in the following pages i have made no reference to the founder of the christian faith.
there is a particular form of blasphemy current in great britain which ascribes to the highest and noblest christian motives actions which are prompted by the meanest passions of cupidity and self-interest. any shadow is good enough for the criminal to creep into in the hope of escaping detection; but blasphemy is not too hard a word to express the attitude of those advocates and supporters of chinese slavery in the rand who actually creep under the shadow of the cross itself for moral protection.
with reservations, the archbishop of canterbury has blessed the movement, having satisfied himself, with an ease somewhat extraordinary, that it was all above-board and moral. the[pg 14] bishop of bristol has commended it. the rev. t. j. darragh, rector of st. mary's church, johannesburg, saw in it nothing but an opportunity to teach the doctrines of christianity to the heathen. "i am much attracted by the possibility of evangelistic work among those people under very favourable conditions, and i hope to see many of them sent back to their country good practising christians. it will be a glorious opportunity for the church."
almost it would seem that the logical conclusion of this estimable priest was that all the heathen nations of asia should be packed into lord selborne's loose-boxes and carted over to johannesburg in order that the evangelistic genius of the rector of st. mary's might have full scope, and countless souls be added to the fold of christ, so long as their duties of digging gold for german jews at a shilling a day were not interfered with. as these advocates and supporters of chinese labour have convinced themselves that the ordinance, so far from being opposed to the principles of christianity, is likely to be of use in spreading the doctrine of love, i realize that it would be hopeless to attempt to prove to them that the importation of chinese to the rand finds no support in the doctrines promulgated in the four gospels.
indeed, to expect spiritual ideals on the rand is too ridiculous for words. the man who searches the bible for a text to suit his line of argument might perhaps find one for[pg 15] the rand lords from the old testament, and preaching from the sentence that "silver was counted as naught in the days of solomon" might argue that all practices were justifiable to bring about a state of affairs which apparently had the divine approval. the ideal of the rand is money. all imperial, social and religious considerations have no weight with the masters of the gold mines. their object is to get gold, and to get it as cheaply as they can, and with this in view they realize that they must obtain two things—1. political control of the transvaal; 2. slave labour. to attain the first, all englishmen, with their democratic ideas of liberty and freedom, must be kept out of the country. this first object attained, the introduction of slave labour would be extremely simple.
how they achieved their object is the history of south africa for the last eight years.
as long ago as 1897, when mines were booming and vast fortunes were being made, the leaders of the mining industry suddenly realized by a simple arithmetical calculation that more money could be made if their workmen were paid less.
representations were made to president kruger, a government commission was appointed, and the possibility of reducing the wages of kaffir workmen was discussed in all its bearings. mr. george albu, who was then the chairman of the chamber of mines, pointed out that 2s. 3d. a shift was being paid to the[pg 16] kaffirs, and that this could be reduced to 1s. 6d. a shift for skilled labour and 1s. or less for unskilled labour. when he was asked how this could be accomplished, he replied, "by simply telling the boys that their wages are reduced." mr. albu, however, declared that a much better state of affairs would be brought about if a law was passed compelling the kaffir to do a certain amount of work per annum, though he admitted that nowhere in the world was there a law enabling any particular industry to obtain forced labour.
president kruger's government—accounted corrupt and irradical in those days, but now regarded by comparison throughout the transvaal and orange river colony by both english and dutchmen alike as most benevolent and beneficent—refused to sanction a system which would not only have been in opposition to the conventions with great britain of 1852, 1854, and 1884, but would have been opposed to the spirit of humanity that should exist among all civilized communities.
then came the war. the boer government was swept away. two hundred and fifty millions and 21,000 english lives was the price exacted for planting the union jack in pretoria and bloemfontein.
during the war the magnates, with a persistence worthy of a better cause, kept before them those objects which i have enumerated. the consulting engineer of the consolidated goldfields reported to a meeting of mining[pg 17] representatives at cape town that dividends could be increased by two and a half millions by reducing kaffir wages, and it was agreed that on the opening of the mines kaffirs' wages should be reduced by 33 per cent. when peace came it was found that the kaffirs were not prepared to work on these terms. they had grown rich during the war, and in the independence of their new-found wealth they refused to be treated as so much human machinery. it was bad enough for them to work at their original wages in the rand mines, without their consenting to such a large reduction in their wages. the rate of mortality in the rand mines was seventy per thousand per annum; the rate of mortality in the de beers mines was only thirty per thousand per annum. the de beers never had any difficulty in obtaining what native labour they required, because they treated their men well, looked after their interests, did not sweat them, and admitted that a black man, although black, was still a man. but even under these circumstances, had the magnates of the rand offered the scale of wages that pertained before the war, they would have found black labour in abundance. but even with a black man a minimum of 30s. and a maximum of 35s. a month with food is hardly tempting enough to draw him from his kraal.
the alternative of white labour was, of course, never seriously considered. the mere englishman who had fought for the country was not to be allowed to settle in the country or to[pg 18] work in the country. the angots, the beits, the ecksteins, the hanaus, the kuchenmeisters, the rosenheims, the schencks, the taubs, the wernhers, and the rest of the gentlemen delighting in similar grand old english names were determined not to permit it. the foolish englishman would want to vote; would have ideas about personal liberty and personal freedom; would have ridiculous notions about magna charta and the bill of rights; would, in short, think that the nation that had spilt its blood and spent its money for the rand was entitled to a vote in its management.
with almost unparalleled insolence the rand lords frankly declared that the introduction of english labour would place the control of the country in the hands of englishmen, and would lead to that trail of the serpent, the formation of labour unions. it was to meet with this that two hundred and fifty millions was spent by the english people, 25,000 died, 25,000 were permanently maimed.
that white labour could be used, and be used profitably, was proved beyond a doubt. even when the higher wages were taken into account, it was found that in the cyanide works of the gold mines the kaffirs' cost per ton was 5s. 3d., against the whites' 4s. 9d. in developing and stopping actual work of the mining underground, the kaffirs cost 4s. 8d. and the whites 4s. 2d. per ton. it was only in the machine drill work that the kaffirs proved slightly cheaper than the whites. there kaffir labour[pg 19] worked out at 6s. 4d. per ton, white labour at 6s. 9d.; a difference of 5d. per ton, so small a difference as to be almost a negligible quantity.
it was not until later that any pretence was put forward that white labour could not be employed. the real reason, and the reason frankly admitted, was the fear of the political power they would possess.
mr. f. h. p. cresswell, general manager of the village main reef, worked his mine upon a system of joint black and white labour, and the mine returned a dividend of 35 per cent. for the year 1903 and 20 per cent. for the first half of 1904. in the report upon the working of this mine it was declared that the efficiency of the mine was increasing, and the output greater, while the working cost was lower. this was proof conclusive that white labour could be employed in the mines if the magnates wished to employ it. that they did not wish to employ it is proved beyond the shadow of doubt by a letter from the late mr. percy tarbutt, of st. swithin's lane, to mr. cresswell—
"dear mr. cresswell,—with reference to your trial of white labour for surface work on the mines, i have consulted the consolidated goldfields people, and one of the members of the board of the village main reef has consulted messrs. wernher, beit & co., and the feeling seems to be of fear that, having a large[pg 20] number of white men employed on the rand in the position of labourers, the same troubles will arise as are now prevalent in the australian colonies, viz. that the combination of the labour classes will become so strong as to be able, more or less, to dictate not only on the question of wages, but also on political questions, by the power of their votes when a representative government is established."
foiled in their attempt to get cheap black labour, threatened with an inundation of englishmen, the cosmopolitan rand lords tried to obtain the slaves they required from central africa. this was not a success. it was admitted by a speaker at a commercial meeting in johannesburg in july 1903 that various experiments had been tried to get native labour, and that the best results had been obtained at the robinson deep, which paid 25 per cent. dividend. "they imported 316 natives from central africa only three weeks ago. so far only eight had died—(laughter)—but there were 150 in the hospital, and by the end of the month the whole will be in hospital. (hear, hear.) they were coming in at the rate of thirty a day. these men cost ￡30 a head, and were not worth a 'bob' a head when they arrived. (cheers.)"
what were the mine lords to do? if only they were allowed they were quite prepared to employ slaves. their amazing reduction in wages had not induced the kaffir to come to[pg 21] the rand. in the words of the native chief the natives did not like to go to johannesburg, "because they went there to die." the majority at the labour commission had proved that if good wages and treatment were extended to the kaffirs, hosts of natives would flock to the mines. but the rand lords cared nothing about kindness, and they were determined to reduce wages.
it was at this juncture that the question of chinese indentured labour was seriously mooted. the black men were tired of being carted about in trucks, and herded like cattle, and beaten and maimed for life without any chance of compensation. it was said that the chinaman was docile and tractable, and would work for practically nothing, with extremely little food, for as many hours as he might be requested. chinese labour, therefore, it was decided to obtain.
but the rand lords had to proceed with guile. they did this country the credit to believe that any hasty determination to import thousands of chinamen would have met with an outburst of popular indignation against which they could not have hoped to have stood firm.
forming a pretty accurate estimate of the leading passions that guide men's minds they determined to appeal to the cupidity of the englishman at home. their press began to pour forth a torrent of sobs over the lamentable decay of the gold industry in the transvaal. the country was ruined, they said; the industry[pg 22] had gone to pieces. for ridiculous considerations of hypocritical morality the rand, for which great britain had sacrificed so much, was to be made bankrupt. in a word, it was bankruptcy—or chinese. they found many powerful supporters in this country. the trail of their wealth was on a section of the press, and that section echoed whatever principles it might please the cosmopolitan gentlemen of johannesburg to give voice to. even now one can recall the despairing moans of leader writers over the ruin that had overtaken the transvaal.
this was in june 1903. somewhat unexpectedly lord milner at this juncture refused to echo the gloomy forebodings of the witwatersrand chamber of mines; in fact, his tone was joyously optimistic. "the production of gold," he said, "even now is greater than in 1895 or 1896, when the transvaal really was, and had been for some time, the marvel of the world in the matter of gold production. the world progresses; but whatever was fabulous wealth years ago is not abject poverty to-day. not only that, but the rate of production is steadily increasing."
what he said was quite right. the output of gold in the district of johannesburg in 1900 was 237,000 ozs., and there were 59,400 kaffirs employed.
but for six months the agitation continued. it was put forward as a theory that the only chance for the transvaal was to employ chinese labour. the supporters of the rand lords[pg 23] hailed the theory with delight, as if it was something new, something that they had never imagined before. clearly this was the direction in which prosperity lay. they must have chinese labour. then shares would go up, dividends would become enormous, and everybody would be wealthy and happy. the transvaal would be something like a mohammedan heaven, with great britain as an annexe. white men were to pour out to the colonies—not to labour on the mines, for that work was only fit for chinamen; besides, white men it was said could not do it—and the rand was to be prosperous and life was to be a veritable bed of roses. was england to be denied the fruits of her victory? for what had the war been waged if the transvaal was to be left a barren, unproductive corner of the empire? were the fruits of victory to be dead sea apples?
by such arguments did they appeal to the british public. the dummy figure of despair and ruin that they had set up served a very useful purpose. it frightened the monied classes into the belief that their investments were not secure. it frightened the patriots into thinking that the war had been waged in vain. few people troubled to make inquiries as to whether the statement of the rand's impending ruin was true or not. there certainly was a slump in kaffir shares. this was held to be indicative of the state of the gold industry. it apparently did not occur to anybody that just as kaffir shares were made to fluctuate during the war—when the mines were not being worked—so [pg 24]they could be made to slump if only the rand lords wished.
in six months they convinced the majority of the house of commons, they convinced the government, and they even made lord milner eat his own words. his dispatches began to take on a garb of gloom. in august they were of the mitigated grief shade; in september the shade darkened; in october it was more than half mourning; in november it had become black; in december it was as black as the egyptian plague. his lordship talked of crises; of what would happen unless some noble, national sacrifice was made to save the sinking ship. chinese labour was the only cure for the deplorable condition of the gold industry in the transvaal!
meanwhile, a labour commission had been appointed, a mission consisting of ten persons, eight of whom were known to be in favour of the introduction of asiatic labour. this commission was authorized to find out whether a scarcity of kaffir or white labour existed, but was forbidden to answer the question which was in the minds of all, whether it would be proper or desirable to introduce chinese labour.
the agitation proved successful, and it was decided to import chinese labour. the grave disasters attendant on the impending crisis lord milner insisted in his dispatches in december 1903 had to be met.
it is curious, of course, to compare the statement of lord milner in december 1903 with his statement in june 1903. in june the [pg 25]output of gold was 237,000 ozs., and according to lord milner everything was satisfactory. the production of gold, in his own words, was greater than in 1895 or 1896. six months later, in december, the output was 286,000 ozs., an increase of 49,000 ozs. yet, according to lord milner, the prosperity of the gold industry was in inverse proportion to the output of gold! two hundred and thirty-seven thousand ounces per month was prosperity in june; 286,000 ozs. in december was grave disaster, and the rest of it. moreover, in those golden days of june 1903 there were 59,400 kaffir labourers working on the mines. in that dark, cheerless december, when the output of gold had increased 49,000 ozs., and the gold industry was rapidly sinking back into the pit of gloom and disaster, the number of labourers employed was 68,800, being an increase of 9400—or 15 per cent. moreover, in this terrible, deplorable month the production of gold was greater than it had ever been before, except during that period between the beginning of 1898 and the commencement of the war. as to the question of labour, the production per labourer per month in december 1903 was 4 ozs. of gold. in 1899 it was only 3·4 ozs.; that is to say, it had been increased by the use of machinery by one-seventh, so that six labourers in december 1903 were equal to seven labourers in the golden period before the war. actually, therefore, those 68,800 labourers were doing the work of 80,262 labourers, and were doing it at wages 33 per cent. less than they were before the war.[pg 26] but this was not prosperity. the dividends were not large enough.
the report of the consulting engineer of the consolidated goldfields still rang in the ear of the rand lords. "cut down the wages 33 per cent. and you will add two and a half millions to the dividends."
an unlimited number of kaffirs would not come to the mines under these conditions; they would not submit to bad wages as well as bad treatment. white men would combine to manage the country and to take the political power out of the hands of the rand lords. "if we could replace 20,000 workers by 100,000 unskilled whites," said one of the directors, "they would simply hold the government of the country in the hollow of their hand; and without any disparagement to the british labourer, i prefer to see the more intellectual section of the community at the helm."
hence the gloomy picture painted of the gold industry in that december 1903. hence the slump in the kaffir market. hence that cry that native labour would not come and that whites could not do the work. hence that more ominous cry that chinese labourers must be employed. the transvaal was not to be for englishmen. it was to be governed by the intellectual genius of mr. rudd and his bevy of german jews and non-british gentiles. even if white labour was economically possible the rand lords did not want it. it was possible—it was economical. but they wanted labour that would be voteless and subservient!
