lord george bentinck had large but defined views as to the policy which should be pursued with respect to ireland. he was a firm supporter of the constitutional preponderance allotted to the land in our scheme of government, not from any jealousy or depreciation of the other great sources of public wealth, for his sympathy with the trading classes was genuine, but because he believed that constitutional preponderance, while not inconsistent with great commercial prosperity, to be the best security for public liberty and the surest foundation of enduring power. but as reality was the characteristic of his vigorous and sagacious nature, he felt that a merely formal preponderance, one not sustained and authorized by an equivalent material superiority, was a position not calculated to endure in the present age, and one especially difficult to maintain with our rapidly increasing population. for this reason he was always very anxious to identify the policy of great britain with that of ireland, the latter being a country essentially agricultural; and he always shrank from any proposition which admitted a difference in the interests of the two kingdoms.

liberal politicians, who some years ago were very loud for justice to ireland, and would maintain at all hazards the identity of the interests of the two countries, have of late frequently found it convenient to omit that kingdom from their statistical bulletins of national prosperity. lord george bentinck, on the contrary, would impress on his friends, that if they wished to maintain the territorial constitution of their country, they must allow no sectarian considerations to narrow the basis of sympathy on which it should rest; and in the acres and millions of ireland, in its soil and its people, equally neglected, he would have sought the natural auxiliaries of our institutions. to secure for our irish fellow-subjects a regular market for their produce; to develop the resources of their country by public works on a great scale; and to obtain a decent provision for the roman catholic priesthood from the land and not from the consolidated fund, were three measures which he looked upon as in the highest degree conservative.

when the project of the cabinet of 1846 had transpired, lord george at once declared, and was in the habit of reiterating his opinion, that ‘it would ruin the 500,000 small farmers of ireland,’ and he watched with great interest and anxiety the conduct of their representatives in the house of commons. it was with great difficulty that he could bring himself to believe, that political liberalism would induce the members for the south and west of ireland to support a policy in his opinion so fatal to their countrymen as the unconditional repeal of the corn laws; and, indeed, before they took that step, which almost all of them have since publicly regretted and attempted to compensate for by their subsequent votes in the house of commons, the prospect of their conduct frequently and considerably varied.

the earl of st. germans, the chief secretary of the lord lieutenant, introduced the coercion bill to the house of lords on the 24th of february, and, considering the exigency, and the important reference to it in the speech from the throne, this step on the part of the government was certainly not precipitate. it was observed that the strongest supporters of the measure in the house of lords on this occasion were the leaders of the whig party. lord lansdowne, ‘so far from complaining of the government for bringing forward the measure at so early a period of the session, was ready to admit, that after the declaration of her majesty, a declaration unhappily warranted by facts known to many of their lordships, every day was lost in which an effectual remedy was not at least attempted to put an end to a state of society so horrible.’ lord clanricarde ‘gave his ready assent to the bill;’ and even lord grey, ‘though he regretted the necessity for this measure, was of opinion that the chief secretary had established a sufficient case for arming the executive government with some additional powers.’ when, therefore, at the end of the month of march, lord george bentinck was invited to attend a meeting of his friends, held at the house of mr. bankes, to consider the course which should be adopted by the protectionist party with respect to the coercion bill, it was assumed, as a matter of course, that the coalition of the government and the whigs must secure the passing of the measure, even if the protectionists were disposed, for the chance of embarrassing the ministry, to resist it; and of course there was no great tendency in that direction. men are apt to believe that crime and coercion are inevitably associated. there was abundance of precedent for the course, which seemed also a natural one.

in less than a century there had been seventeen coercive acts for ireland, a circumstance which might make some ponder whether such legislation were as efficacious as it was violent. however, assassination rife, captain rock and molly m’guire out at night, whigs and tories all agreed, it was easy to catch at a glance the foregone conclusion of the meeting. one advantage of having a recognized organ of a political party is, that its members do not decide too precipitately. they listen before they determine, and if they have a doubt, they will grant the benefit of it to him whose general ability they have acknowledged, and to whom they willingly give credit for having viewed the question at issue in a more laborious and painful manner than themselves. without a leader, they commit themselves to opinions carelessly and hastily adopted. this is fatal to a party in debate; but it often entails very serious consequences when the mistakes have been committed in a less public and responsible scene than the house of commons.

in the present case, there was only one individual who took any considerable lead in the management of the party who ventured to suggest the expediency of pausing before they pledged themselves to support an unconstitutional measure, proposed by a government against which they were arrayed under circumstances of urgent and unusual opposition. the support of an unconstitutional measure may be expedient, but it cannot be denied that it is the most indubitable evidence of confidence. this suggestion, though received with kindness, elicited little sympathy, and lord george bentinck, who had not yet spoken, and who always refrained at these meetings from taking that directing part which he never wished to assume, marking the general feeling of those present, and wishing to guide it to a practical result advantageous to their policy, observed that the support of the coercion bill by the protectionists, ought to be made conditional on the government proving the sincerity of their policy by immediately proceeding with their measure; that if life were in such danger in ireland as was officially stated, and as he was bound to believe, no corn or customs’ bill could compete in urgency with the necessity of pressing forward a bill, the object of which was to arrest wholesale assassination. he was, therefore, for giving the government a hearty support, provided they proved they were in earnest in their determination to put down murder and outrage in ireland, by giving a priority in the conduct of public business to the measure in question.

this view of the situation, which was certainly adroit, for it combined the vindication of order with an indefinite delay of the measures for the repeal of the protective system, seemed to please every one; there was a murmur of approbation, and when one of the most considerable of the country gentlemen expressed the prevalent feeling, and added that all that was now to be desired was that lord george bentinck would kindly consent to be the organ of the party on the occasion, and state their view to the house, the cheering was very hearty. it came from the hearts of more than two hundred gentlemen, scarcely one of whom had a personal object in this almost hopeless struggle beyond the maintenance of a system which he deemed advantageous to his country; but they wished to show their generous admiration of the man who, in the dark hour of difficulty and desertion, had proved his courage and resource, had saved them from public contempt, and taught them to have confidence in themselves. and after all, there are few rewards in life which equal such sympathy from such men. the favour of courts and the applause of senates may have their moments of excitement and delight, but the incident of deepest and most enduring gratification in public life is to possess the cordial confidence of a high-spirited party, for it touches the heart as well as the intellect, and combines all the softer feelings of private life with the ennobling consciousness of public duty.

lord george bentinck, deeply moved, consented to become the organ of the protectionists in this matter; but he repeated in a marked manner his previous declaration, that his duty must be limited to the occasion: he would serve with them, but he could not pretend to be the leader of a party. in that capacity, however, the government chose to recognize him, and there occurred in consequence, very shortly after this meeting, a scene in the house of commons, which occasioned at the time a great deal of surprise and scandal. the secretary of the treasury, in pursuance of one of his principal duties, which is to facilitate by mutual understanding the conduct of public business in the house of commons, applied to lord george bentinck, confessedly at the request of sir robert peel, to ‘enter into some arrangement’ as to the conduct of public business before easter. the arrangement suggested was, that if the protectionists supported the coercion bill, which it was the wish of sir robert peel should be read a first time before easter, the third reading of the bill for the repeal of the corn laws should be postponed until after easter. the interview by appointment took place in the vote office, where the secretary of the treasury ‘called lord george aside’ and made this proposition. lord george stated in reply, ‘what he believed to be the views of the party with whom he served,’ and they were those we have already intimated. the ‘arrangement’ was concluded, and it was at the same time agreed that certain questions, of which notice had been given by lord john russell, relative to the progress of these very measures, should be allowed by the protectionists to pass sub silentio. this ‘pledge,’ made by the noble lord for himself and his friends, was ‘scrupulously observed.’ nevertheless, after all this, a letter arrived from the secretary of the treasury, addressed to the noble lord, stating that the secretary ‘had not been authorized in saying as much as he had said,’ and requesting that the conversation which had taken place might be considered private. upon this, lord george bentinck drew up a statement, ‘setting forth all that had passed,’ and forwarded it to the secretary as his reply. subsequently, he met that gentleman, who admitted that ‘every word in that statement, as respected the conversation which had passed, was perfectly correct.’

this being the state of the case, on the second night of the debate on mr. eliot yorke’s amendment, which we have noticed, and after the adjournment had been moved and carried, the government proceeded with some motions of form, which indicated their intention to secure, if possible, the third reading of the corn bill before easter. upon this, lord george bentinck, after a hurried and apparently agitated conversation with the secretary of the treasury and others connected with the government, rose to move the adjournment of the house. he then gave as his reason the circumstances which we have briefly conveyed. a scene of considerable confusion occurred; the secretary of the treasury admitted the correctness of the statement; the first lord of the treasury rejected the alleged authority of the secretary. mr. tuffnell, on the part of the whigs, intimated that public business could not be carried on if the recognized organs were repudiated by their chief. the feeling of all parties coincided with mr. tuffnell; finally, an irish repealer rose and announced that the government were bartering their corn bill to secure coercion to ireland. lord george bentinck said the coercion bill was ‘a second curfew act,’ that nothing but necessity could justify it, and if it were necessary it must be immediate. sir robert remained irritated and obstinate. he would not give up a stage either of the corn bill or the coercion bill; he wanted to advance both before easter. the mere division of the house between free-traders and protectionists had already ceased; there were breakers ahead, and it was not difficult from this night to perceive that the course of the government would not be so summary as they had once expected.

this strange interlude occurred after midnight on the 26th of march. on friday, the 27th, the house divided on the amendment of mr. eliot yorke, and the corn bill was read for the second time. on the reassembling of the house on monday, the 30th, an extraordinary scene took place.

it appears that the cabinet, after painful deliberation, had arrived at the conclusion that, notwithstanding the importance of sending up the corn bill to the house of lords before easter, it was absolutely necessary to proceed at once with the coercion bill; and it was resolved that the secretary of state should on this evening lay before the house the facts and reasons which ‘induce the government to believe in the necessity of the measure.’ mr. o’connell and his followers had already announced their intention of opposing the first reading of the bill, an allowable but very unusual course. it is competent to the house of commons to refuse a first reading to any bill sent down to it; but the journals afford few examples of the exercise of such a privilege. a member of the house of lords may lay on the table, as a matter of pure right, any bill which he thinks proper to introduce, and it is read a first time as a matter of course; the orders of the house of commons are different, and a member must obtain permission before he introduces a bill. this permission is occasionally refused; but when a bill comes from the house of lords, the almost invariable custom is to read it for the first time without discussion. there are, however, as we have observed, instances to the contrary, and the irish coercion bill of ‘33 was one of them. so pregnant a precedent could not be forgotten on the present occasion. the government therefore were prepared for an opposition to the first reading of their bill; but trusting to the strength of their case and the assumed support of the whig party, they believed that this opposition would not be stubborn, more especially as there were numerous stages of the measure on which the views of its opponents might be subsequently expressed, and as they themselves were prepared to engage that they would not proceed further than this first reading until the corn bill had passed the house of commons. the consternation, therefore, of the government could scarcely be concealed, when they found on monday night that they had to encounter a well-organized party opposition, headed by sir william somerville, and sanctioned and supported in debate by lord john russell and sir george grey.

it would seem indeed a difficult and somewhat graceless office for the whigs to oppose the first reading of a government bill, concerning, too, the highest duties of administration, which had received such unqualified approval from all the leading members of their party in the house of lords, who had competed in declarations of its necessity and acknowledgments of its moderation, while they only regretted the too tardy progress of a measure so indispensable to the safety of the country and the security of her majesty’s subjects. a curious circumstance, however, saved them from this dilemma, which yet in the strange history of faction they had nevertheless in due time to encounter.

as the coercion bill coming from the lords appeared on the paper of the day in the form of a notice of motion, the secretary of state, this being a day on which orders have precedence, had to move that such orders of the day should be postponed, so that he might proceed with the motion on the state of ireland, of which notice had been given. the strict rule of the house is, that on mondays and fridays, orders of the day should have precedence of notices of motion, so that it was impossible for the secretary of state to make his motion, that a certain bill (the protection of life—ireland—bill) should be read a first time without permission of the house, a permission always granted as a matter of course on such nights to the government, since the business which can be brought forward, whether in the shape of orders or motions, is purely government business, and thus the interests and privilege of no independent member of parliament can be affected by a relaxation of the rules which the convenience of a ministry and the conduct of public business occasionally require. however, on this night, no sooner had the secretary of state made, in a few formal words, this formal request, than up sprang sir william somerville to move an amendment, that the orders of the day should not be postponed, which he supported in a spirited address, mainly on the ground of the great inconvenience that must be suffered from the postponement of the corn bill. the motion of the secretary of state would produce a long, exciting, and exasperating debate. time would be lost—for what? to advance one stage of a measure which it was avowedly not the intention of the government to press at the present moment. sir william concluded with a very earnest appeal to lord george bentinck and his friends, who might at no very distant period have the government of ireland entrusted to them, not, for the sake of a momentary postponement of the corn bill, to place themselves, by voting for this measure of coercion, in collision with the irish nation.’ he called upon lord george bentinck to weigh the position in which he was placed.

this amendment was seconded by mr. smith o’brien, the member for the county of limerick, who warned the government that they ‘were entering on a contest which would continue for months.’ he taunted the minister with governing the country without a party. what chance was there of reconciliation with his estranged friends? after the treatment of that ‘disavowed plenipotentiary,’ the secretary of the treasury, who would be again found willing to undertake the mission of patching up a truce? he was not present when the terms of the treaty were exposed: but he understood, that if the government introduced this coercion bill before easter, then that lord george bentinck would deem it wise, proper, and expedient; but if after easter, then the complexion and character of the bill were, in the noble lord’s judgment, utterly transformed, and it was declared to be quite untenable and unconstitutional. was that the kind of support on which the government calculated for passing this measure?

the secretary of state made a dexterous, conciliatory, almost humble address, in reply to the taunts of mr. smith o’brien. he said that he was well aware of the fact of which he had been just reminded, that, in the present state of parties, the declared adherents of the government were a small minority; he even, while excusing the delay in the progress of the irish measure, reminded the house of the curious fact, that since the meeting of parliament, two successive irish secretaries had lost their seats in the house of commons in consequence of supporting the administration of which they were members.

the case of the government was really so good and clear, that for a moment it seemed the opposition could hardly persist in their unusual proceeding: but this was a night of misfortunes.

there had been for some time a smouldering feud between the secretary and the recorder of dublin. the learned gentleman had seized the occasion which the present state of parties afforded, and in the course of the recent debate on the second reading of the corn bill, had declared that the asserted famine in ireland was, on the part of the government, ‘a great exaggeration.’ the secretary had addressed himself particularly to this observation in his speech on the 27th, the night of the division, and had noticed it in a tone of acerbity. he had even intimated that it might have been used by one who was a disappointed solicitor for high office, and whom the government had declined to assist in an unwarrantable arrangement of the duties and salary of the judicial post he at present occupied. the learned recorder, justly indignant at this depreciating innuendo, resolved to make an opportunity on the following monday for his vindication and retort. he rose, therefore, immediately after the skilful and winning appeal of the secretary, and pronounced an invective against the right honourable gentleman which was neither ill-conceived nor ill-delivered. it revived the passions that for a moment seemed inclined to lull, and the protectionists, who on this occasion were going to support the government, forgot the common point of union, while the secretary was described as ‘the evil genius of the cabinet.’

after this, it was impossible to arrest the course of debate. mr. o’connell, who appeared to be in a state of great debility, made one of those acute points for which he was distinguished. he said the government complained of the threat held out by those who opposed the bill, that they would avail themselves of the forms of the house to give it every opposition in their power. but what did the government do themselves? why, they were trying to trample upon one of the sessional orders and to abrogate the forms of the house in order to coerce the irish people. lord george bentinck said, that ‘the chief minister had told them, that this was a bill to put down murder and assassination; in that case, if this bill were delayed, the blood of every man murdered in ireland was on the head of her majesty’s ministers.’ sir george grey followed, and avoiding any discussion of the state of ireland, in which lord george had entered, supported the amendment of sir william somerville, on the broad ground that the bill for the repeal of the corn laws ought not to be for a moment delayed. ‘the debates on that measure had continued several weeks; and all who had any lengthened parliamentary experience must be convinced, that if the further progress of the corn bill was postponed until after easter, they would have much longer and protracted debates in its future stages, than if the bill were pushed de die in diem. as he had understood, the government had intended that this bill should have gone up to the house of lords before easter, when it would have been printed, and the second reading could have taken place at an early day after the holidays; but if it were put off until after easter, he would defy any man to show any reasonable expectation of its getting to a second reading in the other house before june, or july, or even august.’ this was encouraging, and the plot seemed to thicken. the secretary at war was put up by the government to neutralize the effect of the speech of sir george grey, and he said, ‘i speak not only as a cabinet minister, but also as a considerable irish proprietor.’ he said, ‘that anything so horrible as the state of demoralization and crime in which many parts of ireland were plunged, anything so perfect as the suspension of the law in those parts of the country, anything, in short, so complete as the abrogation of liberty that obtained there, was, perhaps never known.’ he thought that, ‘no man and no minister could, under these circumstances, decline to admit that every and any measure ought to be postponed until a division had been taken, at least upon the principle of a measure which had for its object the suppression of these horrors.’ after such a declaration it was clear the government were in a false position when by the same organ it had to state, ‘that in asking to read this bill to-night, they only intended to postpone the corn bill for one night.’

lord john russell following, admitted, that ‘in voting for the motion of sir william somerville it was not to be supposed, that if the secretary of state made out a case, he would not support the government bill;’ yet how the secretary was ever to find an opportunity of making out his case, if the amendment of sir william somerville was carried, was not very apparent. sir robert peel, who was disquieted by the whole proceedings connected with the coercion bill, irritated by the episode of ‘the disavowed plenipotentiary,’ from which he did not for some time recover, and really alarmed at the indefinite prospect of delay in passing his all-important measures which now began to open, could not conceal his vexation in the remarks which he offered, and speaking of the amendment as one ‘of a frivolous character,’ indignant cries of ‘no, no,’ from his usual admirers, obliged him to withdraw the expression. his feelings were not soothed when, later in the evening, even mr. cobden rose to deplore the conduct of that minister whom he otherwise so much admired. ‘he certainly regarded it as a great calamity. something had actuated the government which he could not understand. he had a perfect belief in the sincerity of the prime minister, but in all human probability the corn bill would not now enter the house of lords before the beginning or middle of may; and when it would come out again, heaven only knew!’

the house now divided, and being supported by all the protectionists present, the government had a majority of thirty-nine, so the standing order was for that night rescinded; and, although the hour was late for such a statement, the secretary proceeded with the official exposition. notwithstanding the depressing circumstances of the previous debate, the speech of sir james graham was distinguished by all that lucid arrangement of details and that comprehensive management of his subject which distinguished him. the statement made a great impression upon the house and the country; but, unfortunately for the government, the more necessary they made the measure appear, the more unjustifiable was their conduct in not immediately and vehemently pursuing it. they had, indeed, in the speech from the throne at the commencement of this memorable session, taken up a false position for their campaign; and we shall see, as we pursue this narrative of these interesting events, that the fall of sir robert peel was perhaps occasioned not so much by his repeal of the corn laws as by the mistake in tactics which this adroit and experienced parliamentary commander so strangely committed.

on this night of the 30th the government made no advance; immediately after the secretary had finished, the followers of mr. o’connell moved the adjournment of the house, and persisted in this line notwithstanding the almost querulous appeal of the first minister.