a cultivated conservative friend of mine once exhibited great distress because in a gay moment i once called edmund burke an atheist. i need scarcely say that the remark lacked something of biographical precision; it was meant to. burke was certainly not an atheist in his conscious cosmic theory, though he had not a special and flaming faith in god, like robespierre. nevertheless, the remark had reference to a truth which it is here relevant to repeat. i mean that in the quarrel over the french revolution, burke did stand for the atheistic attitude and mode of argument, as robespierre stood for the theistic. the revolution appealed to the idea of an abstract and eternal justice, beyond all local custom or convenience. if there are commands of god, then there must be rights of man. here burke made his brilliant diversion; he did not attack the robespierre doctrine with the old mediaeval doctrine of jus divinum (which, like the robespierre doctrine, was theistic), he attacked it with the modern argument of scientific relativity; in short, the argument of evolution. he suggested that humanity was everywhere molded by or fitted to its environment and institutions; in fact, that each people practically got, not only the tyrant it deserved, but the tyrant it ought to have. “i know nothing of the rights of men,” he said, “but i know something of the rights of englishmen.” there you have the essential atheist. his argument is that we have got some protection by natural accident and growth; and why should we profess to think beyond it, for all the world as if we were the images of god! we are born under a house of lords, as birds under a house of leaves; we live under a monarchy as niggers live under a tropic sun; it is not their fault if they are slaves, and it is not ours if we are snobs. thus, long before darwin struck his great blow at democracy, the essential of the darwinian argument had been already urged against the french revolution. man, said burke in effect, must adapt himself to everything, like an animal; he must not try to alter everything, like an angel. the last weak cry of the pious, pretty, half-artificial optimism and deism of the eighteenth century came in the voice of sterne, saying, “god tempers the wind to the shorn lamb.” and burke, the iron evolutionist, essentially answered, “no; god tempers the shorn lamb to the wind.” it is the lamb that has to adapt himself. that is, he either dies or becomes a particular kind of lamb who likes standing in a draught.
the subconscious popular instinct against darwinism was not a mere offense at the grotesque notion of visiting one’s grandfather in a cage in the regent’s park. men go in for drink, practical jokes and many other grotesque things; they do not much mind making beasts of themselves, and would not much mind having beasts made of their forefathers. the real instinct was much deeper and much more valuable. it was this: that when once one begins to think of man as a shifting and alterable thing, it is always easy for the strong and crafty to twist him into new shapes for all kinds of unnatural purposes. the popular instinct sees in such developments the possibility of backs bowed and hunch-backed for their burden, or limbs twisted for their task. it has a very well-grounded guess that whatever is done swiftly and systematically will mostly be done by a successful class and almost solely in their interests. it has therefore a vision of inhuman hybrids and half-human experiments much in the style of mr. wells’s “island of dr. moreau.” the rich man may come to breeding a tribe of dwarfs to be his jockeys, and a tribe of giants to be his hall-porters. grooms might be born bow-legged and tailors born cross-legged; perfumers might have long, large noses and a crouching attitude, like hounds of scent; and professional wine-tasters might have the horrible expression of one tasting wine stamped upon their faces as infants. whatever wild image one employs it cannot keep pace with the panic of the human fancy, when once it supposes that the fixed type called man could be changed. if some millionaire wanted arms, some porter must grow ten arms like an octopus; if he wants legs, some messenger-boy must go with a hundred trotting legs like a centipede. in the distorted mirror of hypothesis, that is, of the unknown, men can dimly see such monstrous and evil shapes; men run all to eye, or all to fingers, with nothing left but one nostril or one ear. that is the nightmare with which the mere notion of adaptation threatens us. that is the nightmare that is not so very far from the reality.
it will be said that not the wildest evolutionist really asks that we should become in any way unhuman or copy any other animal. pardon me, that is exactly what not merely the wildest evolutionists urge, but some of the tamest evolutionists too. there has risen high in recent history an important cultus which bids fair to be the religion of the future—which means the religion of those few weak-minded people who live in the future. it is typical of our time that it has to look for its god through a microscope; and our time has marked a definite adoration of the insect. like most things we call new, of course, it is not at all new as an idea; it is only new as an idolatry. virgil takes bees seriously but i doubt if he would have kept bees as carefully as he wrote about them. the wise king told the sluggard to watch the ant, a charming occupation—for a sluggard. but in our own time has appeared a very different tone, and more than one great man, as well as numberless intelligent men, have in our time seriously suggested that we should study the insect because we are his inferiors. the old moralists merely took the virtues of man and distributed them quite decoratively and arbitrarily among the animals. the ant was an almost heraldic symbol of industry, as the lion was of courage, or, for the matter of that, the pelican of charity. but if the mediaevals had been convinced that a lion was not courageous, they would have dropped the lion and kept the courage; if the pelican is not charitable, they would say, so much the worse for the pelican. the old moralists, i say, permitted the ant to enforce and typify man’s morality; they never allowed the ant to upset it. they used the ant for industry as the lark for punctuality; they looked up at the flapping birds and down at the crawling insects for a homely lesson. but we have lived to see a sect that does not look down at the insects, but looks up at the insects, that asks us essentially to bow down and worship beetles, like ancient egyptians.
maurice maeterlinck is a man of unmistakable genius, and genius always carries a magnifying glass. in the terrible crystal of his lens we have seen the bees not as a little yellow swarm, but rather in golden armies and hierarchies of warriors and queens. imagination perpetually peers and creeps further down the avenues and vistas in the tubes of science, and one fancies every frantic reversal of proportions; the earwig striding across the echoing plain like an elephant, or the grasshopper coming roaring above our roofs like a vast aeroplane, as he leaps from hertfordshire to surrey. one seems to enter in a dream a temple of enormous entomology, whose architecture is based on something wilder than arms or backbones; in which the ribbed columns have the half-crawling look of dim and monstrous caterpillars; or the dome is a starry spider hung horribly in the void. there is one of the modern works of engineering that gives one something of this nameless fear of the exaggerations of an underworld; and that is the curious curved architecture of the under ground railway, commonly called the twopenny tube. those squat archways, without any upright line or pillar, look as if they had been tunneled by huge worms who have never learned to lift their heads. it is the very underground palace of the serpent, the spirit of changing shape and color, that is the enemy of man.
but it is not merely by such strange aesthetic suggestions that writers like maeterlinck have influenced us in the matter; there is also an ethical side to the business. the upshot of m. maeterlinck’s book on bees is an admiration, one might also say an envy, of their collective spirituality; of the fact that they live only for something which he calls the soul of the hive. and this admiration for the communal morality of insects is expressed in many other modern writers in various quarters and shapes; in mr. benjamin kidd’s theory of living only for the evolutionary future of our race, and in the great interest of some socialists in ants, which they generally prefer to bees, i suppose, because they are not so brightly colored. not least among the hundred evidences of this vague insectolatry are the floods of flattery poured by modern people on that energetic nation of the far east of which it has been said that “patriotism is its only religion”; or, in other words, that it lives only for the soul of the hive. when at long intervals of the centuries christendom grows weak, morbid or skeptical, and mysterious asia begins to move against us her dim populations and to pour them westward like a dark movement of matter, in such cases it has been very common to compare the invasion to a plague of lice or incessant armies of locusts. the eastern armies were indeed like insects; in their blind, busy destructiveness, in their black nihilism of personal outlook, in their hateful indifference to individual life and love, in their base belief in mere numbers, in their pessimistic courage and their atheistic patriotism, the riders and raiders of the east are indeed like all the creeping things of the earth. but never before, i think, have christians called a turk a locust and meant it as a compliment. now for the first time we worship as well as fear; and trace with adoration that enormous form advancing vast and vague out of asia, faintly discernible amid the mystic clouds of winged creatures hung over the wasted lands, thronging the skies like thunder and discoloring the skies like rain; beelzebub, the lord of flies.
in resisting this horrible theory of the soul of the hive, we of christendom stand not for ourselves, but for all humanity; for the essential and distinctive human idea that one good and happy man is an end in himself, that a soul is worth saving. nay, for those who like such biological fancies it might well be said that we stand as chiefs and champions of a whole section of nature, princes of the house whose cognizance is the backbone, standing for the milk of the individual mother and the courage of the wandering cub, representing the pathetic chivalry of the dog, the humor and perversity of cats, the affection of the tranquil horse, the loneliness of the lion. it is more to the point, however, to urge that this mere glorification of society as it is in the social insects is a transformation and a dissolution in one of the outlines which have been specially the symbols of man. in the cloud and confusion of the flies and bees is growing fainter and fainter, as is finally disappearing, the idea of the human family. the hive has become larger than the house, the bees are destroying their captors; what the locust hath left, the caterpillar hath eaten; and the little house and garden of our friend jones is in a bad way.
