the czar at the duma—the campaign in galicia—our life at g.h.q.—growing disaffection in the rear
(1916)
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{161}
the czar had returned to g.h.q. alone on december 25th, and three days later he reviewed on the galician frontier the divisions of the guard which had been concentrated in view of an imminent offensive. the absence of alexis nicola?evitch was a real sorrow to him, as he had been looking forward eagerly to presenting him to his guard. he had then returned to mohileff.
towards the end of the year 1915 the military situation of the russians had greatly improved. the army had taken advantage of the quiet months which followed the conclusion of the great german offensive at the end of september, 1915, and, thanks to the enormous reserves in man-power at the disposal of the country, it had easily made good the very heavy losses it had suffered in the retreat. once more the germans found themselves baulked of the great prize they had promised themselves—a prize which their brilliant successes at the opening of the campaign seemed to have assured. they had growing doubts about their ability to overcome the stubborn russian resistance by arms, and by clever propaganda and cunning intrigues they were now endeavouring to stir up such{162} disaffection in the interior of the country as would hasten, they hoped, the consummation so devoutly to be desired. but in the person of the czar they found an insurmountable obstacle to the realisation of their designs. that obstacle must be removed.
by assuming the command of his troops and thus staking his crown on the struggle, the czar had definitely deprived his enemies of all hopes of a reconciliation. at berlin the authorities now knew that nicholas ii. would stand by his allies to the bitter end, and that all attempts at a rapprochement would be broken against his unswerving determination to continue the war at any cost. they also knew that the czar was the sole bond between the different parties in the empire, and that once it was removed no organised power would be capable of averting dismemberment and anarchy.
the german general staff therefore devoted itself unceasingly to ruin the prestige of the monarchy and bring about the downfall of the czar. to attain that object the essential step was to compromise the czar in the eyes of his people and his allies. germany had in russia many sources of intelligence and powerful means of action, and she devoted herself to spreading the idea that the czar was thinking of liquidating the war and making a separate peace.
the czar decided to nip these intrigues in the bud and to define his intentions beyond doubt. on january 2nd, at zamirie, where he was inspecting the regiments of general kuropatkin’s army, he ended his address to the troops with the following formal declaration:
“you need have no fear. as i announced at the beginning of the war, i will not make peace until we have driven the last enemy soldier beyond our frontiers, nor will i conclude{163} peace except by agreement with our allies, to whom we are bound not only by treaties but by sincere friendship and the blood spilt in a common cause.”
nicholas ii. thus confirmed in the presence of his army that solemn compact which had been entered upon on august 2nd, 1914, and renewed when he had become commander-in-chief of the russian armies. the government was anxious to give the widest possible publicity to the czar’s speech, and had it printed and distributed among the armies and in the country districts.
in january and february the czar continued his visits to the front and g.h.q. (it was at mohileff that he spent the russian new year), and returned to tsarsko?e-selo on february 21st, the day before the opening of the duma. five days before, the news of the capture of the fortress of erzerum, which had so long been the backbone of the turkish resistance, had caused great joy throughout russia. it was certainly a fine success, and the offensive of the army of the caucasus continued to make rapid headway.
the morning after his arrival the czar carried out his intention of going with his brother, the grand-duke michael, to the tauride palace, where the duma was to resume its labours that day. it was the first time that the representatives of the nation had received a visit from their sovereign, and in political circles great importance was attached to this historical event. it bore witness to the czar’s ardent desire for closer co-operation with the people’s representatives, and the step was particularly warmly welcomed, as confidence in the government had been shaken as the result of the reverses suffered by the army and the crushing charges made against the former minister of war, general sukhomlinoff.{164}
the czar was received on his arrival at the tauride palace by m. rodzianko, president of the duma, who conducted him into the catherine hall, where he was present at a te deum to celebrate the capture of erzerum. then turning to the deputies, the czar expressed his great pleasure at being among them, and voiced his absolute conviction that in the tragic days through which russia was passing they would all unite their efforts and work together in perfect harmony for the welfare of the country. his words were received with vociferous cheers.
the czar withdrew after a visit to the chambers and offices of the tauride palace. half an hour later the president, in opening the session, ended his speech with these words:
“the direct association of the czar with his people, that benefit which is inestimable and indispensable to the prosperity of the russian empire, is now strengthened by a tie which is still more potent. this good news will fill all hearts with, joy even in the remotest corners of our land, and give fresh courage to our glorious soldiers, the defenders of their country.”
on that memorable day it seemed that the sovereign, the ministers, and the representatives of the nation had one thought, and one thought alone—to conquer at whatever cost.
the same evening the czar went to the council of state, which was also resuming its labours that day. then he returned to tsarsko?e-selo, which he left next morning for g.h.q. this was the time of the great onslaught on verdun, and it was essential that russia should intervene without delay in order to draw a larger portion of the german forces upon herself. it was decided to take the offensive.
the attack was launched about march 15th in the dvinsk and vilna sectors, and at first it was crowned with success,{165} but the progress of the russians was slow, for the germans offered a very stubborn resistance. there had been a thaw, the roads were almost impracticable, and the men had to wade through mud and marsh. the attack died down about the beginning of april and soon came to a standstill. yet the diversion had borne fruit, for the germans had found themselves compelled to send considerable reinforcements to the threatened sectors.
alexis nicola?evitch had remained very weak as the result of the excessive h?morrhage which had so endangered his life in december. it was february before he was quite strong again, but the czarina had learned from experience, and intended to keep him at tsarsko?e-selo until the return of the fine weather.[41]
i was far from complaining of the czarina’s decision, for the czarevitch’s education was suffering as the result of our long visits to the front.
we did not return to g.h.q. until may 17th. the czar was to remain there for a considerable time. a fortnight after our arrival—on june 4th—the great offensive of general brussiloff opened in galicia. it was a complete triumph, and our successes were greatly extended in the following days. under the pressure of the russian army the austrian front gave way and was withdrawn towards lemberg. the number of prisoners was very large, and the situation of the austrians in{166} the lutzk sector became highly critical. the news of this fine victory was received with immense enthusiasm at g.h.q. it was to be the last cause of rejoicing for the czar.
since our return to headquarters our life had followed the same course as during our previous visits, though i no longer gave the czarevitch his lessons in his father’s study, but in a little verandah which we had converted into a schoolroom or in a large tent in the garden, which was also our dining-room. it was here that the czar took his meals after the hot weather began. we took advantage of the fine summer days to go sailing on the dnieper. we had the use of a small yacht which had been placed at our disposal by the ministry of ways and communications.
from time to time the czarina and the grand-duchesses paid short visits to g.h.q. they lived in their train, but joined the czar at lunch and came with us on our excursions. the czar in return dined with the czarina and spent part of the evening with his family whenever he could. the grand-duchesses greatly enjoyed these visits to mohileff—all too short to their taste—which meant a little change in their monotonous and austere lives. they had far more freedom here than at tsarsko?e-selo. as is so often the case in russia, the station at mohileff was a very long way from the town and almost in the open country. the grand-duchesses spent their spare time visiting the peasants of the neighbourhood or the families of railway employees. their simple ways and natural kindness soon won all hearts, and as they adored children you could see them always accompanied by a mob of ragamuffins collected on their walks and duly stuffed with sweets.
unfortunately, life at mohileff grievously interrupted alexis
[image unavailable.]
three of the grand-duchesses (olga, anastasie, and tatiana) visiting the wife and children of a railway employee at mohileff.
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the czarina and the grand-duchess tatiana talking to refugees. mohileff, may, 1916.
[facing page 166.{167}
nicola?evitch’s studies and was also bad for his health. the impressions he gained there were too numerous and exciting for so delicate a nature as his. he became nervous, fretful, and incapable of useful work. i told the czar what i thought. he admitted that my objections were well founded, but suggested that these drawbacks were compensated for by the fact that his son was losing his timidity and natural wildness, and that the sight of all the misery he had witnessed would give him a salutary horror of war for the rest of his life.
but the longer we stayed at the front the stronger was my conviction that it was doing the czarevitch a lot of harm. my position was becoming difficult, and on two or three occasions i had to take strong steps with the boy. i had an idea that the czar did not entirely approve, and did not back me up as much as he might have done. as i was extremely tired by my work in the last three years—i had had no holiday since september, 1913—i decided to ask for a few weeks’ leave. my colleague, m. petroff, came to take my place, and i left general headquarters on july 14th.
as soon as i arrived at tsarsko?e-selo the czarina summoned me, and i had a long talk with her, in the course of which i tried to show the grave disadvantages for alexis nicola?evitch of his long visits to the front. she replied that the czar and herself quite realised them, but thought that it was better to sacrifice their son’s education temporarily, even at the risk of injuring his health, than to deprive him of the other benefits he was deriving from his stay at mohileff. with a candour which utterly amazed me she said that all his life the czar had suffered terribly from his natural timidity and from the fact that as he had been kept too much in the background he had found himself badly prepared for the duties{168} of a ruler on the sudden death of alexander iii. the czar had vowed to avoid the same mistakes in the education of his son.
i realised that i had come up against a considered decision, and was not likely to secure any modification. all the same, it was agreed that alexis nicola?evitch’s lessons should be resumed on a more regular plan at the end of september, and that i should receive some assistance in my work.
when our conversation was over the czarina made me stay behind to dinner. i was the only guest that evening. after the meal we went out on the terrace. it was a beautiful summer evening, warm and still. her majesty was stretched on a sofa, and she and two of her daughters were knitting woollen clothing for the soldiers. the two other grand-duchesses were sewing. alexis nicola?evitch was naturally the principal topic of conversation. they never tired of asking me what he did and said. i spent an hour thus in this homely and quiet circle, suddenly introduced into the intimacy of that family life which etiquette had forbidden me from entering, save in this casual and rare fashion.
in the days following i spent my time in a round of visits and renewing relationships which my journeys to the front had compelled me to neglect. i thus saw people in different strata of society in the capital, and was not slow to realise that far-reaching changes had taken place in public opinion in recent months. people did not confine themselves to violent attacks on the government, but went on to attack the person of the czar.
since that memorable february 22nd on which nicholas ii. had presented himself to the duma in his sincere desire for{169} reconciliation, the differences between the sovereign and the representatives of the nation had only increased. the czar had long been hesitating to grant the liberal concessions which had been demanded. he considered it was the wrong time, and that it was dangerous to attempt reforms while the war was raging. it was not that he clung to his autocratic personal prerogatives, for he was simplicity and modesty itself, but he feared the effect such radical changes might have at so critical a moment. when the czar declared on february 22nd that he was happy to be among the representatives of his people, the czar had spoken his real thoughts. in inviting them to unite all their efforts for the welfare of the country in the tragic days through which it was passing, he was urging them to forget all their political differences and have only one goal—victory and belief in their czar until the end of the war.
why did he not make a solemn promise that day to give the nation the liberties they asked as soon as circumstances permitted? why did he not try to recover by his acts that confidence of the duma which he felt he was losing? the answer is that those around him had made it impossible for him to find out for himself what was really going on in the country.
the czar’s visit to the tauride palace had given rise to great hopes. they had not been fulfilled, and men were not slow to see that nothing had been changed. the conflict with the government was immediately resumed. the demands became more pressing and recrimination more violent. frightened by the false reports of those who abused his confidence, the czar began to regard the opposition of the duma as the result of revolutionary agitation, and thought he could re-establish his authority by measures which only swelled the general discontent.{170}
but it was the czarina who was the special object of attack. the worst insinuations about her conduct had gained currency and were believed even by circles which hitherto had rejected them with scorn. as i have said, the presence of rasputin at court was a growing blot on the prestige of the sovereigns, and gave rise to the most malicious comments. it was not as if the critics confined themselves to attacks upon the private life of the czarina. she was openly accused of germanophile sympathies, and it was suggested that her feelings for germany could become a danger to the country. the word “treason” was not yet heard, but guarded hints showed that the suspicion had been planted in a good many heads. i knew that all this was the result of german propaganda and intrigues.[42]
i have explained above that in the autumn of 1915 the berlin government had realised that they could never overthrow russia as long as she stood united round her czar, and that from that moment her one idea had been to provoke a revolution which would involve the fall of nicholas ii. in view of the difficulties of attacking the czar directly, the germans had concentrated their efforts against the czarina and begun a subterranean campaign of defamation against her. it was skilfully planned and began to show results before long. they had stopped at nothing in the way of calumny. they{171} had adopted the classic procedure, so well known to history, of striking the monarch in the person of his consort. it is, of course, always easier to damage the reputation of a woman, especially when she is a foreigner. realising all the advantages to be derived from the fact that the czarina was a german princess, they had endeavoured to suggest very cunningly that she was a traitor to russia. it was the best method of compromising her in the eyes of the nation. the accusation had been favourably received in certain quarters in russia and had become a formidable weapon against the dynasty.
the czarina knew all about the campaign in progress against her and it pained her as a most profound injustice, for she had accepted her new country, as she had adopted her new faith, with all the fervour of her nature. she was russian by sentiment as she was orthodox by conviction.[43]
my residence behind the front also enabled me to realise how much the country was suffering from the war. the weariness and privations were causing general discontent. as a result of the increasing shortage of rolling-stock, fuel, which had been cruelly scarce in the winter, continued to be{172} unpurchasable. it was the same with food, and the cost of living continued to rise at an alarming rate.
on august 11th i returned to g.h.q. thoroughly perturbed at all i had seen and heard. it was pleasant to find the atmosphere at mohileff very different from that at petrograd, and to feel the stimulating influence of circles which offered so stern a resistance to the “defeatist” spirit at work at home. yet the authorities there were very concerned at the political situation, although that was not so obvious at first sight.
alexis nicola?evitch gave me a very affectionate welcome when i came back (he had written to me regularly while i was away), and the czar received me with exceptional kindness. i could thus congratulate myself on the result of leaving my pupil for some time, especially as it might have been a false step, and i took up my duties again with renewed energies. my english colleague, mr. gibbes, had meanwhile joined us, and as m. petroff remained with us, the czarevitch’s lessons could proceed practically regularly.
at the front the fighting had gradually died down in the northern and central sectors. it continued only in galicia, where the russians were still driving the austrians before them, and their defeat would long since have become a flight if they had not been supported by a large number of german regiments.
the campaign of 1916, however, had convinced the russian general staff that they would never break the resistance of the enemy and secure final victory so long as they suffered from so great a lack of artillery. their inferiority in that respect prevented a thorough exploitation of the successes gained by the courage of the troops and their numerical superiority at the{173} beginning of each attack. there was nothing for it but to wait until the material promised by the allies, the delivery of which had been delayed by difficulties of transport, was ready and available.
the austrian defeats had had a very great effect on rumania. she was more and more inclined to associate herself with the cause of the entente, but she was still hesitating to enter the arena. the russian minister at bucharest had had to bring strong pressure to bear to induce her to make up her mind.[44]
on august 27th rumania at length declared war. her position was very difficult, as she was on the extreme left flank of the immense russian front, from which she was separated by the carpathians. she was threatened with an austro-german attack from the north and west, and could be taken in rear by the bulgarians. that is exactly what happened, and the beginning of october marked the beginning of the reverses which were to end only with the occupation of almost the whole of rumania.
as soon as the danger was apparent the russian general staff had taken steps to send help to the rumanian army, but the distances were great and the communications extremely defective. nor was russia in a position to reduce the effectives on her own front to any serious degree, for in case of urgent necessity she would have found herself unable to retrieve the divisions sent to rumania in time. under pressure from the czar, however, all the available reinforcements had been directed there. the question was whether these troops would arrive in time to save bucharest.{174}
we returned to tsarsko?e-selo on november 1st. the impression made by the rumanian disaster had been great, and the minister for foreign affairs had been held responsible. at the beginning of the year sturmer had succeeded goremykin as president of the council of ministers. his appointment had been badly received, and he had simply made one fault after another. it had been as the result of his intrigues that sazonoff, who had rendered such great services as foreign minister, had had to resign, and sturmer had hastened to take his place while remaining president of the council.
he was hated as much for his name as his acts. it was alleged that he only kept himself in power thanks to the influence of rasputin. some even went so far as to accuse him of pro-german sympathies, and to suspect him of favouring a separate peace with germany.[45] nicholas ii. compromised himself by keeping for so long a minister whom all suspected. it was hoped that the czar would ultimately realise that he had been deceived once more, but we all feared that he would find out only too late, when the harm done was irremediable.
