hordeonius flaccus at first furthered civilis' schemes by shutting his eyes to them. but when messengers kept arriving in panic with news that a camp had been stormed, cohorts wiped out, and not a roman left in the batavian island, he instructed120 munius lupercus, who commanded the two legions288 in winter-quarters,289 to march against the enemy. lupercus lost no time in crossing the river,290 taking the legions whom he had with him, some ubii291 who were close at hand, and the treviran cavalry who were stationed not far away. to this force he added a regiment of batavian cavalry, who, though their loyalty had long ago succumbed, still concealed the fact, because they hoped their desertion would fetch a higher price, if they actually betrayed the romans on the field. civilis set the standards of the defeated cohorts292 round him in a ring to keep their fresh honours before the eyes of his men, and to terrify the enemy by reminding them of their disaster. he also gave orders that his own mother and sisters and all the wives and small children of his soldiers should be stationed in the rear to spur them to victory or shame them if they were beaten.293 when his line raised their battle-cry, the men singing and the women shrieking, the legions and their auxiliaries replied with a comparatively feeble cheer, for their left wing had been exposed by the desertion of the batavian cavalry, who promptly turned against us. however, despite the confusion, the 121legionaries gripped their swords and kept their places. then the ubian and treviran auxiliaries broke in shameful flight and went wandering all over the country. the germans pressed hard on their heels and meanwhile the legions could make good their escape into the camp, which was called 'castra vetera'.294 claudius labeo, who commanded the batavian cavalry, had opposed civilis as a rival in some petty municipal dispute. civilis was afraid that, if he killed him, he might offend his countrymen, while if he spared him his presence would give rise to dissension; so he sent him off by sea to the frisii.
19it was at this time that the cohorts of batavians and canninefates, on their way to rome under orders from vitellius, received the message which civilis had sent to them.295 they promptly fell into a ferment of unruly insolence and demanded a special grant as payment for their journey, double pay, and an increase in the number of their cavalry.296 although all these things had been promised by vitellius they had no hope of obtaining them, but wanted an excuse for rebellion. flaccus made many concessions, but the only result was that they redoubled their vigour and demanded what they felt sure he would refuse. paying no further heed to him they made for lower germany, 122to join civilis. flaccus summoned the tribunes and centurions and debated with them whether he should use force to punish this defiance of authority. after a while he gave way to his natural cowardice and the fears of his subordinates, who were distressed by the thought that the loyalty of the auxiliaries was doubtful and that the legions had been recruited by a hurried levy. it was decided, therefore, to keep the soldiers in camp.297 however, he soon changed his mind when he found himself criticized by the very men whose advice he had taken. he now seemed bent on pursuit, and wrote to herennius gallus in command of the first legion, who was holding bonn, telling him to bar the path of the batavians, and promising that he and his army would follow hard upon their heels. the rebels might certainly have been crushed had flaccus and gallus each advanced their forces from opposite directions and thus surrounded them. but flaccus soon gave up the idea, and wrote another letter to gallus, warning him to let the rebels pass undisturbed. this gave rise to a suspicion that the generals were purposely promoting the war; and all the disasters which had already occurred or were feared in the future, were attributed not to the soldiers' inefficiency or the strength of the enemy, but to the treachery of the generals.
20on nearing the camp at bonn, the batavians sent forward a messenger to explain their intentions to herennius gallus. against the romans, for whom 123they had fought so often, they had no wish to make war: but they were worn out after a long and unprofitable term of service and wanted to go home and rest. if no one opposed them they would march peaceably by; but if hostility was offered they would find a passage at the point of the sword. gallus hesitated, but his men induced him to risk an engagement. three thousand legionaries, some hastily recruited belgic auxiliaries, and a mob of peasants and camp-followers, who were as cowardly in action as they were boastful before it, came pouring out simultaneously from all the gates, hoping with their superior numbers to surround the batavians. but these were experienced veterans. they formed up into columns298 in deep formation that defied assault on front, flank, or rear. they thus pierced our thinner line. the belgae giving way, the legion was driven back and ran in terror to reach the trench and the gates of the camp. it was there that we suffered the heaviest losses. the trenches were filled with dead, who were not all killed by the blows of the enemy, for many were stifled in the press or perished on each other's swords. the victorious cohorts avoided cologne and marched on without attempting any further hostilities. for the battle at bonn they continued to excuse themselves. they had asked for peace, they said, and when peace was persistently refused, had merely acted in self-defence.
