we know, from official sources, that in spite of all the foolish self-congratulation of mr. mckenna and his friends—who are "getting on" towards birthday honours,—and his attempt to gag the globe, there are some 27,000 alien enemies still at large in great britain, and upon their activities on their country's behalf, until recently our only check was the shadowy form of "registration" that we have adopted. even many of those interned are now being released upon bonds being given by responsible citizens.

unfortunately, anyone who ventures to suggest that these people—whose bonds may be signed by persons in german pay—may constitute a very serious danger, is at once branded, officially, as an alarmist, and accused of attempting to manufacture a "spy scare," whatever official optimists may mean by that term.

i am no alarmist, and the last thing i should wish to see in our country would be a scare of any description. but as i have, for so many years, made a special study of the spy question, as the evidence i was able to[pg 172] lay before the government caused the establishment of our anti-espionage precautions, i think, without undue egotism, i may claim to know something about the matter. i should have remained silent unless i had been absolutely convinced that there is still a very real and very grave peril of espionage owing to our supineness in this matter of aliens living here practically uncontrolled, and certainly owing to their great numbers not being under anything like effective supervision.

the popular idea of the spy still seems to be that he is, invariably, an individual sent specially from germany to wander about this country picking up such scraps of information as he can. there could be no more dangerous delusion. the germans are far too acute to trust to such methods; they know a great deal too much about the science of espionage to dream of thinking that foreigners sent hap-hazard into this country—obviously strangers and, therefore, most likely to invite attention—are likely to be able to carry out safely the difficult and dangerous work of espionage. their secret agents are chosen, invariably, with the utmost care and method.

the "foreign" spy is not the worst peril; the real danger comes from those who, for years, have made their homes among us, who have married englishwomen, and have become so familiar to their neighbours that they are in little or no danger of being under[pg 173] the slightest suspicion. this has been proved over and over again, both here and in france, during the present war.

the case of the barber ernst was a good instance. this man had carried on business at the same shop for sixteen years, and we can be quite sure that the last thing his neighbours thought of him was that he was a spy in german pay! no. he was a good englishman like the rest of us. yet, it was shown that he was a secret agent of the most dangerous character, and even worthy of a personal visit from the great and distinguished steinhauer himself!

now i hope that the many who have read my books over the last twenty years will at least believe that i am one of the last men to be suspected of any desire to belittle my own countrymen. i am simply an englishman who has tried to interest them. to-day i point a peril to each and all of my million readers. but i wish to make it quite clear that nothing i say in this connection should be taken as reflecting on the work of our confidential department—a department which has done magnificently and which in every way i respect. they have matched brains against brains, and cunning against cunning, and the balance of the account is decidedly in their favour. they have, indeed, fooled steinhauer's agents all through—examined their correspondence and their reports, tracked the agents down by the information thus gained, arrested a large[pg 174] number of them, and to a very great extent smashed the organisation in its original form. so much i cheerfully admit, and congratulate them heartily upon their success. my point is that the work has not gone far enough, that what they have done has not been adequately supplemented, that much yet remains to be done before we can assume that a reasonable degree of security has been attained.

on october 8th last, a very important statement was issued by the home secretary, describing the steps that had been taken "to deal with the system of espionage on which germany has placed so much reliance." i have shown elsewhere how the confidential department came into being, and how it was able to "discover the ramifications of the german secret service in england." in this statement mr. mckenna says:—

the agents ... were watched and shadowed without in general taking any hostile action or allowing them to know that their movements were watched. when, however, any actual step was taken to convey documents or plans of importance from this country to germany, the spy was arrested, and in such cases evidence sufficient to secure his conviction was usually found in his possession.

proceedings under the official secrets act were taken by the director of public prosecutions, and in six cases sentences were passed varying from eighteen months to six years' penal servitude. at the same time steps were taken to mark down and keep under observation all the agents known to have been engaged in this traffic, so that when any necessity arose the police might lay hands[pg 175] upon them at once; and accordingly on august 4th, before the declaration of war, instructions were given by the home secretary for the arrest of twenty known spies, and all were arrested.

this figure, it is added, does not cover over two hundred who were under suspicion or noted to be kept under special observation, the great majority of whom were interned at, or soon after, the declaration of war.

now, although the spy organisation which had been established before the war may have been partially broken up, mr. mckenna admits that "it is still necessary to take the most rigorous measures to prevent the establishment of any fresh organisation, and to deal with individual spies who might previously have been working in this country outside the organisation, or who might be sent here under the guise of neutrals after the declaration of war."

here really we have the crux of the whole matter. it is easy enough to deal with the known spy; it is easy enough in time of war for the post office to watch very closely correspondence not only with germany, but also with neutral countries, from which letters can so easily be sent into germany—as i have sent them—and it is easy enough to censor cables. mr. mckenna says:—

this censorship has been extremely effective in stopping secret communications by cable or letter with the enemy, but as its existence was necessarily known to them, it has not, except in a few instances, produced materials for the detection of espionage.

[pg 176]

i should think not, indeed! would any sane person suspect the german secret service of such imbecility as endeavouring to send important reports by post or cable from this country in time of war, except as a last desperate resort to deal with some unexpected situation in an apparently harmless message? it was this very thing that brought about the downfall of lody, and the fact that he attempted to send a cable-message shows how urgent he thought it was that his message should reach its destination as soon as possible. he trusted to luck, but luck failed him. if i thought our confidential department regarded such a proceeding as normal, i should indeed be in despair.

remember one highly important fact. it is perfectly easy to-day to travel from holland or denmark to berlin, and there is no difficulty in anyone with a british or american passport travelling from this country to holland. some two hundred british and american passports have been "mislaid"—in plainer language, stolen—by the german authorities. can we think for a moment that it would be impossible for the germans to find agents quite willing to run, as commercial travellers or what not, the trivial risk of making the journey from england to holland, where their information could be handed over for conveyance to berlin?

lody came to england as an american; i have no doubt he could have gone back to berlin in the same guise if he had wanted to.[pg 177] we know perfectly well that every scrap of official news published here finds its way to berlin in a very short time—a distinguished british general a few days ago stated that the german commanders had copies of the london papers within a few hours of publication. where, then, assuming a spy in england has secured some useful information, lies the difficulty of transmitting it to those who are ready and anxious to receive it?

suspected passengers on the steamers, it may be said, can be searched, and letters found upon them examined. is it to be imagined that a spy's reports would be written in copperplate on a large sheet of paper for all and sundry to read? need they even be written at all?

censorship on mails and on cables, and the close examination of cross-channel passengers are excellent precautions, but, after all, we are only locking the door after the horse has been stolen. admit that the spy is here, grant that he has got hold of a piece of important information, and i will wager that he finds means of transmitting it to his government, if he possesses an ounce of sense.

the man louis trabbaut, sentenced at marlborough street, had passed through the german lines nine times between london and brussels. more than this, it has been shown that the kaiser, since the war began, has been using a courier to send letters to london! on october 8th, mr. h.l. reiach, editor of the yachting monthly, received a card from vice-[pg 178]admiral k. von eisendecher, who is attached to the kaiser's suite, stating that he would no longer subscribe for that journal. there is no reason, as the daily mail pointed out, why this particular communication should not have been sent by open post in the ordinary way, but for some reason the kaiser's admiral preferred to use the secret courier service. the letter, written at karlsruhe, was evidently brought over by a courier, stamped with an english penny stamp, and posted in the south-west district of london.

i wonder what else came over by that courier, and, still more, what went back!

"it is practically impossible," said a high police official discussing this incident, "to prevent this smuggling of letters." the only certain way to prevent it would be to detain and strip every passenger arriving at our south and east coast ports, and minutely examine every article of their clothing. the authorities have power to detain and search any suspected person, but that is very different from searching every passenger—man, woman and child. the real remedy lies not in these palliatives; the disease is desperate enough to call for drastic remedies. we must stop so far as is humanly possible—and no one asks more—the collection of information here. and there is only one really effective way of doing this—intern or deport every individual of enemy birth, naturalised or not, until the end of the war.

[pg 179]

now i am not alone in holding this opinion; it has been expressed by our judges, and by much more exalted individuals than my humble self. so recently as october 27th, the recorder of pontefract said:—

all those who have not been naturalised at all should be deported until the end of the war. those who had been naturalised during the past ten years, since when germany has been competing navally with england, should be interned under supervision but allowed to conduct their business; men naturalised over ten years ago should be allowed to live on their own premises under substantial bond for their good behaviour under police supervision.

this is the opinion, not of a layman, but of a judge, speaking with all the authority and responsibility which must attach to his high office. must we write him down as a spy-maniac or an alarmist?

lord leith of fyvie is a nobleman who has been giving special attention to the spy-peril, more particularly along the east coast. here is his view, expressed at torquay as recently as october 23rd:—

at last the chief spy has been removed from the neighbourhood of rosyth (it was late enough, i might remark!), and the government has recognised the necessity of making a wholesale sweep of aliens. there cannot be any distinction between classes. the only exception ought to be in favour of english women who have married aliens. all others ought to be transported to a neutral country; out of great britain they must go. such a course would certainly be the most humane course that could be taken. originally the east coast was the most[pg 180] dangerous zone, but in view of the desire of the "head spy and devil emperor william" to seize calais, it was necessary to deal with the whole coast.

the government recently decided to arrest all enemy aliens between the ages of 17 and 45. this, of course, meant that all men of military age were to be arrested, and it was a welcome step. no doubt this decision, which was announced on october 22nd, considerably reduced the danger of espionage arrangements that had previously been made, by removing many of the agents. but are we to assume that the home secretary considers that no german over 45 is capable of acting the part of a spy? or is he under the impression that 45 is the utmost age attained by germans in this country?

"after this war," said mr. justice ridley at worcester assizes on october 22nd, "we must make an end of spies. the german nation appears to think that it can conquer europe by a system of espionage. we will have no more of that." most people will concur with the learned judge's view, but will regard it as rather belated to wait till "the end of the war" to make an end of the german espionage which is rampant now!

it is often represented by well-meaning people that it would be unjust, and not in accordance with british fair-play, to take steps against aliens who have become naturalised. we are told that these people have[pg 181] been promised the full liberty accorded to british-born subjects, and that to treat them in a manner different from other englishmen would be to go back upon our solemn undertaking.

i confess this argument leaves me unmoved. we have no use for the unpatriotic get-rich-at-the-expense-of-your-neighbour arguments. we are britons, and britons we will remain in spite of the puny leading articles in unimportant papers. naturalisation, in the great majority of cases, means absolutely nothing; it is, indeed, usually adopted purely for business reasons. seldom does a german become so imbued with profound veneration for our institutions and customs that nothing short of citizenship of our empire will satisfy his sacred feelings of patriotism. moreover, naturalisation is one of the spy's favourite devices, and surely one of his best methods of disarming any possible suspicion.

but these are not ordinary times, and the requirements of the situation as we see it cannot surely be met by ordinary methods. nothing is more jealously guarded in this country than the right to be protected from arbitrary imprisonment. no one in england can be arrested and kept in custody for more than a few hours without being fully informed of the nature of the charge against him, and brought before a magistrate, whose duty it is to decide whether there is a prima facie case against him, upon which he should be sent for trial. that, in ordinary times, is[pg 182] the british practice. yet, only a few days before i write, the high court refused an order, under the habeas corpus act, that an englishman, who had been imprisoned for over a week without any charge having been made against him, should be brought up for trial.

the case was a remarkable one. a collision had occurred between a submarine and a british steamer, and the captain of the steamer was arrested. no charge being preferred against him, application was made to the high court. it was stated in court that a charge might be made, but that it was against the interests of the nation that it should be stated. the application was therefore refused.

looking at the absolute stringency of english law on this subject at ordinary times, that was a very remarkable decision, but i venture to think it was absolutely correct, since the interests of the state must at all times over-ride the rights of the individual. the question of the guilt or innocence of the captain, it should be remembered, was not before the court, and was not even discussed.

the same rule, i contend, should be applied to the naturalised alien. it was burke who said that it was not possible to frame an indictment against a nation, but we can say with tolerable certainty that no german loses his german sympathies simply because he takes out naturalisation papers at the british home office.

[pg 183]

undoubtedly, if it were determined to intern or deport all of alien birth, whether naturalised or not, there would be many cases of hardship, and many people who are good citizens and perfectly loyal to the country of their adoption would suffer. many such are suffering to-day. i am not going to suggest for a moment that every one of the thousands of aliens we have interned in the concentration camps is dangerous, either as a spy or as a combatant. i do insist, however, that many of them are, and to catch all the guilty we must necessarily, though with regret, inflict hardship on some who are innocent. exactly the same conditions apply to the naturalised alien; in many cases they apply with even greater force.

in his published statement from which i have already quoted, mr. mckenna parades with intense satisfaction the absence, since the war began, of any outrages traceable to aliens. he says:—

another matter which has engaged the closest attention of the police has been the possibility of conspiracies to commit outrages. no trace whatever has been discovered of any such conspiracy, and no outrage of any sort has yet been committed by any alien—not even telegraph wires having been maliciously cut since the beginning of the war.

as a dose of soothing-syrup administered in mr. mckenna's "best bedside manner" this is inimitable; as a contribution to the solution of a very serious problem, it lacks finality. i wonder whether it has ever[pg 184] occurred to the home secretary, or the sleepy department over which he presides, that, up to the present moment, there has not been the slightest necessity for any alien to commit an outrage of any description, and that to have done so before the time was ripe would merely have meant rousing such an outburst here that, when the time did come, there would probably not have been an alien left at liberty to give help at the psychological moment? what, in the name of johnson, would it profit a german, or germany, to blow up at the present moment a tube station or one or two bridges on our main lines? the time for that was when we were moving the expeditionary force, if at all, under present conditions. but the movement of the expeditionary force was carried out with such speed and secrecy that hardly anyone knew what was going on, and in any case a slight delay to a few units of that force would not have been a vital matter.

now whether it is possible or not, whether it has a faint chance of success or whether it is foredoomed to hopeless failure, an invasion of england is at the present moment the dearest dream of every german heart. to compass that, they are prepared to make any and every sacrifice. personally, i have no fear that to-day such an invasion would have the remotest chance of success, but that is not the belief of germans, military or civilian. they believe that it is not only[pg 185] possible, but that it must succeed, and we know that plans for carrying it out have been carefully elaborated for years past.

suppose the germans come. troops will be instantly hurried towards the scene of their landing by every railway in england. what, then, i ask, would be the value of a few skilfully placed charges of explosive? what, then, would be the value of a successful attempt to cut the trunk telephone or telegraph wires running along one of our main lines of communication? what would it mean to us if an important bridge on a main line were shattered, and many trainloads of troops delayed for hours? remember that in the unlikely event of invasion time will be calculated by minutes, for the germans must rely upon the effects of a desperate dash to strike us in a vital spot before we could overwhelm them by accumulated reinforcements.

but mr. mckenna tells us "there is no evidence of a conspiracy to commit outrages." let us fold our arms and sleep! i wonder what the war office would tell him if he hinted that there was no evidence that the germans were planning to invade us, and that they had better cease the arrangements they are very properly making to deal with such a contingency, however remote or unlikely it may appear!

it is not in the least degree likely that all the german arrangements and plans have been made for outside operations only, and[pg 186] that every internal device that could help to ruin us has been neglected; that is not at all the german way. it has already been officially admitted that there is reason for believing that the germans have established petrol stores in these islands. is there any reason why they should not equally have established depots of explosives for use in the same contingency?

our naval authorities say quite plainly that, with the present disposition of the fleet, no invading force above the proportions of a raiding party intended to create panic could ever hope to reach these shores. to that, i think, the great majority of our people, supremely confident in our splendid navy, cordially subscribe. but in war no chances can be taken, for the unexpected always happens, and though we may not discuss the measures that have been adopted, it is known that the war office authorities have done everything possible to provide for even such a remote contingency. can we say that the home office has done everything possible to cut the claws of the german plotters, when so many potential enemies are still allowed to be at large amongst us? and further, many enemy aliens are now being released, and returning to their employment in hotels.

mr. mckenna has quite justifiably claimed that the confidential department has broken up the organisation of spies that existed in england before the war. for that, i desire[pg 187] quite sincerely to give them every credit. the home secretary has admitted, however, the necessity of taking every possible step to deal with those who have come here since the war began. and in this connection a very serious position has been created by the swarms of unhappy refugees from belgium who have been pouring into the country for several months past. among these thousands, it is absolutely certain, there must be many clever german agents, possibly men who have long lived in belgium, and speak french or flemish without a trace of german accent.

what steps are being taken to guard against this peril? it must be remembered that in the case of these unfortunate people there can be no question of passports, or papers of any kind. the great majority of them are quite glad enough to have escaped with their lives, without troubling about their papers, even had they wished to do so. there would not be the slightest difficulty in german agents slipping over amongst these thousands without any risk of detection, and we can be tolerably confident that many have done so.

it has been suggested that some of the better educated belgians, about whose bona fides there could be no question, should be given the work of tracking down any possible impostors. they would probably be glad of the work, and in this direction they could do much to help us. they would be only too keen upon doing so, for most of them are[pg 188] filled with a hatred of everything german, beside which our own growing dislike is a mere nothing. to lay by the heels one of the german spies who have contributed so powerfully to the ruin of belgium would be, to the average refugee, the keenest delight. i believe this plan would be well worth a trial, and i should like to see it put into effect immediately.

the trial and conviction on a charge of high treason of mr. nicholas emil herman adolph ahlers, a naturalised german who, for some years, acted as german consul in sunderland, is a remarkable and emphatic corroboration of every word i have written as to the manner in which the authorities are dealing with the alien peril.

mr. ahlers was accused of assisting german reservists to return to germany after the declaration of war. it was alleged that he sought out our enemies, impressed upon them the necessity of returning to germany, and gladly paid their fares. the striking feature of the affair was, it is alleged, ahlers' own statement, "although naturalised, i am a german at heart."

on december 9th, the prisoner was convicted of high treason, and sentenced to death. yet anything more farcical could not well be imagined, and was certainly well in keeping with the tactics of the home office. mr. ahlers was prosecuted for having "adhered to the king's enemies." yet he had only, after all, succoured the king's[pg 189] enemies to the extent actually allowed to him by the order in council! as mr. justice bankes justly observed at the appeal, it is abhorrent to the mind that a man should be sentenced to death for doing what the home secretary's circular expressly permitted.

as exposed in the court of appeal, the whole prosecution was simply another effort of the authorities to mislead and gull the public, and to play to the gallery.

when this amazing prosecution was undertaken, and the solicitor-general was sent down to durham to invoke the majesty of the law, the home office must have known that the order in council, issued by that same department, gave alien enemies—up to august the 11th—the right to leave our shores! therefore mr. ahlers ought never to have been prosecuted and sentenced to death. what was presented to the public as a grim and terrible tragedy, turned out to be an amusing, though hollow comedy. yet we find, even in the final scene at the court of appeal, the solicitor-general gallantly protesting that the order in council had nothing to do with the case.

of course, as the press pointed out, had the matter been anything but the merest jest produced for the purpose of making the people of this country believe that the government were at last tackling the spy peril in earnest, the minister, or other official, who drew up the order in council might have found himself in an awkward position. it[pg 190] allowed alien enemies, without any distinction as to whether they were combatants or not, to leave this country and join the king's enemies for a full week after war had been declared, and whoever was responsible for it was much more deserving of condemnation than the unfortunate "german at heart."

but a further fact seems to have escaped the notice of the public. it is this. when the conviction for high treason had been obtained against mr. ahlers—a conviction improperly obtained—the government, with their conscience awakened, hastened to prepare the public for the comedy by issuing from the press bureau the following illuminating communication:—

"the conviction of ahlers is subject to appeal, the judge having granted a certificate of appeal on certain points of law which arose at the trial. the sentence of death was the only one which the judge could pronounce in accordance with the law on a conviction for high treason. if, on the appeal, the conviction is affirmed, the secretary of state for home affairs will consider the question of advising a commutation of the death-sentence with a view to substituting a term of penal servitude or imprisonment."

the whole prosecution was a ghastly hoax, for mr. ahlers had committed no legal offence. the proceedings, so dignified and realistic, which resulted in him lying under sentence of death for a crime which he had not committed, was merely a hollow pretence in order to give a sop to the public.

[pg 191]

it reflects no credit upon our authorities, whoever was responsible, and such proceedings are, surely, not in accordance with the high morality of british justice. it is important, however, as serving as yet another example of the pitiful rule-of-thumb methods which are being adopted towards this grave peril.

if the home department, in its wisdom, bestirs itself in future and prosecutes dangerous aliens and spies, it is to be hoped that it will not endeavour to further mislead us by presenting such a lamentable spectacle as it has done in the case of mr. ahlers.

surely this is not the moment when the department should be engaged in trying to discover whether the german soldiery were guilty of any atrocities in belgium. the futility of the latter i pointed out to mr. mckenna in a letter i ventured to address to him at the home office on december 11th, 1914.

it ran as follows:—

"sir,—though seven days have now elapsed since my letter of december 3rd, i am still awaiting a reply, as i am anxious—in the interests of the public—to have an explanation of the matter to which it refers.

"i desire to point out to your department—which, according to mr. aitken's letter to me of november 16th, is making an inquiry into allegations of outrages by german troops, and in which my aid is requested—that any further waste of public time and public money may be avoided if it will—as it no doubt can do if it wishes—obtain, through the proper channels, a copy of general[pg 192] von bülow's proclamation posted in liége on august 22nd last. in this, the general in question declares in reference to the destruction of the town of andenne:—

"'it is with my consent that the general had the whole place burned down, and about one hundred people shot.'

"in addition, three official reports of the royal belgian commission, sent to me by his excellency the belgian minister, are before me, and i have interviewed m. carton de wiart, belgian minister of justice, regarding them.

"further, i would point out that your department might, with advantage, examine the proclamation of field-marshal von der goltz, and also major deckmann's poster published at grivegnée.

"as these, no doubt, will be as available to you as they are to the public press, perhaps your department may obviate further waste of time by examining them.

"meanwhile, i await, with anticipation, a reply to my letter of december 3rd."

let us hope that the home department—if only responsible for german spies in london, as it is—will really rub its eyes and awaken, ere it is too late.

for five months the authorities had been continually warned by lord leith of fyvie, and others, of spies who were detected in the act of signalling at night off the east coast. the newspapers were flooded with correspondence on the subject, while i myself received more than a hundred letters asking me to urge the authorities to take up the matter, and deal with it.

on december 16th, yorkshire had its first instalment of the fruits of the extraordinary[pg 193] manner in which this signalling has been permitted to continue, and the freedom given to spies. on the previous night it was noticed, by reliable observers, that the night signallers were specially active, and at eight o'clock next morning, the towns of scarborough, whitby, and hartlepool were bombarded by german ships, resulting in over four hundred persons being injured, and over one hundred killed, including many women and children.

information supplied by secret means to the german navy had already enabled shells to be flung at yarmouth, but here, as in the attack in yorkshire, we have again very clear proof and evidence of spies. indeed, already orders have been issued to shoot at sight anyone found signalling from the coast—but, alas! after so many innocent persons have lost their lives!

the daring adventure of the german ships show that they must have received information concerning the distribution of our fleet.

according to the first lord of the admiralty, practically the whole fast cruiser force of the german navy, including some great ships vital to their fleet and utterly irreplaceable, was risked for the passing pleasure of killing as many english people as possible, irrespective of sex, age, or condition, in the limited time available.

now we know sufficient of german thoroughness to be quite sure that they would never[pg 194] have risked a journey of over four hundred miles from their base, through a sea sown with mines, unless they were well acquainted with the channels left open. knowledge of the exact positions in which we have placed our mines could only have been gained through spies amongst us.

surely this should be sufficient answer to mr. mckenna's communiqué to the press.

a special correspondent of the london evening news, who passed between london and berlin twice, unsuspected, during the month of december, and even visited vienna, writing on december 19th of what he saw in the german capital, declared that he heard the raid upon scarborough discussed in certain circles in berlin on december 16th, three days before it took place!

in the course of his comments he wrote:—

"i always thought the spy mania in england exaggerated, but now i am absolutely persuaded that even those englishmen who recognise this peril do not realise the lengths to which it goes. they have been suspecting waiters and servants, whilst the spies are in high social positions; they have contented themselves with searching the houses of german barbers and grocers, whilst neglecting the hands which collect and forward to berlin the information gathered by more humble satellites.

"it is very sad to have to say such things, but i think the most dangerous spies still in england are not germans, whether naturalised or not, but are people belonging to neutral countries—even to countries actually fighting germany—and subjects of great britain herself.

[pg 195]

"i would not have written this if i was not sure of it; the diplomat from whom i got the information assured me that there are some english and french of both sexes who come regularly to berlin, or to frontier towns through neutral countries, and have conversations with officials and then return. the restrictions as to luggage and passports, both in france and in england, are not half as severe as they should be; they are even slacker than at the beginning of the war. i know, personally, of a number of stolen american passports under the shelter of which german spies are now travelling, and an italian consul with whom i happened to travel a few days ago, said he had discovered two fellows with false italian passports almost perfectly imitated.

"in berlin i heard people, well-informed people, saying that in every english town of importance, and on every spot of strategical value on the british coast, germany has got a few friends keeping their eyes open and ready to receive an eventual german raid, and to give their friends as strong a hand as possible."