather reports were coming in season from observers at land stations in the west indies, mostly by cable. from many places the cable messages went to washington via halifax. ship’s weather messages came by radio to coastal stations on the atlantic and gulf, and from there to washington by telegraph. twice a day these reports were put on maps and isobars, and pressure centers (highs and lows) were drawn.
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in general, the same system is used today. arrows show the direction and force of the wind at each of many points; also the barometer reading, temperature, cloud data, and other facts are entered. conditions in the upper air are shown at a few places where balloon soundings are made. as the map takes shape, it begins to show the vast sweep of the elements across the southern united states, mexico, central america, and all the region in and around the caribbean sea and the atlantic. in these southern regions, the trade winds, coming from the northeast and turning westward across the islands and the caribbean, bring good weather to the edge of the belt of doldrums.
this is the lazy climate of the tropics, in the vast spaces where the bulge of the earth near the equator seems to give things the appearance of a view through a magnifying glass. in the distant scene, islands are set off by glistening clouds hanging from mountain tops. white towers of thundery clouds push upward here and there over the sea, in startling contrast to the blue of the sky and water. nature seems to be at peace but the trained weather observer may see and measure things that are disturbing to the weather forecasters when put together on a weather map of regions extending far beyond any single observer’s horizon.
here and there in this atmosphere that seems so peaceful an eddy forms and drifts westward in the grand sweep of the upper air across these southern latitudes. these temporary swirls in the atmosphere, some of which are called “easterly waves,” are marked by a wave-like form, drifting from the east. the wind turns a little, the barometer falls slightly, the clouds increase temporarily, but nothing serious happens and the eddy passes as better weather resumes. this goes on day after day and week after week, but during the hurricane season the storm hunters are always on the alert.
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all this work of charting the weather day by day and week by week is not wasted if no hurricane develops. planes take off every day from southern and eastern airports, carrying passengers to bermuda, nassau, trinidad, cuba, jamaica, mexico, and central and south america. the crews stop at the weather office to pick up reports of wind and weather for their routes and at destination. the weather over these vast expanses of water surface is reported and predicted also for ships at sea. and when a storm begins to develop, ships and planes are among the first to be notified.
sooner or later, one of these swirling waves shows a definite center of low pressure, with winds blowing counterclockwise around it. now the modern drama of the hurricane begins. in the region where these ominous winds are charted, radio messages from headquarters ask for reports from ships—every hour, if possible—and weather offices on islands are asked to make special balloon soundings of the upper air and send reports at frequent intervals. warnings go out to vessels in the path of the storm as it picks up force. alert storm hunters in cuba and other countries are contacted to discuss the prospects, to furnish more frequent reports, and to assist in warning the populations on the islands.
on the coast of the united states, excitement is in the air. conversations in the street, offices, stores, homes, everywhere, turn to the incipient hurricane, and become more insistent as the big winds draw nearer. and finally the hour comes when precautions are necessary. by this time, business in the threatened area is at a standstill. the situation is like that during world-series baseball games and almost as dramatic as that which follows a declaration of war. few people have their minds on business. at this point, the reports of storm hunters and the decisions of forecasters involve the immediate plans of hundreds of thousands of 109 people, large costs for protection of property, and the safety of human life along shore and in small craft on the water.
some of the men and women who came down to the weather and radio offices this morning know now that they will not go home tonight. there will be an increasing volume of weather reports, the rattle of teletypewriters will become more insistent, the radio receivers will be guarded by alert men growing weary toward morning, planes will be evacuated from airports in the threatened region and flown back into the interior, and the businessman will go home early and get out the frames he uses to board up the windows when a hurricane is predicted. the navy may take battleships and cruisers out of a threatened harbor, so that their officers will have room to maneuver.
under these dramatic conditions the hurricane comes toward land with good weather in advance—sunny by day and clear at night. the native fears the telltale booming of the surf and feels concerned about the fitful northeast breezes. in time there are lofty, thin clouds, spreading across the sky in wisps or “mares’ tails” of cirrus—composed of ice crystals in the high cold atmosphere far above the heated surface of the subtropics. a thin veil forms over the sky. at the end of the day, red rays of the lowering sun cast a weird crimson color into the cloud veil, reflecting a scarlet hue over the landscape and the sea. for a few minutes the earth seems to be on fire. to the visitor, it is a beautiful sunset. to the native, it is alarming, and in some parts of the caribbean it is terrifying as an omen of the displeasure of the storm gods. in these dramatic situations the head forecaster makes his decision.
also, during these nervous hours, representatives of the red cross begin arriving on the scene. at the same time, crews assigned to duties of repairing telephone, telegraph, and power lines are sent to the threatened area by their 110 respective companies. as soon as the storm has passed, these men will be ready to go to work.
at this juncture it is probable that strange things will happen. against the stream of refugees moving away from the coast, there are always a few adventurers who come from more distant places to see the full fury of a great hurricane roaring inland from the sea. at first they thrill to the crash of tremendous waves breaking on the coast and hurling spray high into the screaming winds. but when the rain comes in torrents, striking with the force of pebbles, and beach structures begin to collapse and give up their components to wind and sea, the curious spectator has had enough. hurriedly he seeks refuge and begins to wonder fearfully if it will get worse. it does. he soon realizes that what he has seen is only the beginning.
as the full force of the blast strikes a coastal city, the scene goes beyond the power of words to describe. darkness envelops everything, with thick, low-flying clouds and heavy rain acting like a dense fog to cut down on visibility. the air fills with debris, and with the roar of the winds and the crash of falling buildings. power lines go down, and until the current can be cut off, electric flashes throw a weird, diffuse light on the growing chaos. in the lulls, the shrieks of fire apparatus and ambulances are heard until the streets become impassable.
most of these great storms move forward rather slowly—often only ten to twelve miles an hour. a boy on a bicycle could keep ahead of the whirling gales if the road took him in the right direction. automobiles carrying news reporters and curious people travel the highways far enough in advance to avoid falling debris, listening to the radio broadcasts from the weather office to learn of the progress of the storm. of all places, the most dangerous are on the immediate coast and on islands near the coast, where the combination 111 of wind and wave is almost irresistible. but even here an occasional citizen chooses to remain, in spite of the warnings, and when he finally decides to leave it may be too late to get out and no one can reach him. there have been many instances of men being carried to sea, clinging to floating objects, and after describing a wide arc under the driving force of the rotary winds, being thrown ashore miles away from home. but in other cases, people are trapped and drowned in the rising waters. in 1919, at corpus christi, warnings were issued while many residents were at their noon meal, on a sunday. many delayed to finish eating while the only road to higher ground was being rapidly flooded. of these 175 were drowned.
the native knows all of the preliminary signs well enough, and it is not necessary to urge him to take precautions after the moment when the ominous gusts of the first winds of the storm are felt. he has been in these situations before and has looked out to see palm trees bent far over and the rain beginning to blot out the view as the fingers of the gale seemed to begin searching his walls and roof for a weak spot. many prefer not to stay and watch. they board up their windows and doors and go back to a safer place in the interior. and so this is the time when the sound of the hammer is heard and streams of refugees are seen on the highways.
in the early thirties, the increasing population in the hurricane states caused an annoying shortage of communications in storm emergencies. for many years the washington forecasters had sent warnings by telegraph and the men in weather offices along southern coasts had talked to each other by telephone, to exchange notes and opinions, but there were frequent delays and failures after 1930 because, when a hurricane approached the coast, the lines became congested with telephone calls and telegraph messages between relatives and friends worrying about the dangers, and 112 by residents making arrangements for evacuation, in addition to emergency calls of many other kinds.
in 1935, the weather bureau found a very good answer to the communication shortage in emergencies. a teletypewriter line called the “hurricane circuit,” running around the gulf coast and atlantic coast of florida, was leased on july 1, with machines in all weather offices. another line was installed between miami and washington and eventually extended to new york and boston. no matter how congested the public lines became, the weather offices were able to exchange messages and reports without any delay. at the same time, three hurricane forecast offices were established in the region—at jacksonville, new orleans, and san juan. after that time, the washington office issued forecasts and warnings of hurricanes only when they came northward to about 35° north latitude and from there to block island, where the boston office took over.
the first violent tropical storm to strike the coast of the united states after the hurricane circuit was set up came across the florida keys on labor day, 1935. it was spotted in ship reports and by observations from turks island on august 31 as a small storm. it moved westward not far from the north coast of cuba on september 1 and turned to the northwest on september 2, having developed tremendous violence.
this hurricane is worth noting, for its central pressure, 26.35 inches, was the lowest ever recorded in a tropical storm at sea level on land anywhere in the world. the average pressure at sea level is about 29.90 inches. the biggest tropical storms have central pressures below 28.00 inches, but very rarely as low as 27.00 inches.
the strongest winds around the center of the labor day hurricane probably exceeded two hundred miles an hour. about seven hundred veterans of world war i were in relief 113 camps at the point where the center struck. a train was sent from miami to the keys to evacuate the veterans ahead of the storm, but it was delayed and was wrecked and thrown off the tracks as the veterans were being put aboard. the loss of life among veterans and natives on the keys in the immediate area was nearly four hundred. there was much criticism in the press. in 1936, a committee in congress carried on a long investigation of the circumstances which led to the establishment of the relief camps in such a vulnerable position, the failure of the camp authorities to act on warnings from the weather bureau, and the delay of the rescue train. there was much talk in the committee of increasing the weather bureau’s appropriations, to enable it to give earlier warnings, but nothing came of it.
the new teletypewriter circuit served well. after this violent hurricane crossed the keys, it went through the eastern gulf and then passed over western florida and overland to norfolk. in spite of intense public excitement, communications between weather offices were maintained without serious interruption. this improved service continued in the years that followed. radio circuits to the west indies and a teletypewriter circuit to cuba by cable helped to bring the reports promptly and at frequent intervals in emergencies.
in this modern drama of fear and violence, the hurricane warning has become the signal that may cause desperate actions by hundreds of thousands of people. colossal costs are entailed in the movement of populations in exposed places and in the protection of property and interruption of business. now, in this emergency, a civil service employee not used to making decisions involving large sums of money finds himself in a position from which he has no escape. he has to make up his mind—to issue the warning or not to issue it. if he fails to get it out in time, there will be much loss of life and property that might have been avoided. if he issues 114 the warning and the hurricane turns away from the coast or loses force, very large costs will have been entailed without apparent justification. in either case, he will be subjected to a lot of criticism.
the hurricane hunter and forecaster who stepped into this responsible position at a critical time was grady norton. born in alabama, in 1895, grady joined the weather bureau shortly before world war i, then became a meteorologist in the army, after taking training at a. & m. college of texas, where a weather school was established early in 1918. but he had no wish to be a forecaster or to send out warnings of hurricanes.
nevertheless, the people in washington were unable to get out of their minds the fact that whenever norton made forecasts for practice, his rating was very high, especially for the southeastern part of the country. the bureau encouraged him at every opportunity because he was one of those who are born with the knack of making good weather predictions—which is an art rather than a science, even in its present stage of development.
then in 1928, grady went on a motor trip and arrived in southern florida just after the palm beach hurricane had struck lake okeechobee, killing more than two thousand people. he saw the devastation, the mass burials, the suffering, and determined to do something about it. by 1930 he was at new orleans, getting experience in forecasting gulf hurricanes. after five years, the hurricane teletype and the centers at jacksonville and new orleans were established and grady was put in charge of hurricane forecasting at jacksonville. there, and later at miami, his name, grady norton, coming over the radio, became familiar and reassuring to almost every householder in the region. for twenty hurricane seasons he took the brunt of it in almost countless emergencies. in some instances, he made broadcasts steadily 115 and continuously every two hours, or oftener, for two days or more without rest, his microphone having direct connections to more than twenty florida radio stations, and by powerful short-wave hook-ups to small towns all over the state. as the hurricane threatened areas beyond florida, he continued the issue of bulletins, warnings, and advices. in the last ten years of this service, he was warned by his physicians to turn a good deal of the responsibility over to his assistants, but the public wanted to know his personal decisions.
in 1954, after hurricanes carol and edna had devastated sections of the northeast with resultant serious criticism of the bureau in regard to the former, a fast-moving blow that allowed very limited time for precautions, norton died on the job while tracking hurricane hazel through the caribbean. a tall, thin, sandy-haired southerner, norton had a slow, calm way of talking that put him, in the public mind, at the top of the list of hurricane hunters of his generation. and it was generally conceded that to his efforts were to be credited in a large degree the advances in hurricane forecasting in the years after 1935. but the outstanding progress was gained from the use of aircraft to reconnoiter hurricanes, in which norton played a very important part.
in grady norton’s place, the bureau put gordon dunn, who was an associate of norton’s at jacksonville when the service began and who had more recently been in charge of the forecast center at chicago.
by the end of 1942 it was plain that the weather offices of the army and navy would have to join with the weather bureau in hunting and predicting hurricanes. it was agreed that the combined office would work best at miami. for the 1943 storm season, the weather bureau moved its forecast office from jacksonville to miami, with norton in charge, and the military agencies assigned liaison officers there for 116 the purpose of coordinating the weather reports received and the warnings issued. all the experts felt that military aircraft would have to be used to get the reports needed. in august, 1943, the news of colonel duckworth’s successful flight into the center of the texas hurricane was the decisive factor. reconnaissance began in 1944.
