the introduction of chinese indentured labour to the transvaal has been a complete failure—(1) financially, (2) socially, (3) politically.
the slave-owning ideals of the rand lords has made the transvaal a hell. it has not even made it a paying hell. every security connected with the rand industry has decreased enormously. it is estimated that the loss of capital runs to many millions of pounds sterling. it cannot be said in excuse that this is the result of general commercial depression throughout the empire, for almost every other kind of security, except consols, has considerably appreciated in value.
certainly the record monthly output of gold has long been passed. more gold has been produced each month than was ever produced before, even during the pre-war period. but these record outputs mean nothing. even at 1s. 6d. a day the chinese labourer has been[pg 111] proved to be an expensive luxury. he costs nearly 50 per cent. more than the kaffir. the expenses of nearly every mine where chinese labour has been employed have gone up; the expenses of every mine where kaffir labour is employed have gone down.
mr. f. h. p. cresswell had something pertinent to say on this topic in the admirable address on the chinese labour question which he delivered the other day at potchefstroom. dealing with the argument that white labour was prohibitively expensive, and that in order to work low-grade mines coolies must be employed, the indefatigable fighter of the yellow man observed—
"i have picked out at random a number of mines, and i find that the mine showing the best results, the only one showing other than very bad results with coolies, is the van ryn mine. this mine in the june quarter of 1904 was working at a cost of 24s. 5d. per ton, and milled 30,000 tons in that quarter; they were then using native and, i believe, no unskilled whites at all. a year before that they were milling 24,500 tons, at a cost of 28s. 2d. per ton, with 1,000 natives. in the june quarter of 1905 it worked at a cost of 21s. per ton, and milled 60,000 tons. in that quarter it was using some 2,000 coolies."
here is an instructive list which was compiled by the pall mall gazette on september 8 last:—
[pg 112]
mine expenses
ever since the beginning of the war, we seem to have been watching in a bewitched trance for the coming of the boom. some people described johannesburg as the enchanted city waiting for the spell to be removed for the boom to come. it has never come; and it never will come as long as chinamen are employed to do the work that can be done by kaffirs or white men.
when the incurable idleness of the chinaman and his cost of keep is added to that 1s. 6d. a day, he is dearer than the black man or the white man.
the rand lord was anxious to procure cheap[pg 113] labour and subservient labour. the white man could not be employed because he would have held the management of the country in the hollow of his hand, have formed trade unions, and insisted on proper wages and proper treatment. enough black men, if time had been given, would have worked at the mines even at the reduced wages paid by the rand lords.
on this point, too, mr. cresswell, from whose potchefstroom speech i quoted just now, had something instructive to say. in dissecting the official records, he observed—
"they show that between june 1904 and the end of last august—the last month for which statistics are available—the number of natives on the producing mines of the rand had increased by 19,000, or an average increase of 1,355 a month. does any man here for a minute really believe that if no chinese had come here at all the gentlemen controlling the mines would not have done exactly the same from june 1904 to august 1905, as they did from june 1903 to june 1904? does any one believe that in the latter period, as in the former period, they would not have managed to bring an average of a hundred more stamps into operation, and into the producing mines, for every 1,085 natives at least that they added to their force of native labour? if they had merely added on 100 stamps for every 1,085 natives, as they did up to june 1904, do you know how many stamps would have been working in august 1905?[pg 114] they would have had 6,503 stamps at work. do you know how many they actually had at work? they had 6,845 stamps at work, or a paltry 342 stamps more than if no chinese had ever been imported!"
but the kaffir could not be forced to work. there was nothing to prevent him from throwing up his employment when he had earned sufficient money and was returning to his kraal. the only chance, therefore, so the rand lords argued, of acquiring the voteless and subservient labour that they wanted, was to get chinese labour. the chinaman is certainly voteless, but he has proved far from subservient—far less subservient than a kaffir.
belonging to a more intelligent race, the child of an old though dormant civilization, he has known exactly how to deal with his masters. of the gold extracted from the mines so much goes to wages and so much goes to dividends; the wages are spent in the country, the dividends are spent in europe. raise wages and you will render south africa prosperous; lower wages and you will denude south africa.
the chinese policy of so-called economy has ruined the small trader, and turned the main stream of south african gold to park lane, paris and berlin, with a thin stream to china. this country, which has given so much for the transvaal, has benefited least by the gold mines.
the kaffir does nearly 50 per cent. more work[pg 115] than the chinese coolie, and mr. cresswell has proved that for the actual work of mining it is better to employ a white man than a kaffir. these are not fanciful deductions, but indisputable facts proved finally and conclusively.
for almost two decades now the gold fields of south africa have been the most potent force in english society, a force more for evil than for good. it is probable that we have lost more money in wars which are the direct result of the gold fever than we have ever made from the gold mines. if we were to estimate the cost of maintaining a large military force in south africa, the financial effect of the unrest which existed in the pre-war period, the serious effect of the jameson raid on the money market, the ￡250,000,000 that we spent on the war, the millions that we have spent since in the work of repatriation, if we were to compare these figures with the amount of wealth extracted from the rand, and made a simple profit and loss account, it is highly probable that we should find ourselves very considerably out of pocket.
and yet, as if hypnotized by the glamour of gold, we continue to treat the mine owners as if they were some particularly favoured class. we continue to submit to their dictation, which has proved so ruinous in the past, and we deliberately disregard the voices of the whole empire in their favour. such a policy is neither good sense nor good business.
[pg 116]
the introduction of chinese labour into the rand on the top of all these grave financial and economical failures cannot be distinguished for a moment from madness. it would seem, indeed, that we were deliberately bent on destroying the empire for the sake of the jewish and un-british houses in johannesburg. "he whom the gods intend to destroy they first make mad," is an ancient proverb, which seems strangely applicable to those gentlemen who are responsible for the management of our vast empire.
they say here in britain that the stories of gangs of murderers roaming over the transvaal are so many political fairy-tales, the result of party feeling, the usual bait for the hustings, the stalking-horse to bring into office one set of men and to throw out of office the other. they say that the objection of the british public to chinese labour is a matter of hypocritical sentiment; that they really have none of those fine ideals which they pretend to; that they have no passion for liberty and freedom and the rights of man. is not the chinaman better off than he is in his own country?
such casuistry would justify the beating to death with the knout in this country of a black criminal, because in his own country capital punishment was carried out by the more cruel process of burying him alive in an ant-heap to be eaten by the ants in the heat of the african sun.
it has brought terror and fear into the [pg 117]transvaal. and terror and fear breed passions and vices which are a danger to every social community. it emphasizes the cruelty and cunning in a man's nature. it destroys in him that kindliness and sympathy—those "virtues of the heart," as dickens used to call them—which in spite of all are still noble and fine sentiments to cherish.
professor james simpson, of new college, edinburgh, who lately visited south africa with the british association, takes the view, i see, that ere long the more evilly-disposed among the chinese will have been worked out of their ranks, and the whole body will settle down to "strenuous, if automatic, labour." it is devoutly to be hoped that such will be the case, but up to the present there is nothing to indicate that it will be so. on the contrary, everything points to the fact that the chinaman, emboldened by his successful efforts at checkmating the representatives of law and order, will perpetrate fresh outrages with increased impunity, and that the last phase of the yellow terror will be worse than the first.
i had just written the foregoing when, happening to pick up an evening paper, the following reuter message from johannesburg, dated november 3, caught my eye:—
"chinese secret society on the rand.
"johannesburg, november 3.
"evidence given at the trial here of some chinamen charged with being concerned in the[pg 118] disturbance at the new modderfontein mine, disclosed the existence of an organized secret society among the chinese called the 'red door,' the object of which is the committal of crime. the members, who are all of bad character, are sworn to render each other assistance. the authorities are breaking up the society and repatriating the ringleaders."
what has his grace of canterbury to say to this?
i have seen in a recent election in england a poster evidently intended as a counterblast to the posters issued by the opposition. it is a poster, in which sir henry campbell-bannerman is addressing an english miner, while in the distance two happy chinamen grin pleasantly in the clean, well-laid-out mine. says sir henry campbell-bannerman in effect, "my dear man, these men are robbing you of your labour." "not at all," replies the white miner, "for every batch of these yellow men one white man is employed."
this is intended as a defence of the statement made by lord milner on march 20, 1904, who then stated that he was prepared to stake his reputation on the estimate that for every 10,000 coloured labourers introduced there would be in three years' time 10,000 more whites in the country. in effect, the implication underlying this statement was, of course, that for every yellow man introduced, one white man would come into the country and find employment.
[pg 119]
six months later—on september 5, 1904—the colonial secretary replied as follows, to a correspondent who wrote asking him whether it would be now advisable for a man to go out to the transvaal.
"mr. lyttelton," so ran the answer, "would certainly not advise any one to go out without a definite prospect of employment."
so far from 50,000 white men finding employment in the transvaal since the introduction of 50,000 chinamen, the proportion is thousands below this number, and not even the poverty-stricken state of poplar or west ham can compare with the impecuniosity to be met with at every street corner of the gold reef city. there are thousands of men in south africa who have been lured there by the prospects of the rand in a daily state of destitution. the streets of johannesburg are crowded with unemployed. the evil seeds of poverty and destitution have been scattered throughout the length and breadth of south africa. business in durban is in a parlous condition. in cape town there are thousands of absolutely destitute men, women, and children who have to be provided for weekly out of funds now almost exhausted. night after night these unfortunate wretches are compelled to sleep on the mountain slopes, whether it be winter or summer, and quite recently a man was found on one of the seats in the public gardens in such a state of starvation—for he had tasted nothing for five[pg 120] whole days—that he died an hour and a half after.
this is the boasted prosperity which was to have come to the country through the introduction of chinese labour. and yet mr. balfour writes to mr. herbert samuel on november 22—vide the correspondence in the times—that he can see "nothing in the condition of things to induce the government to reverse a policy which was recommended by an overwhelming majority in the transvaal legislative council, with the approval of the great bulk of the white population."(!)
many attempts have been made to justify the pledge made by lord milner, that for every 10,000 introduced, 10,000 white men would find employment. this is a side of the question which was admirably put by lord coleridge in may last:—
the government's policy seems to be that of the mine owner, or rather to serve that of the mine owner—to get labour as cheaply as possible, and, above all, to keep out the white man for fear he should grow independent. mr. lyttelton, speaking at exeter on may 5, said:—
"the result of the introduction of chinamen has been that 3000 white men are employed on the mines in addition to those that were employed before the introduction of that labour, and the result is that, in round figures, ￡500,000 has been received by british artisans."
and so on. that is a completely misleading statement. i say, and i think i shall show, that the employment of chinese has led to a decrease in the amount of white labour employed. take the year from june 1903 to june 1904. the proportion of white men to kaffirs during those twelve months remained practically stationary, at one in six, in[pg 121] round figures. on march 31, 1905, which is the date of the last return we have, there were 105,184 kaffirs working in the mines, and at the proportion of one-sixth there would have been 17,530 white men. but the number of white men employed at that date was only 16,235. following that proportion, if the chinese had not arrived we should have had at least 1300 or 1400 more white men employed than there are now. in addition to that there are over 34,000 chinese employed not represented by a single white man, and lord milner does not hold out any hope that the proportion of white men to coloured labourers will in future be greater than one in fourteen.
crime and outrage are all that this degrading policy of chinese slavery has brought to the country. there is an old text that says, "be sure your sins will find you out." but rarely does it happen within the space of a year and a half, that a national crime meets with its reward.
immediately after the war one could not say that the transvaal was peopled by a happy, industrious community, but it was a veritable heaven compared with the transvaal of 1905; a veritable paradise of plenty. this has been the social effect of the importation of chinese labour. the political effect is quite as serious.
it has been said that the ultimate object of our rule in south africa is the federation of all the states of south africa into one commonwealth. it was the dream of cecil rhodes that south africa should take her place among the commonwealths of the empire. a constitution, such as exists in australia at the[pg 122] present moment, was to be given to south africa. the states of cape colony, natal, the orange river colony and the transvaal—all free, self-governing units—were to be welded together into one great self-governing imperial unit. the introduction of chinese labour in the transvaal has rendered this impossible. until these chinamen are repatriated there will be no commonwealth for south africa.
in the first place, one of the essentials for such a federation would be that each state should be a self-governing colony. the mine owner knows, and the government of great britain must know by now, that once self-government is given to the transvaal, chinese slavery would be at an end. therefore the mine owners, who really "boss" the transvaal, would take care to suppress any agitation in favour of self-government. as they refused the referendum so will they refuse the boer and the briton the right of free constitution. hence the granting of responsible government to the transvaal is deferred, and hence the federation of south africa is postponed indefinitely.
again, cape colony would never consent to the federation of the transvaal unless the chinese labourers were repatriated. they have stated their opinion in no uncertain language. they would have no desire to enter into a partnership arrangement with a community which was hampered with such a grave social problem as chinese labour. the[pg 123] transvaal has done harm enough to cape colony, without adding this last straw to the load of evil which the gold mines of the rand have bred for her.
this is one of the imperial political disasters resulting immediately from the importation of chinese labour.
there is another imperial consideration even more serious.
no one can read the protests sent to the colonial office by the great self-governing colonies that fought in the war, without realizing the gravity with which such a breaking away from the traditions of the empire has been received by these colonies. had we known it was to be war for the chinese miners, the appeal made to australia for men and arms would have had a very different effect. this is the substance of australia's protest. sentiment is a thing easily destroyed. not even the government, i think, can realize the indignation felt in canada, australia, and new zealand by the indentured labour ordinance. it should have been the policy of the imperial government to foster the tie that binds all the units of the empire together. mr. chamberlain has voiced this opinion times out of number; our imperial bards have sung it. the government, which has always boasted that it was more imperial than the opposition, more wrapped up in the honour and the greatness of the empire, has made this sentiment a commonplace in every election speech. and yet they have done[pg 124] more to destroy this bond than any other party in the state.
again, some attention should have been paid to the dutch problem in the transvaal. no attention was paid to it. we hear little now of the war. the transvaal might have been ruled from the beginning by the british government. now and again the english papers mention casually the once familiar name of general botha as having addressed the het volk. but the dutch problem is never considered at all in england by the great men of the people. and yet it is a very vital and important question. next to the native question it is, perhaps, the most vital question with which south africa has to deal.
throughout south africa the boers are to-day the most thrifty, the most industrious, and almost the most agricultural section of the community. of their ability in war we have had a long experience. of their courage and patriotism we gained a knowledge at a great cost. they outnumber the english population in the transvaal and cape colony. and south africa will never be absolutely secured to the british empire until the proportion of boers to the total white population is reduced.
it should have been the object of the government, immediately after the war, to pack the transvaal with englishmen, to act as a counterbalance to the boer population. this would have been a dangerous experience if[pg 125] there was no excuse for introducing such a large number of englishmen. but the excuse was to hand. a splendid opportunity of reducing the population of the boers to the total white population occurred at the re-opening of the mines. increased use of white labour in the mines would have given to the transvaal that preponderating majority of britons which the safety of the empire demands. the home government did not take that opportunity, and south africa has been left in exactly the same dangerous condition as she was after the war.
instead of performing this obvious duty to the country, the government listened to the objections of the mine owners to swarming the country with white labour, upon the grounds that they would prove a disturbing element socially and politically, and agreed to the importation of the chinamen.
there is yet another grave political aspect of this deplorable problem. as the british people are apt to forget that the boers outnumber the britons in the transvaal, so they forget, when considering the problem of south africa, that there is a vast population of natives within our territory.
these black tribes are utterly demoralized, and, it is recognized, by the war of the white man against the white man, and certain causes which could not have been foreseen, have increased the unrest and lawlessness.
from lagos to the cape the same story has[pg 126] been told for the last two years: that the black man is growing restive under the white man's rule, that the white man is losing rapidly that superstitious authority which up till then he had always carried with him. the cause of this is the utter failure of the germans to bring the war in damaraland to a successful conclusion. the continued successes scored by the hereroes have undoubtedly set aflame the ambitions of the black tribes throughout the south-west coast and inland. in some cases it has been fomented and worked up by mahommedan and ethiopian missionaries. in addition to these disturbing elements the death of lerothodi, the paramount chief of basutoland, has increased the natives' restlessness. the spectacle of chinese bands roaming the country, looting farms, killing white men and raping white women has added to these symptoms of native disaffection.
a rising among the basutos—which more likely than not would be followed by a general rising of natives throughout swaziland, zululand and the transvaal—would engage all our strength to suppress. we should have to make use of the constabulary which is now with great difficulty keeping under control the chinese labourers. it is not hard to imagine the terrible state of affairs that would result from such a rising. while we suppress the black man the chinaman would be left unguarded and unpoliced free to desert and to commit outrages. indeed, should the chinaman rise with the black[pg 127] man the safety of both briton and boer would be in the gravest jeopardy.
these are the deplorable risks which are being run by maintaining in the transvaal some 50,000 chinamen.
financially the chinamen have been a failure, a very grave failure. socially their importation has proved disastrous. instead of bringing wealth they have brought stagnation. instead of bringing employment for the white man they have brought destitution and abject poverty. in introducing them it was recognized that some system must be devised by which they could be prevented from mixing with the population. that system has failed utterly and completely. they were to have brought wealth; they were to have brought employment for the white man. all they have brought is chaos. all they have done is to increase the output of gold at a cost which has decreased instead of increasing the mining companies' dividends. they have spread a terror throughout the length and breadth of the transvaal. economically and socially the policy proposed by the mine owners and forced upon the government has proved deplorable. their introduction has been a grave imperial error which has aroused in the great self-governing colonies anger and indignation. it has already loosened the bonds which the common danger of war had tightened.
their continued stay in south africa, and the continued introduction of more coolies has given rise to the possibility of danger that[pg 128] is awful to contemplate. the rising of the black man would leave the policing of nearly 50,000 chinamen in the hands of a few white men.
it is not too much to say that no greater sin against the ideals of the british people, no more vicious and ruinous policy, has ever been adopted.
