man the animal that thinks
to expatiate upon the importance of thought would be absurd. the traditional definition of man as "the thinking animal" fixes thought as the essential difference between man and the brutes,—surely an important matter. more relevant to our purpose is the question how thought is important, for an answer to this question will throw light upon the kind of training thought requires if it is to subserve its end.
§ 1. the values of thought
the possibility of deliberate and intentional activity
i. thought affords the sole method of escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action. a being without capacity for thought is moved only by instincts and appetites, as these are called forth by outward conditions and by the inner state of the organism. a being thus moved is, as it were, pushed from behind. this is what we mean by the blind nature of brute actions. the agent does not see or foresee the end for which he is acting, nor the results produced by his behaving in one way rather than in another. he does not "know what he is about." where there is thought, things present act as signs or tokens of things not yet experienced. a thinking being can, accordingly, act on the basis of the absent and the future. instead of being pushed into a mode of action by the sheer urgency of forces, whether[pg 15] instincts or habits, of which he is not aware, a reflective agent is drawn (to some extent at least) to action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware.
natural events come to be a language
an animal without thought may go into its hole when rain threatens, because of some immediate stimulus to its organism. a thinking agent will perceive that certain given facts are probable signs of a future rain, and will take steps in the light of this anticipated future. to plant seeds, to cultivate the soil, to harvest grain, are intentional acts, possible only to a being who has learned to subordinate the immediately felt elements of an experience to those values which these hint at and prophesy. philosophers have made much of the phrases "book of nature," "language of nature." well, it is in virtue of the capacity of thought that given things are significant of absent things, and that nature speaks a language which may be interpreted. to a being who thinks, things are records of their past, as fossils tell of the prior history of the earth, and are prophetic of their future, as from the present positions of heavenly bodies remote eclipses are foretold. shakespeare's "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks," expresses literally enough the power superadded to existences when they appeal to a thinking being. upon the function of signification depend all foresight, all intelligent planning, deliberation, and calculation.
the possibility of systematized foresight
ii. by thought man also develops and arranges artificial signs to remind him in advance of consequences, and of ways of securing and avoiding them. as the trait just mentioned makes the difference between savage man and brute, so this trait makes the difference between civilized man and savage. a savage who has been shipwrecked in a river may note certain things which[pg 16] serve him as signs of danger in the future. but civilized man deliberately makes such signs; he sets up in advance of wreckage warning buoys, and builds lighthouses where he sees signs that such events may occur. a savage reads weather signs with great expertness; civilized man institutes a weather service by which signs are artificially secured and information is distributed in advance of the appearance of any signs that could be detected without special methods. a savage finds his way skillfully through a wilderness by reading certain obscure indications; civilized man builds a highway which shows the road to all. the savage learns to detect the signs of fire and thereby to invent methods of producing flame; civilized man invents permanent conditions for producing light and heat whenever they are needed. the very essence of civilized culture is that we deliberately erect monuments and memorials, lest we forget; and deliberately institute, in advance of the happening of various contingencies and emergencies of life, devices for detecting their approach and registering their nature, for warding off what is unfavorable, or at least for protecting ourselves from its full impact and for making more secure and extensive what is favorable. all forms of artificial apparatus are intentionally designed modifications of natural things in order that they may serve better than in their natural estate to indicate the hidden, the absent, and the remote.
the possibility of objects rich in quality
iii. finally, thought confers upon physical events and objects a very different status and value from that which they possess to a being that does not reflect. these words are mere scratches, curious variations of light and shade, to one to whom they are not linguistic signs. to him for whom they are signs of other things,[pg 17] each has a definite individuality of its own, according to the meaning that it is used to convey. exactly the same holds of natural objects. a chair is a different object to a being to whom it consciously suggests an opportunity for sitting down, repose, or sociable converse, from what it is to one to whom it presents itself merely as a thing to be smelled, or gnawed, or jumped over; a stone is different to one who knows something of its past history and its future use from what it is to one who only feels it directly through his senses. it is only by courtesy, indeed, that we can say that an unthinking animal experiences an object at all—so largely is anything that presents itself to us as an object made up by the qualities it possesses as a sign of other things.
the nature of the objects an animal perceives
an english logician (mr. venn) has remarked that it may be questioned whether a dog sees a rainbow any more than he apprehends the political constitution of the country in which he lives. the same principle applies to the kennel in which he sleeps and the meat that he eats. when he is sleepy, he goes to the kennel; when he is hungry, he is excited by the smell and color of meat; beyond this, in what sense does he see an object? certainly he does not see a house—i.e. a thing with all the properties and relations of a permanent residence, unless he is capable of making what is present a uniform sign of what is absent—unless he is capable of thought. nor does he see what he eats as meat unless it suggests the absent properties by virtue of which it is a certain joint of some animal, and is known to afford nourishment. just what is left of an object stripped of all such qualities of meaning, we cannot well say; but we can be sure that the object is then a very different sort of thing from the objects that we perceive. there[pg 18] is moreover no particular limit to the possibilities of growth in the fusion of a thing as it is to sense and as it is to thought, or as a sign of other things. the child today soon regards as constituent parts of objects qualities that once it required the intelligence of a copernicus or a newton to apprehend.
mill on the business of life and the occupation of mind
these various values of the power of thought may be summed up in the following quotation from john stuart mill. "to draw inferences," he says, "has been said to be the great business of life. every one has daily, hourly, and momentary need of ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed: not from any general purpose of adding to his stock of knowledge, but because the facts themselves are of importance to his interests or to his occupations. the business of the magistrate, of the military commander, of the navigator, of the physician, of the agriculturist, is merely to judge of evidence and to act accordingly.... as they do this well or ill, so they discharge well or ill the duties of their several callings. it is the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged."[3]
§ 2. importance of direction in order to realize these values
thinking goes astray
what a person has not only daily and hourly, but momentary need of performing, is not a technical and abstruse matter; nor, on the other hand, is it trivial and negligible. such a function must be congenial to the mind, and must be performed, in an unspoiled mind, upon every fitting occasion. just because, however, it is an operation of drawing inferences, of basing conclusions upon evidence, of reaching belief indirectly, it is[pg 19] an operation that may go wrong as well as right, and hence is one that needs safeguarding and training. the greater its importance the greater are the evils when it is ill-exercised.
ideas are our rulers—for better or for worse
an earlier writer than mill, john locke (1632-1704), brings out the importance of thought for life and the need of training so that its best and not its worst possibilities will be realized, in the following words: "no man ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the understanding with such light as it has, well or ill informed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all his operative powers are directed.... temples have their sacred images, and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind. but in truth the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them, and to these they all, universally, pay a ready submission. it is therefore of the highest concernment that great care should be taken of the understanding, to conduct it aright in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes."[4] if upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses we make of all our other powers, locke's assertion that it is of the highest concernment that care should be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement. while the power of thought frees us from servile subjection to instinct, appetite, and routine, it also brings with it the occasion and possibility of error and mistake. in elevating us above the brute, it opens to us the possibility of failures to which the animal, limited to instinct, cannot sink.
§ 3. tendencies needing constant regulation
physical and social sanctions of correct thinking
up to a certain point, the ordinary conditions of life, natural and social, provide the conditions requisite for regulating the operations of inference. the necessities of life enforce a fundamental and persistent discipline for which the most cunningly devised artifices would be ineffective substitutes. the burnt child dreads the fire; the painful consequence emphasizes the need of correct inference much more than would learned discourse on the properties of heat. social conditions also put a premium on correct inferring in matters where action based on valid thought is socially important. these sanctions of proper thinking may affect life itself, or at least a life reasonably free from perpetual discomfort. the signs of enemies, of shelter, of food, of the main social conditions, have to be correctly apprehended.
the serious limitations of such sanctions
but this disciplinary training, efficacious as it is within certain limits, does not carry us beyond a restricted boundary. logical attainment in one direction is no bar to extravagant conclusions in another. a savage expert in judging signs of the movements and location of animals that he hunts, will accept and gravely narrate the most preposterous yarns concerning the origin of their habits and structures. when there is no directly appreciable reaction of the inference upon the security and prosperity of life, there are no natural checks to the acceptance of wrong beliefs. conclusions may be generated by a modicum of fact merely because the suggestions are vivid and interesting; a large accumulation of data may fail to suggest a proper conclusion because existing customs are averse to entertaining it. independent of training, there is a "primitive credulity"[pg 21] which tends to make no distinction between what a trained mind calls fancy and that which it calls a reasonable conclusion. the face in the clouds is believed in as some sort of fact, merely because it is forcibly suggested. natural intelligence is no barrier to the propagation of error, nor large but untrained experience to the accumulation of fixed false beliefs. errors may support one another mutually and weave an ever larger and firmer fabric of misconception. dreams, the positions of stars, the lines of the hand, may be regarded as valuable signs, and the fall of cards as an inevitable omen, while natural events of the most crucial significance go disregarded. beliefs in portents of various kinds, now mere nook and cranny superstitions, were once universal. a long discipline in exact science was required for their conquest.
superstition as natural a result as science
in the mere function of suggestion, there is no difference between the power of a column of mercury to portend rain, and that of the entrails of an animal or the flight of birds to foretell the fortunes of war. for all anybody can tell in advance, the spilling of salt is as likely to import bad luck as the bite of a mosquito to import malaria. only systematic regulation of the conditions under which observations are made and severe discipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can secure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and the other sound. the substitution of scientific for superstitious habits of inference has not been brought about by any improvement in the acuteness of the senses or in the natural workings of the function of suggestion. it is the result of regulation of the conditions under which observation and inference take place.[pg 22]
general causes of bad thinking: bacon's "idols"
it is instructive to note some of the attempts that have been made to classify the main sources of error in reaching beliefs. francis bacon, for example, at the beginnings of modern scientific inquiry, enumerated four such classes, under the somewhat fantastic title of "idols" (gr. ειδωλα, images), spectral forms that allure the mind into false paths. these he called the idols, or phantoms, of the (a) tribe, (b) the marketplace, (c) the cave or den, and (d) the theater; or, less metaphorically, (a) standing erroneous methods (or at least temptations to error) that have their roots in human nature generally; (b) those that come from intercourse and language; (c) those that are due to causes peculiar to a specific individual; and finally, (d) those that have their sources in the fashion or general current of a period. classifying these causes of fallacious belief somewhat differently, we may say that two are intrinsic and two are extrinsic. of the intrinsic, one is common to all men alike (such as the universal tendency to notice instances that corroborate a favorite belief more readily than those that contradict it), while the other resides in the specific temperament and habits of the given individual. of the extrinsic, one proceeds from generic social conditions—like the tendency to suppose that there is a fact wherever there is a word, and no fact where there is no linguistic term—while the other proceeds from local and temporary social currents.
locke on the influence of
locke's method of dealing with typical forms of wrong belief is less formal and may be more enlightening. we can hardly do better than quote his forcible and quaint language, when, enumerating different classes of men, he shows different ways in which thought goes wrong:[pg 23]
(a) dependence on others,
1. "the first is of those who seldom reason at all, but do and think according to the example of others, whether parents, neighbors, ministers, or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith in, for the saving of themselves the pains and troubles of thinking and examining for themselves."
(b) self-interest,
2. "this kind is of those who put passion in the place of reason, and being resolved that shall govern their actions and arguments, neither use their own, nor hearken to other people's reason, any farther than it suits their humor, interest, or party."[5]
(c) circumscribed experience
3. "the third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason, but for want of having that which one may call large, sound, roundabout sense, have not a full view of all that relates to the question.... they converse but with one sort of men, they read but one sort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions.... they have a pretty traffic with known correspondents in some little creek ... but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge." men of originally equal natural parts may finally arrive at very different stores of knowledge and truth, "when all the odds between them has been the different scope that has been given to their understandings to range in, for the gathering up of information and furnishing their heads with ideas and notions and observations, whereon to employ their mind."[6]
[pg 24]
in another portion of his writings,[7] locke states the same ideas in slightly different form.
effect of dogmatic principles,
1. "that which is inconsistent with our principles is so far from passing for probable with us that it will not be allowed possible. the reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony, not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules.... there is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds propositions ... from their parents, nurses, or those about them; which being insinuated in their unwary as well as unbiased understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (and this whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. for men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned." they take them as standards "to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies."
of closed minds,
2. "secondly, next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mold, and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis." such men, locke goes on to say, while not denying the existence of facts and evidence, cannot be convinced by the evidence that[pg 25] would decide them if their minds were not so closed by adherence to fixed belief.
of strong passion,
3. "predominant passions. thirdly, probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run the same fate. let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning, and money on the other, it is easy to foresee which will outweigh. earthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongest batteries.
of dependence upon authority of others
4. "authority. the fourth and last wrong measure of probability i shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the others together, is the giving up our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighborhood or country."
causes of bad mental habits are social as well as inborn
both bacon and locke make it evident that over and above the sources of misbelief that reside in the natural tendencies of the individual (like those toward hasty and too far-reaching conclusions), social conditions tend to instigate and confirm wrong habits of thinking by authority, by conscious instruction, and by the even more insidious half-conscious influences of language, imitation, sympathy, and suggestion. education has accordingly not only to safeguard an individual against the besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind—its rashness, presumption, and preference of what chimes with self-interest to objective evidence—but also to undermine and destroy the accumulated and self-perpetuating prejudices of long ages. when social life in general has become more reasonable, more imbued with rational conviction, and less moved by stiff authority and blind passion, educational agencies may be more positive and constructive than at present, for they will[pg 26] work in harmony with the educative influence exercised willy-nilly by other social surroundings upon an individual's habits of thought and belief. at present, the work of teaching must not only transform natural tendencies into trained habits of thought, but must also fortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in the social environment, and help displace erroneous habits already produced.
§ 4. regulation transforms inference into proof
a leap is involved in all thinking
thinking is important because, as we have seen, it is that function in which given or ascertained facts stand for or indicate others which are not directly ascertained. but the process of reaching the absent from the present is peculiarly exposed to error; it is liable to be influenced by almost any number of unseen and unconsidered causes,—past experience, received dogmas, the stirring of self-interest, the arousing of passion, sheer mental laziness, a social environment steeped in biased traditions or animated by false expectations, and so on. the exercise of thought is, in the literal sense of that word, inference; by it one thing carries us over to the idea of, and belief in, another thing. it involves a jump, a leap, a going beyond what is surely known to something else accepted on its warrant. unless one is an idiot, one simply cannot help having all things and events suggest other things not actually present, nor can one help a tendency to believe in the latter on the basis of the former. the very inevitableness of the jump, the leap, to something unknown, only emphasizes the necessity of attention to the conditions under which it occurs so that the danger of a false step may be lessened and the probability of a right landing increased.[pg 27]
hence, the need of regulation which, when adequate, makes proof
such attention consists in regulation (1) of the conditions under which the function of suggestion takes place, and (2) of the conditions under which credence is yielded to the suggestions that occur. inference controlled in these two ways (the study of which in detail constitutes one of the chief objects of this book) forms proof. to prove a thing means primarily to try, to test it. the guest bidden to the wedding feast excused himself because he had to prove his oxen. exceptions are said to prove a rule; i.e. they furnish instances so extreme that they try in the severest fashion its applicability; if the rule will stand such a test, there is no good reason for further doubting it. not until a thing has been tried—"tried out," in colloquial language—do we know its true worth. till then it may be pretense, a bluff. but the thing that has come out victorious in a test or trial of strength carries its credentials with it; it is approved, because it has been proved. its value is clearly evinced, shown, i.e. demonstrated. so it is with inferences. the mere fact that inference in general is an invaluable function does not guarantee, nor does it even help out the correctness of any particular inference. any inference may go astray; and as we have seen, there are standing influences ever ready to assist its going wrong. what is important, is that every inference shall be a tested inference; or (since often this is not possible) that we shall discriminate between beliefs that rest upon tested evidence and those that do not, and shall be accordingly on our guard as to the kind and degree of assent yielded.
the office of education in forming skilledpowers of thinking
while it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, any more than to teach every possible item of information, it is its business to culti[pg 28]vate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. no matter how much an individual knows as a matter of hearsay and information, if he has not attitudes and habits of this sort, he is not intellectually educated. he lacks the rudiments of mental discipline. and since these habits are not a gift of nature (no matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them); since, moreover, the casual circumstances of the natural and social environment are not enough to compel their acquisition, the main office of education is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation. the formation of these habits is the training of mind.
