if the economic development of cuba holds little promise for the people of the country, they have even less to look for in the political prospect. the period of self-government following freedom from the spanish yoke has been marked by utter failure to meet the demands and the responsibilities of the situation. the palma administration, ushered in with the highest hopes and the utmost encouragement, was tainted with corruption and cut short by revolution. the present regime can not boast even that weak element of honesty and ability that its predecessor possessed. to quote la lucha, of habana, which was the official organ of the gomez party, the present condition is characterized by “intranquillity in the country, uneasiness in the towns and cities, hatreds, fears, and absolute lack of confidence in the future.... our rulers refuse to be convinced that they{148} are not the owners, but simply the administrators of the public wealth.” insurrection has been staved off on several occasions by means of the strong arm or the greased palm. as the year 1911 approaches its close, the rumblings of revolution are heard in many different parts of the island at the same time. these are not to be taken as popular indications of resentment against bad government,—the cubans are used to that. they are the organized preparations of the “outs” to unseat the “ins.” such disturbances are natural incidents of a situation which is controlled by professional politicians. there are in cuba no political parties based on principle. instead there are a number of cliques, each headed by a leader who holds his followers by promises of patronage in case of success. experience has taught that the bullet is more effective than the ballot in cuban politics. a few shots fired at the moon displaced the palma government. to quote again from la lucha: “in cuba nothing can resist the slightest armed movement, because the first subversive cry raised in our fields is, and ever will be, the death knell of our political state.” the administration can not place dependence upon the military forces. the keen{149}est rivalry and the bitterest feeling exist between the rural guard and the regular army. in case of a civil war, these bodies would surely take opposite sides, and neither has any sentiment of loyalty to the flag, or allegiance to the government. the chief influence to which they would be amenable is the will of their respective commanders, who are politicians and aim to employ the forces under them as political instruments. the most effective defence of the president is found in placating his enemies by substantial concessions, but this method has naturally created fresh opponents with an appetite for sops, and the chief executive finds himself well-nigh at the end of his resources.
a country may be greatly prosperous and the mass of its people be miserable in the extreme. mexico is an example in point. cuba is another.
throughout the hardships and hazards of the war of independence the insurrectos were supported by the belief that american enlistment in their cause, upon which they counted for success, would be followed by an era of permanent prosperity for the masses. the man who bore the brunt of the fighting, buoyed by these high hopes, realizes now that he was exploited{150} by a handful of his own countrymen and deserted by his expected saviour. the desertion was repeated after the need for protection had been emphasized and the exploitation continues in an aggravated form.
on the guajiro falls most heavily the burden of supporting the most expensive and extravagant government in the world. this because that government dare not bear too hardly with taxation upon the great corporations and wealthy property owners. an important part of the game of finesse which is necessary to the life of any administration in cuba consists in keeping in the good graces of the money interests, for it is in the power of these to stop the fat grazing in the political pastures by forcing american reoccupation, and even perhaps annexation.
so we have one of the most striking of the many anomalies in the cuban system of administration,—the customs duties. here, in a country with no industries to protect, the tariff exaction is at the rate of $12 per head. in the united states it is no more than $3.50, while in other countries it is considerably less. at first hand the importer pays this tax, but, of course, it ultimately falls upon the consumer. and, as
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a guajiro’s shack.
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more than half the importations of the island are foodstuffs or articles of clothing, it necessarily follows that the masses discharge the great bulk of the customs duties. at the same time large tracts of land that are held by their wealthy owners at high figures are exempted from taxation entirely.
is it any wonder that the peasant groans under the load? it is true that he works intermittently and loafs unnecessarily, but that is no good reason why his last dollar should be squeezed out of him, and, if he earned more, he would probably invite heavier taxation. he has no encouragement to exert himself beyond the needs of the present hour. he is probably occupying land that he may be required to vacate to-morrow. he can find no better market for his produce than the precarious one of the adjacent village. enterprise is an invitation to the spoilers of the capital and the petty officials of his locality. if you should ask his candid opinion, it would be that conditions are no better than they were under spain, and perhaps not quite as good. you may attempt to relieve his depression by a reminder of his splendid independence. he will not understand what you are talking about, although he is far from{152} being a dullard. he fought in the wars of independence because he was assured that success would mean a full stomach and perchance the ownership of a scrap of land. it resulted in neither and, unless restrained by scepticism, he would fight again, under any banner, for the same promise. independence per se is of no more value to him than a cocoanut husk. he can not eat it and it will not buy calico for his woman.
the only class of cubans that is waxing fat and living in contentment is that composed of the office-holders,—the professional politicians. they toil not, but they reap with prodigious assiduity. they fill easy jobs on extravagant salaries and try to persuade the country that they are performing extremely difficult and important tasks. their sole interest and concern is to fill their pockets with as little exertion as need be. the welfare of the people is a matter of no consideration to them. the only fly in their ointment is the fact that they can not all be in office at the same time, and so the “ins” are disturbed by the uncomfortable knowledge that the “outs” are constantly scheming to oust them.
the peasant has entirely lost whatever faith{153} he may have had in the politician. the man who pulled the chestnuts out of the fire is growing impatient of supporting a lot of unnecessary office-holders. the peasant is supine to a shameful degree, but there is a limit to his forbearance, and it has almost been reached. he is ripe to serve the purposes of any agitators—any one who will offer a fair prospect of changed conditions.
but, be it well understood, this unrest and dissatisfaction are the outcome of basic causes. they can only be remedied by radical reformation of the economic and political state of the country. and such reformation is not to be expected from any native source. cuba’s salvation depends upon guidance and aid from without, or, if not that, from the foreign element within her borders. this fact has become so obvious that even the organs of the politicians admit it. all classes, save the numerically smallest, are weary and disgusted with the condition of things. they can find no remedy at the polls. if the present administration is ejected, it is sure to be followed by another as bad, or worse.
when it comes to a consideration of the best means to relieve cuba’s distress, the factors{154} in the matter are found to be so complex, and the opinions on the subject so diverse, that it is extremely difficult to arrive at any definite conclusion. one point, at least, almost all students of the situation are agreed upon, and that is that the united states fell very short of affording the cubans the assistance in rehabilitating themselves that they had a right to expect, and that the hasty manner in which they were left to their own resources is mainly responsible for the confusion that has existed ever since.
if the cuban has not an actual ineptitude for exercising the functions of government, he must be disqualified by utter inexperience. the brief period of autonomy is hardly worth considering in this respect. before the present century only a very small proportion of the population had ever exercised the elementary political function of voting. under spain the affairs of the country were regulated to the smallest detail by the national authority, which extended its paternal supervision to matters affecting the private life of the individual. for instance, regulations for the conduct of the bull-ring and the cock-pit emanated from the captain-general, and under his instructions the petty officers were constituted censors of the{155} morals of private citizens, with power to punish offenders.
another equally serious disqualification is to be found in the large proportion of illiterates in cuba. these comprise more than half the total population. the great majority of them are campesinos, rustics. nevertheless, it is to the country districts that we must look for the best thought and the greatest influence in future political movements. city dwellers are prone to act and think in mass, to be led by the crowd and to be unduly influenced by the press. the guajiro, who owns a little patch of ground, but is utterly lacking in education, is a safer and more valuable political unit than the average citizen of habana.
order was established and a workable form of government framed in cuba by the united states, but its action in leaving this machinery entirely under the control of an inexperienced and immature people was like placing a razor in the hands of a child. the needs of the island were sacrificed to the political exigencies of its protector. this is a fact that will hardly admit of dispute. the leading cuban papers and the most representative citizens of the country declared unequivocally that the people were not{156} prepared nor qualified to assume the responsibility of self-government. governor magoon, in a report which was suppressed, made similar representations to his superiors in washington. nevertheless, thirteen months after the transfer of the island from spain to the united states, president roosevelt ordered that withdrawal should take place one year later and “under no circumstances and for no reason” should our occupancy be extended beyond the date set, which happened to be just before the assembling of the presidential conventions. we committed our first injustice to the country and made our first mistake in the treatment of it by that hasty and premature abandonment. we have already paid a heavy price for the blunder and cuba has suffered severely from the effects of it. but our responsibility still exists and the task remains to be performed. there is no possibility of avoidance. sooner or later we must take the work of cuba’s regeneration in hand seriously and carry it out thoroughly. how this shall be done is difficult of conjecture.
a small number of men in this country, whose opinions on any subject command respect, believe that the best course will be found{157} in leaving cuba to work out her own difficulties without interference. the advocates of this laissez faire policy point to mexico, the argentine, and other latin-american republics as shining examples of peoples who have independently worked out similar problems and have brought their countries through long periods of misery and disturbance to peaceful prosperity. but there are two strong objections to this policy. in the first place, the united states is pledged to the cubans and the world at large to maintain order in the island. no one who is familiar with conditions can believe that the cubans are capable of carrying on a government for a period of five years without revolutionary eruptions. is it conceivable that the people of the united states would allow their government to step in periodically to suppress disturbances and to step out promptly as soon as peace should be restored? it is safe to say, that the next occupation of cuba by the united states, which can not be delayed many years, will last for a considerably longer period than did either of the preceding occupations. then again, the situation in cuba contains a very important element which destroys the applicability to it of the examples cited. during{158} their formative stages mexico, argentina, and the other latin-american countries contemplated were undeveloped and comparatively little foreign capital was invested in them. cuba, on the contrary, is the scene of an advanced economic development. almost the entire country belongs to aliens, who have billions of their money sunk in it. is it at all probable that these persons and corporations would submit to the loss or deterioration of their property that would assuredly be involved in an independent government of cuba by the cubans? the monied interests form at present the most determined of the classes that look for a radical change in conditions. they know that trouble is constantly in the air and may take definite form at any moment.
what is the prospect of the cubans working out an orderly and efficient government unaided? up to the present, notwithstanding ample opportunity, there is not even the nucleus of a stable and rational political party in the country. the best men stand aloof, or find themselves hopelessly excluded from participation in public affairs. they complain, but their plaints are vague and indeterminate. all classes of cubans, but one, are clamoring for a
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general view of jiguani.
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change, but no class has put its hopes and wishes into definite utterance. the press is hardly more explicit in its demands and denunciations. the following quotation from the unión espa?ola, of habana, affords a typical illustration:
“political anarchy, by which the country is at present confronted, is daily growing greater. it would seem as though all the political elements had made an agreement to perturb, or rather to dissolve, the nation, for the tendency on all sides is to dissolution. it is time the true patriots sounded the alarm, and that politicians pause in their work of destruction, curbing bits, that the cuban people may continue the ministering of its destinies and in the possession of self-government. it would be shameful, worse than shameful, criminal, that cubans, drunk with sordid ambition and in petty strife for self-aggrandisement, should again wreck the republic, turning over this island to the covetous stranger to exploit it and lord over it.”
it is hardly possible to avoid the conviction that cuba’s ultimate fate will be annexation to the united states, or some very similar state. the united states has on five different occasions emphatically and distinctly declared its{160} intention to preserve the independence of cuba. these formal and public announcements would make it difficult for any administration to countenance, and much more to take the initiative in, any movement tending to annexation. but several contingencies are conceivable which might make it possible for the united states to take cuba into the federation with a good grace.
the result may be brought about by one of several causes, or by combination of them.
it is highly probable that abuse of political power, or revolution, will make american intervention again necessary before long. if the next occupation is not permanent, the one succeeding it is likely to be so. the people of america will tire of the trouble and expense of periodical correction of conditions in cuba.
the property owning class in cuba, native as well as foreign, is almost unanimously in favor of the annexation of the island to the united states, and a majority of the resident spaniards entertain the same sentiment. if this class should unite in action it would be irresistible. should it form a political party, with annexation as its chief platform, it could overcome the professional politicians and control{161} congress. a majority of the peasantry would undoubtedly support such a party. the island might thus pass in a legal manner by vote of the people.
the same result might be brought about by the monied interests deciding to buy the congressional vote without going to the trouble and expense of creating a genuine majority in the legislature.
if none of the suggested contingencies should come about, it is highly probable that cuba will eventually come into the union by a process somewhat similar to that which brought hawaii under the flag. american interests and american citizens are constantly increasing in the island. it is not difficult to imagine a coup d’état, resulting in a government in the hands of americans.
if the desire of a majority of the cubans were all that was necessary to bring about annexation, the matter might be accomplished without serious difficulty. there are, however, many obstacles in the way when the question is viewed from the standpoint of the other party to the transaction. the united states would derive important advantages from the possession of cuba, but in several respects the{162} american people would suffer by the arrangement.
at the outset a difficulty would arise as to the terms of admission. the most enthusiastic advocates of annexation among intelligent cubans would not be willing to come under the american flag with anything less than the status and rights of a state. this attitude is easy to appreciate. cuba’s population, wealth, resources, commerce, industries, and strategic position would fully justify her aspirations to the highest rank among america’s possessions. she would not be content with a territorial position, and the proposition, which has been advanced, that she should accept the indefinite status of puerto rico and the philippines, is not worth a moment’s consideration.
despite official figures to the contrary, it is the conviction of many who have had the best possible opportunities for judging, that a large majority of the native population of cuba have negro blood in their veins. practically one hundred per cent. of the people profess the roman catholic faith and spanish is the mother tongue of the same proportion. would the american nation agree to the construction of a sister state out of such material?{163}
the admission to the united states of cuba’s products free of duty would constitute a serious menace to louisiana’s chief industry and to the growing beet sugar industry of our northwestern territory. the fruit growers of california and florida would suffer from competition with products raised by cheaper labor, and to a less extent the tobacco growers of virginia and kentucky would feel the same pressure.
as to the advantages that cuba would enjoy from annexation, there can be no question. the most obvious and pronounced would be the assurance of good government, perpetual peace within her borders, an incalculably better administration than the present at one-third of its cost, free trade with the united states, and a market there for all her products and purchases.
perhaps cuba might approximate closely to the enjoyment of these benefits under an arrangement which could be effected with much less difficulty than annexation. a permanent protectorate, if introduced with the usual methods of soothing and placating the protected, would probably solve cuba’s difficulties more effectually than any other plan at present prac{164}ticable. out of such a state, cuba might at some future date become a member of the union by a gradual process of evolution. there is, of course, the objection to such an arrangement that it would impair the independence which we have promised to maintain, but when both parties to an agreement are willing to waive its terms there should be no obstruction to cancelling it. furthermore, if such a protectorate should be established it will no doubt grow out of a presumptively temporary occupation. the process would be something like that which has resulted in england’s established control over egypt. when the british occupation of that country occurred the administration under gladstone declared positively that great britain would retire as soon as her work should be done. she has now, however, no thought of ever doing so. her control of the country is undoubtedly a great benefit to the people, and the world at large would regret her relinquishment of it. our government is acting in a similar manner in its treatment of the filipinos. no statesman in the country now contemplates the independence of those people as within the bounds of probability.
under a protectorate it would be possible for{165} the united states to insure to the cubans a considerable measure of the benefits that would accrue to them from annexation, without entailing upon this country the disadvantages which would follow the latter measure.
