somewhere in each one of us lurks stevenson’s spirit of “divine unrest,” the parent of speculation. to-day, as in wise old greece in the morning of the world, philosophers sit under every tree, speculating upon the phenomena of the universe, and upon the practical application of them to the needs of humanity. thus archimedes came to know of things that we now call copernican, seventeen centuries before copernicus was born; thus columbus and his argosy sailed into the great unknown, speculating upon an irrational and even shocking exploit; thus pasteur saved to france through the meditations of his speculative mind a sum greater than the cost of the prussian war and the colossal indemnity that followed it.

and so the “divine unrest” goes on and on, impelling men to speculations and explorations of the physical world and of the world that lies beyond our primitive senses, with here and there a high achievement, and now and then36 a miserable failure, but always on and on. the hypothesis of the spectacled professor blossoms into a boon; the dream of the inventor becomes a benefaction; the forlorn hope of the explorer points the way to wealth. things that were speculations yesterday become realities to-day. to-morrow?—nobody knows. in a free field, not bounded by formul? nor restricted by law of god or man, with money to encourage it and enterprise to spur it on, what may come from the speculations of the future passes understanding.

now speculation is an all-embracing word, overworked, threadbare, and worn to the bone. originally it meant “to see”; then “to view,” “watch,” “spy out”; then “exploration” or “contemplation.” when thrift came into the language and men ceased burying their gold, it began to take on a new meaning. the spirit of legitimate adventure, that entered men’s minds when the most christian kings abandoned brute force and repudiation, led men to buy things in the hope of selling them at a profit. it was risky business at first, and capital, then as now, was timid. the high finance of the middle ages was not easily forgotten. but little by little channels through which enterprise might flow into wealth came into being, and confidence came with them. this was called speculation.

37 by the time adam smith wrote his “wealth of nations” (1776) the word was firmly fixed in the language. “the establishment of any new manufacture,” he said, “or any new branch of commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation from which the projector promises himself extraordinary profits.” how the early channels of speculation broadened into great rivers, how confidence grew as the art of making money and increasing it developed, how credit became established, how speculation led to the opening of new countries and the extension of immense advantages, through civilization, to the people of those countries—all this is a fascinating story. and yet the speculation of to-day is no different in its elementals from that of the early greeks; the same spirit of “divine unrest” that spurs on the philosopher in his study stimulates the explorer of strange lands, beckons on the engineer and the builder of railways, and attracts the capital of the adventurous investor. we cannot stop it if we would, because hope, ambition, and avarice are fundamentals of human nature. the police cannot arrest them; they are fixed and immutable.

if there is more speculation in material things to-day than there ever was before, it is because there are more things to speculate in, more money38 to speculate with, more people to speculate, and more machinery, like telephones and telegraphs, to facilitate speculation. capital, credit, and new undertakings grow day by day and open new avenues of possible profit. the per capita wealth of nations, growing by what it feeds on, constantly seeks new fields for enterprise and adventure. the intelligence of the people increases by leaps and bounds, and goes peering curiously into all the little nooks and crannies of the world for opportunities of gain—the apotheosis of speculative enterprise.

all forms of human endeavor in material things are, or were at their beginning, speculations. every ship that goes to sea carries with it a speculation, and leaves another one behind it at lloyds. every man who insures his life or his house buys a speculation, and every company that insures him sells one. the farmer speculates when he fertilizes his land, again when he plants his seed, and again when he sells his crop for future delivery, as he often does, before it is planted or before it has matured. the merchant contracts to fill his shelves long before spring arrives; he is speculating. the manufacturer sells to him, speculating on the hope or belief that he will be able to buy the necessary raw material, and again on the labor, the looms and the spindles39 necessary to make the delivery. in the south the grower of cotton and in australia the grower of wool are likewise speculating on the probability of a crop and on the price at which they may sell to this manufacturer. it sounds like “this is the house that jack built” in its endless chain of sequences; a chain, indeed, and one no stronger than its weakest link. interfere with any part of it, and the whole commercial structure which it binds together falls apart. the grower, the manufacturer, and the merchant must speculate.

there was twofold speculation on the part of our great financial barons who built our transcontinental railways, for they had to reckon not only upon the probability of profit in their undertakings but likewise upon the willingness of other speculators—you and i—to assist them by buying a part of the securities which represented the outlay. to be sure it so happened that many of these vast speculations at first proved unsound. some of them were a little premature; others pushed too far; they brought disaster upon the speculators who had put money into them. and yet who shall say that our great railways have failed to enrich the world and spread the comforts of civilization? “but for a verdant and evergreen faith,” says a recent writer, “salted with the love of risk and adventure for their own40 sakes, how could mountains be bored and waters bridged? if there were not superstition there could be no religion; if there were not bad speculation there could be no good investment; if there were no wild ventures there would be no brilliantly successful enterprises.”

this is not hyperbole; it is fact. the world of business and enterprise must go on; it cannot stop. as it goes on capital must be enlisted, which is another way of saying that speculators must be attracted. the only way that has been devised to attract them is through the medium of certificates of ownership or evidences of debt, called securities. but the business does not end there, for, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the capital of speculators will not take hold unless a market is provided. they want to know where they stand; before they venture upon the troubled waters of new enterprises they must be assured of a public market, a harbor where they can get ashore quickly if storms are brewing.

the only plan that the ingenuity of man has thus far devised to meet this emergency is a stock exchange. one man, or two, or a hundred cannot make a market, because the immense volume and variety of these securities make it impossible for any unorganized handful of brokers and dealers to determine a fair market price.41 what is required, and what the man whose capital is wanted insists upon, is an organized body of brokers, speculators, and investors competing keenly, seeking to buy cheap and sell dear, gathering and disseminating all the news, and so sharpening the judgment and stimulating the higgling of buyers and sellers as to bring prices to their legitimate level and give them stability. ten thousand competitors in this business of bringing prices and values together are of course better than one thousand; a hundred thousand would be better still. the stock exchange supplies this want, and will continue to supply it until a better plan is devised.16 meantime, since it has grown to its present stature by forms of speculation necessary to the maintenance of enterprise, any serious interruption of the facilities it affords will bring enterprise to a standstill and cause the whole sensitive structure of credit to collapse in terror. let professor seligman explain this matter:

“if a railway or other industry, in launching a new enterprise, had to depend on the chance investors at the time of42 the issue of the securities, it would be seriously hampered. the mere knowledge that at any moment there will be a ready sale on the exchange greatly increases the circle of purchasers, many of whom may not intend to be permanent investors. the stock exchange aids the investment of capital, as the produce exchange aids the production of finished commodities. business orders and corporate needs are intermittent, because they depend on temporary exigencies; the risks at one end, at all events, are eliminated by the unintermittent, continuous market which regular speculation affords. the cotton exchange was the result of the disorganization of the cotton trade after the civil war; speculation in all other staples has in the same way been the consequence of the efforts of the manufacturer to avert the risks of intermittent and spasmodic fluctuations in the raw material. the result of regular speculation is to steady prices. speculation tends to equalize demand and supply, and by concentrating in the present the influences of the future it intensifies the normal factors and minimizes the market fluctuation. speculation so far as it has become the regular occupation of a class, differentiated from other business men for this particular purpose, subserves a useful and in modern times an indispensable function.”17

here we have an authority who tells us that speculation in securities, no less than in raw materials, is “an indispensable function” if business is to go ahead. the last census shows that 32? per cent. of the population of the united states is composed of laboring men, not counting agricultural workers. this large army of men is43 by no means independent; on the contrary it is strictly dependent on the ability of others to give it employment. shut down the factories, curtail the operations of railways, close the mines and quarries, stop building and new construction, and in greater or less degree suffering and privation among these large masses must ensue.

now go a step further, and we find that the managers of these railways, mines, and factories, are in turn dependent—wholly dependent upon capital. they cannot go ahead with the extensions and improvements necessary to efficiency without borrowing money; and credit, in turn, will not come to their support unless a broad market is provided, through the stock exchange, for the securities which represent these obligations. hence we see that just as every farmer in the west and every cotton-grower in the south must have a stable market for his products, so every laborer in our great industrial field is directly concerned with the maintenance of a stable market for the securities of the company that employs him. the interests of one are the interests of all, and speculation, in one form or another, underlies all industrial progress. “complaint is made of the evils of speculation,” said the greatest of french economists, “but the evils that speculation44 prevents are much greater than those it causes.”18

now that we have reached a point in our discussion that brings us face to face with the so-called “evils” of speculation on the stock exchange, let us pause and consider the difference between speculation, which is held by many to be abhorrent, and investment, which is generally thought right and proper. the first thing we encounter is the shadowy and indistinct boundary line that separates the one from the other. does any one know where the one begins and the other ends? france has more conservative investors than any other country, yet, as mr. hirst puts it, the most critical and hidebound buyer of french rentes is a speculator in the sense that he not only wishes his purchase to yield him interest, but also hopes and expects that sooner or later he will be able to sell out at a profit, all of which is legitimate, proper, and human. the first question every man asks when the time comes to invest is, “is this a good time for investment?” “am i buying cheap?” by which he means “are these investments likely to enhance in value?”

he may have bought spanish bonds at low prices during the war between spain and the45 united states—a somewhat speculative investment—and in his purchase he believed himself an investor in a strict sense. yet, when those bonds recovered to a normal basis and he sold out at a profit, was it speculation, or investment, or a little of both, that defined the trade? british consols are low to-day, and there is of course no safer investment, but the investor who buys them is influenced by the fact that a long period of peace seems to lie ahead, with reduced expenditures for armament and hence with diminished borrowings by the government leading to a substantial recovery in the price of these solid securities. such a man is “speculating” on england’s abstention from war, on its limitation of military and naval expenditures, and on the probable effects of these matters on the price of his consols.19

the truth seems to be that all investment is speculation, differing from it in degree but not in kind. this salient fact was recognized as long ago as 1825, when, despite the comparatively limited field for investment enterprise, mcculloch saw what was coming and grasped the true idea of the part speculation and its handmaiden, investment, were to play in the industrial renaissance.46 coming at a time when speculation was new, and subjected, as all innovations are, to widespread criticism and doubt, his words have prophetic significance.

“it is obvious that those who indiscriminately condemn all sorts of speculative engagements have never reflected on the circumstances incident to the prosecution of every undertaking. in truth and reality they are all speculations. their undertakers must look forward to periods more or less distant, and their success depends entirely on the sagacity with which they have estimated the probability of certain events occurring, and the influence which they have ascribed to them. speculation is, therefore, really only another name for foresight; and, though fortunes have sometimes been made by a lucky hit, the character of a successful speculator is, in the vast majority of instances, due to him also who has skilfully devised the means of effecting the end he had in view, and who has outstripped his competitors in the judgment with which he has looked into futurity, and appreciated the operation of causes producing distant effects.”20

a quarter of a century later we find england’s foremost thinker sounding the same clear note. john stuart mill was by no means a hermit philosopher47 feeding on theories. traveler, sportsman, business man, statesman, and author, he saw things broadly and wrote for practical men. “speculators,” he said—and he was speaking of the “greedy” ones who buy and sell for gain—“have a highly useful office in the economy of society. among persons who have not much considered the subject there is a notion that the gains of speculators are often made by causing an artificial scarcity; that they create a high price by their own purchases and then profit by it. this may easily be shown to be fallacious.” he then shows, what i have outlined elsewhere, that the market is larger than any speculator or group of speculators, and, if this was true in 1848, i think it will not be disputed that it is quite true to-day.

continuing, mill says: “the operations of speculative dealers are useful to the public whenever profitable to themselves. the interest of the speculators as a body coincide with the interests of the public; and as they can only fail to serve the public interest in proportion as they miss their own, the best way to promote the one is to leave them to pursue the other in perfect freedom. neither law nor opinion should prevent an operation, beneficial to the public, from being attended with as much private advantage as is compatible with full48 and free competition.” mill makes no distinction here between investors and speculators; they are one and the same. in any case it is conceded that speculation is what makes the markets to-day, since 90 per cent. of the transactions that take place daily on the world’s stock exchanges are speculations pure and simple. and this is a good thing. before we go on with our subject, let professor emery explain why, and bring the teachings of mcculloch and mill down to our own day:

“speculation has become an increasingly important factor in the economic world without receiving a corresponding place in economic science. in the field in which it acts, in the trade in grain and cotton and securities and the like, speculation is the predominant influence in determining price, and, as such, is one of the chief directive forces in trade and industry. but treatises in the english language on general economic theory and conditions have given very little space to this influence, which is fundamental in the world of economic fact....

“it is true that forty years ago speculation was far less important than it is now, and there was, therefore, more justification for disregarding it. professor hadley has given due consideration to the new conditions which prevail in modern business. at the same time it should be remembered that mcculloch, already in his day, had grasped the true idea of the function of speculation, a fact shown by the incorporation of his treatment of the subject into his chapters on value. wide as is the influence of speculation, its force is felt primarily in the field of prices. by making prices it directs industry and trade, for men produce and exchange49 according to comparative prices. speculation then is vitally connected with the theory of value.

“from the point of view of theory, therefore, it is incorrect to attach so little importance to the function of speculation; in practice it is impossible to deal intelligently with the evils of the speculative system without first recognizing its real relation to business. both the writer and the reformer must reckon more than they have yet done with the fact that speculation in the last half century has developed as a natural economic institution in response to the new conditions of industry and commerce. it is the result of steam transportation and the telegraph on the one hand, and of vast industrial undertakings on the other. the attitude of those who would try to crush it out by legislation, without disturbing any other economic conditions, is entirely unreasonable.”21

now we come to the evils of the business. that there are evils, really serious ones, no one will deny. to be sure many of the phases of speculation that are called evils are not evils at all; the statements made concerning them have what oscar wilde termed “all the vitality of error, and all the tediousness of an old friend,” and yet, although the prevalent criticism is often stupid and superficial, there are undeniably offensive forms of speculation that one would like to see suppressed. speculation is a comparatively new phenomenon, and it has brought with it dangers and pitfalls. so also have automobiles, electricity, and steam50 engines. but while the stock exchange has created the arena for the display of these abuses, it has not originated them “except,” as a recent writer puts it, “in the sense in which one may say that private property has originated robbery.”

the great evil of speculation consists in the buying of securities or real estate or anything else with borrowed money, by uninformed people who cannot afford to lose. its commonest form in speculation in securities is what is known as “margin” trading, this name being derived from the fact that the buyer, instead of paying cash in full for his purchase, deposits only a fractional amount of its cost, which is intended to serve as a margin to protect the broker from loss, while the broker pays the remaining sum necessary to complete the actual purchase. thus the speculator may deposit $1000 on securities costing $10,000, while the broker furnishes the additional $9000. it is a system in use everywhere; on the london stock exchange it is called “cover,” on the paris bourse, “la couverture.”

there is no fixed amount of margin called for by brokers, as circumstances differ widely with the character of the securities dealt in, the standing of the buyer, and the condition of the market; but in a broad way it may be said that members of the new york stock exchange exact a margin51 equivalent to ten points on middle-grade speculative issues, twenty points on high-priced and erratic securities, and five points on very low-priced shares that move slowly. there are, of course, certain securities on which no payment short of actual outright purchase in full would be accepted by reputable brokers, while on the other hand, in the case of securities that fluctuate but slightly, such as our government, state, or municipal bonds, a 5 per cent. margin would be ample. this is also the practice in london and paris, generally speaking. in paris the agents de change always insist upon a greater margin than the coulissiers, or outside brokers, and here members of the new york stock exchange invariably pursue the same policy.

this affords an opportunity to say that the local evil of stock speculation arising from insufficient margins is one that may be laid at the door of outside exchanges rather than the “big” exchange, as it is called, because, in the minor exchanges, margins are notoriously small, and the smaller the margin the greater the number of “victims.” indeed, if it were not for this practice it would be difficult for members of smaller exchanges to exist at all. in so far as speculation in securities may merit criticism, this tendency to attract poor people by the bait of slim margins is undeniably a very52 real evil, and one which can only be corrected by the brokers themselves. the hughes committee, after devoting much time and labor to this matter, put its conclusions in these words:

“we urge upon all brokers to discourage speculation upon small margins, and upon the exchange to use its influence, and if necessary its power, to prevent members from soliciting and generally accepting business on a less margin than 20 per cent.”22

every one connected with the new york stock exchange knows that this suggestion, like all the others made by the commission, was received with approval by all hands, and, if a hard53 and fast rule could have been devised to meet not merely the spirit but the letter of the recommendation, the governors of the exchange would have put it into instant operation. but there are difficulties in the way, and one of the duties of the governors is to consider very carefully all sides of each perplexing question that comes before them, not merely in the interests of the stock exchange, but with due regard to the common law and the interests of the public. margin trading is a matter of contract, and “the right of one private person to extend credit to another,” as the chairman of the hughes commission himself points out, “is simply the right to make a contract, which, under the federal constitution, cannot be impaired by any state legislature.”23

here is a very considerable difficulty in the way of restricting margin trading, and one that is not fully understood by the outsider. he is prone to speak of contracts thus made as “gambling transactions,” missing altogether the essential point that there is a vast difference between a transaction with a contract behind it, enforceable at law, and one that has to do with bucket-shops and roulette, in which there is no contract, and is54 expressly prohibited by law. no matter what his intent may have been when he bought, and no matter what margin the broker accepted—the buyer has the right to demand his securities at any time, and the broker must always be prepared to deliver them; conversely, the broker may compel the buyer to pay for and to receive the securities he has bought. motives and methods have nothing whatever to do with the transaction.

the broker who buys for a client to-day does not know, and sometimes the client himself does not know, whether the securities are “bought to keep,” or are to be sold to-morrow; similarly the broker has no means of knowing whether the client, who deposited a ten-point margin at the time of his purchase, will or will not deposit another ten points to-morrow, and continue such payments until his securities are wholly paid for. in the large majority of cases the intent of the speculative buyer is to sell as soon as he can get a satisfactory profit, but that does not make him a gambler by any means. why? because, if he bets $1000 on a horse race, one party to the transaction wins and the other loses; whereas, if he deposits $1000 as margin against a stock speculation and makes a profit of say $500, the broker loses nothing by paying him that profit when the account is closed. no property changes55 hands in the one case, while, in the other, actual property is purchased and held ready for delivery on demand. the law is clear in classifying the operations of bucket-shops with gambling transactions, because in a large majority of instances no actual purchase is made; the “buyer” merely bets in that case as to what subsequent quotations will be; the “trade” is between two principals, one of whom must lose if the other wins.

the hughes commission, as i have said, went very fully into all these matters. it was in session six months, and many witnesses were examined. after considering all the pros and cons of margin trading, the experience of england and germany in dealing with speculation, the three-years’ debate in congress on the hatch anti-option bill, and the voluminous reports of the industrial commission, the conclusion was reached “to urge upon all brokers,” as shown in the paragraph cited, a general agreement on margins of not less than 20 per cent. it must be borne in mind that this was not in the nature of a formal recommendation, but rather as the expression of a hope that some measure of reform might be accomplished if such concerted action by brokers were feasible.

that members of the new york stock exchange endorse this view goes without saying.56 they realize more fully than is generally known by the public that indiscriminate and reckless speculation by uninformed people who are beguiled into it by the lure of small margins is an undoubted evil that should be checked, and they are doing what they can to check it by discouraging such operations. for example, it would be very difficult to-day for a woman to open a speculative account with any reputable firm of brokers on the major exchange unless she were well known, peculiarly qualified for such transactions, and abundantly able to support them. accounts will not be accepted from clerks or employees of other brokerage houses or of banks and other corporations in the wall street district; indeed, such transactions are expressly forbidden by the rules of the exchange. no accounts will be accepted from any one who is not personally known to one of the firm’s partners—and the practice resorted to in earlier years of employing agents to solicit business under the nominal title of “office managers,” “bond department managers,” and all that sort of technical subterfuge, is likewise forbidden.

members of the exchange are not permitted to advertise in any way save that defined as of “a strictly legitimate business character,” and57 the governors are the judges of what is legitimate. the layman has but to glance at the bare and colorless announcements made by stock exchange houses in the advertising columns of our newspapers to see how rigidly this rule is enforced; indeed 90 per cent. of the members do not advertise at all. best of all, speculation on “shoe-string” margins is now almost eliminated from the major exchange. the houses that notoriously offended in this respect ten and fifteen years ago are to-day inconspicuous in the day’s dealings. their business is gone—in its very nature it could not last long—and if rumor be credited its demise carried with it a part of the capital of the firms involved. it was a lesson and a warning. all these instances serve to show that the stock exchange is doing what it can to remedy this evil, and, if circumstances arise in which more can be done, the governors and members will be found a unit in enforcing whatever restrictions are necessary.

at the moment it is difficult to see how an inflexible rule of 20 per cent. margins could be put in practice without seriously interfering with really sound business. a telegraphic order may be received from a customer of the utmost responsibility who may happen to be in europe. any stockbroker, and any business man in mercantile58 trade, would be glad to execute for such a person all the orders he chose to entrust, regardless of margins. in such a case no question of motive enters into the transaction; it may ultimately prove to be a speculation pure and simple, or the buyer may cable instructions to deliver the securities to his bank, in which case it would seem to be an investment; but, regardless of that, an insistence by the broker on a 20 per cent. margin would be silly, and would merely drive the business elsewhere or prevent it altogether.

numerous instances of a similar sort might be cited to show how difficult it would be to enforce margin prohibitions in all these perfectly legal contracts. germany tried it in the law of 1896, with disastrous consequences, which i have described elsewhere. it is a matter that will always be a fruitful topic of discussion, yet it differs in no essential respect from the practice of a speculator in real estate who pays down a small percentage of a purchase price and borrows the balance on mortgage. it is similar to what the merchant does when he fills his shelves with goods bought with a fractional payment in cash and the balance at some future date. in all these cases involving property let me repeat that the deposit of a specified sum by the principal and an59 agreement or contract with the broker is a perfectly valid transaction.24

that newspaper criticism and attacks by social mentors should go to extreme lengths in deprecating stock speculation by crude, greedy, and unsophisticated people is perhaps, after all, a perfectly useful function, and if such critics err in going to great extremes, that too may be set down as right and proper, for it is perhaps better to go too far than not to go far enough. the interests of the stock exchange are the interests of the whole country; its welfare depends upon an intelligent and thrifty people; its aims are public-spirited and patriotic. whatever it may lose in60 the way of business from ignorant and silly people who are driven out of blind speculative undertakings leading to losses which they can ill afford, it will gain tenfold in imparting sound information through candor and publicity. on the other hand, unless we are prepared to abolish property altogether, do away with the instruments of credit, and suppress all forms of trading designed to supply our future requirements, we may as well reconcile ourselves to the inevitable and take what comfort we may in the reflection that prudence, thrift, and foresight are not to be eliminated, merely because the proletariat below stairs sometimes indulges in speculation and suffers the consequences of its folly.

“finally,” writes professor emery, “the question must be faced of the effect of eliminating the public from the speculative market even if it could be accomplished. it is supposed sometimes that such a result would be all benefit and no injury. on the contrary, the real and important function of speculation in the field of business can only be performed by a broad and open market. though no one would defend individual cases of recklessness or fail to lament the disaster and crime sometimes engendered, the fact remains that a ‘purely professional market’ is not the kind of market which best fulfils61 the services of speculation. a broad market with the participation of an intelligent and responsible public is necessary. a narrow professional market is less serviceable to legitimate investment and trade and much more susceptible of manipulation.”25

one of the difficulties with which men have to contend in a big country like this is the apparent inability of large masses of the people to understand other large masses. distances are so great, occupations so diverse, and enterprise so confining, that one whole section of the country may not and often does not know what another section is doing. men are too busy to learn by travel and reading that which, in the interest of the whole country, they should thoroughly understand. thus it happens that a section of the country given over, let us say, to agricultural pursuits, having first acquired the notion that speculation in securities is only a form of legalized robbery, assumes that to new york city and the new york stock exchange is confined a greater part of the stock speculation of the world. we have seen the fallacy in the first of these hasty conclusions; the second may easily be explained away.

yankee speculation in securities is not a marker to speculation in london, where the day to day62 trading vastly exceeds ours, and where the “kaffir circus” of 1894–5 and the “rubber boom” of 1909–10 exceeded any similar outburst ever known in america. france is the most prudent and thrifty of nations, yet the panama mania which collapsed in 1894, although followed by a period of the utmost repentance and conservatism, found a parallel in the crazy french speculation in russian industrials which crashed in 1912. there was an extraordinary speculation in egyptian land and financial companies in cairo in 1905–6, which, in proportion to the number of participants, greatly exceeded any boom in new york. china awakens slowly, but, once its political reforms are effected, a field of extraordinary speculation will open there without a parallel in history. the chinaman is not only a shrewd and competent business man, but he is, mr. hirst tells us, “a confirmed and incurable” speculator. “from time to time,” says this writer, “the shanghai stock exchange becomes a scene of the wildest speculation, and it is safe to predict that, when a new china is evolved, stock exchanges will spring up in all the large towns. of this, a foretaste was afforded in the spring and summer of 1910, when shanghai caught the rubber infection from london. all classes and races took part, but the native chinaman63 plunged deepest. when the break in prices came, one chinese operator was so heavily involved that, on his failure, many of the native banks had to suspend payment, with the result that for months the trade and credit of this great shipping and business centre were disorganized.”26

i mention these incidents to show that speculation is not confined to geographical limits. it is all a part of the “divine unrest” inherent in each of us, and it develops and grows intense just in proportion with the march of the civilization it serves to benefit. in new countries, as in china, it may often go too far; sometimes in old countries it oversteps the bounds of prudence, but any student of these phenomena knows that, as economic processes become understood by the masses, the intervals of time between the panics that result from over-speculation grow wider and wider.

another mistake of those sections of the country that do not understand the stock exchange results from the indiscriminate blending of that institution with wall street. let us hear from mr. horace white on this point. he was the chairman of the last committee that investigated the stock exchange; he is one of our foremost economists, and he may be assumed to understand his subject:

64

“there is a widespread belief that wall street and the stock exchange are one and the same thing, and that all the fluctuations on the exchange are caused by wall street. this is an error as glaring as it would be to suppose that all the water in the mississippi river comes from the adjacent banks, ignoring the innumerable streams and rills that contribute their quota from countless unseen sources. wall street and the stock exchange are two different things. the men on the floor of the exchange are the agents of others, executing the orders which they receive both from wall street and from other parts of the habitable globe. some of them speculate on their own account, but the speculating members of the exchange are divided into bulls and bears. they do not all push in the same direction at any one time. they simply aim to anticipate, each for himself, the drift of financial public opinion in order to take advantage of it.

“this is what wall street outside of the exchange does; and the only advantage which speculators in wall street have over those in other parts of the country is derived from larger capital, more direct and ample sources of information, and greater skill and promptness in the use of it. wall street speculators are likewise divided into bulls and bears pushing against each other; and all their advantages do not save them from making mistakes, which often result in losses proportioned to the magnitude of their operations. the ‘rich men’s panic’ of 1903 was such an instance. the panic of 1907 was another. it is sometimes said that wall street can put prices on the stock exchange up or down at its own pleasure. this is a delusion.”27

members and friends of the new york stock exchange view with apprehension the periodic65 attacks upon their great institution made by those who, for reasons not to be discussed here, wish to attract popular attention. but there is no reason why these matters should excite alarm. the exchange purified itself long ago of the old abuses, new ones as they occur meet with severe disciplinary measures, and it has a certificate of good character in the report made to the sovereign state of new york by the hughes commission. this commission has stated explicitly that margin trading is a matter of contract guaranteed by the federal constitution. it is not conceivable that any legislature can ignore such a report, by such a commission, nor is it possible that, in such event, any court could be found to uphold legislation directed at random against an institution that bears the endorsement of all students of economics.

one has but to read the decisions of the courts to see that the matter of non-interference with the great exchanges, on technical grounds, has become a fixture in our jurisprudence. “the exchanges,” said judge grosscup of the united states circuit court, “balance like the governor of an engine the otherwise erratic course of prices. they focus intelligence from all lands, and the prospects for the whole year, by bringing together minds trained to weigh such intelligence and to forecast66 the prospects. they tend to steady the markets more nearly to their right level than if left to chance or unhindered manipulation.”28 in somewhat similar vein justice holmes of the united states supreme court, said: “speculation ... is the self-adjustment of society to the probable. its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices, and providing for periods of want. it is true that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in their turn. but legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the natural evolutions of a complex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand, and that such coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social function as a simple prohibition and laws to stop its being, are harmful and vain.”29

with these opinions before them, so long as the governors of the stock exchange continue their policy of a wise and dignified administration in the interest of the public they serve, there is nothing to fear. corrections, remedies, improvements, and reforms will be found to be necessary from time to time—some of them are necessary67 at this moment, and the governors are hard at work on the task. to accuse them of indifference or neglect of duty is to deny them that form of intelligence which enables a man to protect his property. their splendid institution has grown to its present importance and power through economic development that could not have been foreseen nor prevented. speculation on a large scale has accompanied its growth, and contributed to it; and speculation, as we have seen, is a highly desirable and useful part of all business. this speculation numbers among its adherents people in all parts of the world who have a perfect right to speculate, and who do vastly more good than harm in their operations.

it has also attracted a great many people who have no business to speculate, and who would be prevented from doing so if it were possible. the ignorance and cupidity of these people is so great, and the pitfalls provided them by unscrupulous, methods outside the exchange are so many and various that something has to be done to protect them. the stock exchange does not encourage them, but it recognizes that they have legal if not moral rights, and it stands ready to help them. it gives to such people the same information that it gives to the richest investor in the land. the securities in which it deals are known to be free from68 taint; all forms of crookedness are prohibited; every transaction within its walls is made openly, as a result of free competitive bidding, and published broadcast to the world. what more, and what less, can be done? has there ever been a time in the world’s history when property and trade were so secure, and when speculation, which makes property and trade, was so jealously safeguarded?