many people are surprised, that, in a government so very jealous of its power as that of venice, there is no military establishment within the city to support the executive power, and repress any popular commotion. for my own part, i am strongly of opinion, that it proceeds from this very jealousy in government, that there is no military garrison here.
an arbitrary prince is fond of a standing army, and loves to be always surrounded by guards; because he, being the permanent fountain of honours and promotion, the army will naturally be much attached to him, and become, on all occasions, the blind instruments of his pleasure; but at venice, there is no visible permanent object,[228] to which the army can attach itself. the doge would not be allowed the command of the garrison, if there was one. the three state inquisitors are continually changing; and before one set could gain the affections of the soldiers, another would be chosen; so that government could not be supported, but much more probably would be overturned, by a numerous garrison being established in venice; for it might perhaps not be difficult for a few of the rich and powerful nobles to corrupt the garrison, and gain over the commander to any ambitious plan of their own, for the destruction of the constitution.
but although there is no formal garrison in a military uniform, yet there is a real effective force sufficient to suppress any popular commotion, at the command of the senate, and council of ten. this force, besides the sbirri, consists of a great number of stout fellows, who, without any distinguishing dress, are kept in the pay of[229] government, and are at the command of that council. there is also the whole body of the gondoleers, the most hardy and daring of the common venetians. this body of men are greatly attached to the nobility, from whom they have most of their employment, and with whom they acquire a certain degree of familiarity, by passing great part of their time, shut up in boats, in their company, and by being privy to many of their love intrigues. great numbers of these gondoleers are in the service of particular nobles; and there is no doubt, that, in case of any popular insurrection, the whole would take the side of the nobility and senate, against the people. in short, they may be considered as a kind of standing militia, ready to rise as soon as the government requires their services.
lastly, there is the grand council itself, which, in case of any violent commotion of the citizens and populace, could be[230] armed directly, from the small arsenal within the ducal palace, and would prove a very formidable force against an unarmed multitude; for the laws of venice forbid, under pain of death, any citizen to carry fire-arms; a law which is very exactly executed by the state inquisitors.
by those means the executive power of government is as irresistible at venice, as at petersburgh or constantinople, while there is a far less chance of the government itself being overthrown here by the instruments of its own power; for, although a regular army, or garrison, might be corrupted by the address of an ambitious doge, or by a combination of a few rich and popular nobles, in which case a revolution would take place at once; it is almost impossible to conceive, that all the different powers above mentioned could be engaged to act in favour of one man, or a small combination of men, without being detected by the vigilance of the[231] inquisitors, or the jealousy of those who were not in the conspiracy. and if we suppose a majority of the nobles inclinable to any change in the form of the government, they have no occasion to carry on a secret plot; they may come to the council chamber, and dictate whatever alterations they think proper.
