some of the cases of espionage within my own knowledge—and into many of them i have myself made discreet inquiry—may not prove uninteresting. foreign governesses, usually a hard-worked and poorly-paid class, are often in a position to furnish important information, and very serious cases have recently been proved against them. these young women have lived in the intimacy of the homes of men of every grade, cabinet ministers, members of parliament, financiers, officers of both services, and officials of every class. by the very nature of their duties, and their extreme intimacy with their employers, they are, naturally, in a position to gather much valuable information, and often even to get sight of their employers' correspondence, which can easily be noted and handed over to the proper quarter for transmission to berlin.
here is a case already reported by me. not very long ago, in the service of a very well-known member of parliament living in essex, lived a clever, good-looking, and intensely musical young german governess,[pg 79] who was regarded by the member's wife as "a perfect treasure," and who took the greatest interest in her two little charges. for over two years fr?ulein had been in the service of this pleasant household, being, of course, regarded as "one of the family."
in the grounds of the big country house in question was a secluded summer-house, and here fr?ulein was in the habit of reading alone, and writing her letters. one hot summer's afternoon she had gone there as usual, when about an hour later one of the under-gardeners, in passing, saw her lying back in her chair unconscious. she had been seized with a fit. he raised the alarm, she was carried back to the house, and the doctor was at once telephoned for.
meanwhile her mistress, greatly alarmed, went out to the summer-house in order to see whether her unconsciousness could be accounted for. upon the table she noticed a number of documents which did not appear to be letters which a governess might receive, and, on examination, she found to her dismay that, not only were they carefully-written reports of conversations between her husband and a certain cabinet minister who had been their guest during the previous week-end, but there were also copies of several confidential letters from one of the government departments to her husband. that the girl was a clever and most dangerous spy was at once proved, yet, rather than there should be any[pg 80] unpleasant publicity, the girl was, that same night, packed off unceremoniously across to the hook of holland.
in another instance a german governess in the employ of an officer's wife at chatham was discovered endeavouring to obtain confidential information; and in a third, at plymouth, a charming young lady was caught red-handed.
these three glaring cases are within my own knowledge; therefore, there probably have been many others where, after detection, the girls have been summarily dismissed by their employers, who, naturally, have hesitated to court publicity by prosecution.
it therefore behoves everyone employing a foreign governess—and more especially anyone occupying an official position—to be alert and wary. many of these young ladies are known to have been trained for the dastardly work which they have been so successfully carrying out, and, while posing as loyal and dutiful servants of their employers, and eating at their tables, they have been listening attentively to their secrets.
we have, of late, been told a good deal of the danger of secret agents among the alien staffs of hotels, and, in deference to public opinion, the authorities have cleared our hotels of all germans and austrians. though holding no brief for the alien servant, i must say, at once, that i have never known one single instance of a hotel servant of lower grade being actually proved to be a secret[pg 81] agent. it is a fact, however, that among the hall-porters of some of the principal hotels were, until the outbreak of war, several well-known spies. the class of person who is much more dangerous is the so-called "naturalised" alien. among these are, no doubt, spies, men who have long ago taken out naturalisation papers for the sole purpose of blinding us, and of being afforded opportunities to pursue their nefarious calling. to-day, while thousands of men who have for years worked hard for a living are in idleness in detention camps, these gentry are free to move about where they will because they are so-called british subjects.
surely the heart of a german is always german, just as the heart of a true-born briton is always british, whatever papers he may sign. i contend that every german who has been "naturalised" during the last seven years should be treated as other aliens are treated, and we should then be nearer the end of the spy-peril.
"naturalised" foreign baronets, financiers, merchants, ship-owners, and persons of both sexes of high social standing, constitute a very grave peril in our midst, though mr. mckenna has not yet appeared to have awakened to it, even though the press and the public are, happily, no longer blind to the german preparations. in the month of november, while spies were being reported in hundreds by the public themselves, the home office was actually engaged in holding[pg 82] an inquiry into whether there had really been any atrocities committed by the german soldiery in belgium! and i was officially asked to assist in this!
as far as can be gathered from mr. mckenna's reply in november to the parliamentary attack on the methods of dealing with the spy peril, the position was still a most unsatisfactory one. though he admitted that we still have 27,000 enemy aliens at large among us, nobody is assumed to be a spy unless he is an unnaturalised german. even if he fulfils this condition, he is then to be caught "in the act" of spying, or if really strong suspicion be aroused, some evidence against him may be "looked for." but until this is "found," and so long as he complies with the posted-up registration orders, etc., he may continue unmolested. in short, after the steed is stolen, our stable door may be shut.
one sighs in despair. could anything be more hopeless? if the matter were not so very serious, the position would be gilbertian in its comedy.
though we are at war, our sons being shot down and our national existence threatened, yet there is yet another very strong factor in favour of the german spy. according to mr. mckenna, he himself is only responsible for the london district, while elsewhere the county constabulary, under the chief constables of counties, are "to pay every attention to representations of the naval and[pg 83] military authorities," in the matter of hostile espionage.[2]
this strikes me as one of the finest examples of "how not to do it" that we have heard of for some time, and it must indeed be a source of delight to the secret "enemy within our gates." fancy such a ridiculous regulation in germany!
of some of the hundreds of cases of undoubted espionage which have been brought to my notice since the outbreak of war, i will enumerate a few.
one was that of two germans who—posing as poles—rented a large country house at ￡150 a year, bought a quantity of furniture, and settled down to a quiet life. the house in question was situated at a very important point on the main london and north western railway, and the grounds ran down to a viaduct which, if destroyed, would cut off a most important line of communication. the suspicion of a neighbour was aroused. he informed the police, and a constable in full uniform began to make inquiries of the neighbours, the result being that the interesting pair left the house one night, and have not since been seen.
[pg 84]
outside london, the county constabulary are making praiseworthy efforts to find spies, but when men in uniform set out to make inquiries—as they unfortunately do in so many cases—then the system becomes hopeless.
the same thing happened in a small coast town in norfolk where signalling at night had been noticed. indeed, in two instances in the same town, and again in dunbar, the appearance of the police inspector caused the flight of the spies—as undoubtedly they were.
as regards the county of norfolk, it has long received the most careful attention of german secret agents. at the outbreak of war the chief constable, major egbert napier, with commendable patriotism, devoted all his energies to the ferreting out of suspicious characters, spies who were no doubt settled near and on the coast in readiness to assist the enemy in case of an attempted landing. by major napier's untiring efforts a very large area has been cleared, more especially from cromer along by sheringham, weybourne—a particularly vulnerable point—and from cley-next-the-sea to wells and king's lynn.
major napier engaged, at my instigation, a well-known detective-officer who, for some years, had been engaged at the criminal investigation department at new scotland yard, specially attached to deal with german criminals for extradition back to germany. he was a russian, naturalised english, and spoke german perfectly, being born in riga—[pg 85]and an ideal officer to inquire into the whole german spy system in norfolk.
well, after major napier had asked him to go forth on his mission, i saw him and wished him all success. within a fortnight this shrewd officer returned to me with a hopeless story. wherever he went the coastguard refused to tell him anything, or any of their suspicions, as they said they were sworn to secrecy, while the superintendents and inspectors of the norfolk constabulary—with few exceptions—even though he bore proper credentials signed by the chief constable himself, actually refused to give him any assistance or information whatsoever!
this keen and clever detective-officer returned to the chief constable of norfolk and told him that he was certain spies still existed along the coast, but expressed regret at the hopeless state of affairs.
if any government authority would like to question the officer upon his experiences, i shall be pleased to furnish that department with his private address.
i had a curious experience myself in norfolk.
in a field, high upon the cliff between cromer and runton, i last year established a high-power wireless installation. when in working order—with a receiving range of 1,500 miles or more, according to atmospheric conditions—i allowed visitors to inspect it. there came along certain inquisitive persons with a slight accent in their speech, and of[pg 86] these i believe no fewer than eight are now interned. it formed quite an interesting trap for spies!
from the great mass of authentic reports of german spies lying before me as i write, it is difficult to single out one case more illuminating than another.
it may perhaps be of interest, however, to know that i was the first to report to the authorities a secret store of german arms and ammunition in london, afterwards removed, and subsequently seized after the outbreak of war. other stores have, it is said, been found in various parts of the country, the secrets of which, of course, have never been allowed to leak out to the public, for fear of creating alarm.
that secret stores of petrol, in readiness for that raid upon us by zeppelins which germany has so long promised, have been thought to exist in scotland, is shown by the reward of ￡100, offered by the commander-in-chief in scotland for any information leading to the discovery of any such bases.
but in connection with this, the situation is really most ludicrous. though, on november 8th, 1914, a london newspaper reproduced a copy of the poster offering the reward—a poster exhibited upon hoardings all over scotland—yet the press censor actually issued to the london press orders to suppress all fact or comment concerning it! we may surely ask why? if scotland is told the truth, why may not england know it?
[pg 87]
between rye and winchelsea of late, on four occasions, people have been detected flashing lights from the most seaward point between those places to german submarines. in fact, two of the spies actually had the audacity to build a shanty from which they signalled! this matter was promptly reported by certain residents in the locality to the dover military authorities, but they replied that it was "out of their division." then they reported to the admiralty, but only received the usual typewritten "thanks" in these terms:—
"the director of the intelligence division presents to mr. —— his compliments, and begs to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of his letter of ——.
"admiralty war staff: intelligence division."
now what happened?
early in the morning of december 10th, in the midst of a thick hazy rain, half-a-dozen german submarines are reported to have made a daring dash for the western entrance of dover harbour, where several of our warships were lying at anchor. fortunately they were discovered by men working the searchlights, heavy guns were turned upon them, and one submarine, if not more, was sunk. we have to thank spies in the vicinity for this attempt, in which we so narrowly escaped disaster. if not through spies, how could the enemy have known that, just at the time the attack was made, dover[pg 88] was without its boom-defence? and the question arises whether the spies were those detected near rye?
in all probability there exists somewhere in the neighbourhood a secret wireless station sufficiently powerful to send intelligence say five miles to sea by day, and double that distance at night. by this means the enemy's submarines could easily learn the truth. therefore the authorities should lose no time in making domiciliary visits to any house where a suspect may be living.
and if secret wireless exists near dover, then there may be—as there probably are, since small wireless stations are not costly to fit up, and could, till the outbreak of war, be purchased without arousing the least suspicion—other stations in the vicinity of other of our naval bases, the peril of which will easily be recognised.
the replies by the admiralty to persons who give information are curt and unsatisfactory enough, yet if a resident in the metropolitan area writes to the chief commissioner of police upon a serious matter concerning espionage—he will not even receive the courtesy of a reply! at least, that has been my own experience. it is appalling to think that the authorities are so utterly incapable of dealing with the situation to-day, even though our men are laying down their lives for us, and fighting as only britons can fight.
existence of carefully-prepared concrete[pg 89] emplacements, in readiness for the huge german krupp guns, has been reported to me from a dozen different quarters—sometimes they are concealed in the form of a concrete carriage-drive, in others as a tennis-court, or a yard enclosed by stables. workmen who have actually been employed in laying them down, and have given me the enormous thicknesses of the concrete used, have communicated with me, and indicated where these long-considered preparations of the enemy are to-day to be found.
but as it is nobody's business, and as mr. mckenna has assured us that we are quite safe, and that the spy-peril has been snuffed-out, the position is here again hopeless, and we are compelled to live daily upon the edge of a volcano.
oh! when will england rub her eyes and awaken?
as events have proved in belgium and france, so here, in our own dear country, i fear we have spies in every department of the public service. i say boldly, without fear of contradiction—that if our apathetic home department continues to close its eyes as it is now doing, we shall be very rudely stirred up one day when the zeppelins come in force—as the authorities fear by the darkening of london. from the lessons taught us in france, i fear that in every department of our public services, the post-office, the railways, the docks, the electric generating-stations, in our arsenals, in our government[pg 90] factories, and among those executing certain government contracts—everywhere, from wick to walmer—the spy still exists, and he is merely awaiting the signal of his masters to strike: to blow up bridges and tunnels, to destroy water-supplies, docks, power-stations and wireless-stations: to cut telegraphs and telephones, and to create panic—a sudden and fearful panic—which it would be to the interest of the invaders to create.
at my suggestion the postmaster-general, at the outbreak of war, ordered each letter-carrier in the kingdom to prepare lists of foreigners on their "walk," and upon those lists hundreds of arrests of aliens took place. no doubt many spies were "rounded-up" by this process, but alas! many still remain, sufficient of the "naturalised,"—even those "naturalised" after the war,—to form a very efficient advance-guard to our invading enemy, who hate us with such a deadly, undying hatred.
if zeppelins are to raid us successfully they must have secret bases for the supply of petrol for their return journey. such bases can only be established in out-of-the-way places where, on descending, air-craft would not be fired upon. the moors, those of yorkshire, dartmoor, and certain districts of scotland and the lake country, are admirably adapted for this purpose, for there are spots which could easily be recognised from the air—by the direction of the roads, running like[pg 91] ribbons across the heather—where considerable stores could easily be secreted without anyone being the wiser.
this is a petrol war, and if any raid is attempted upon the country, petrol will be wanted in great quantities by the enemy. is it not, therefore, with our knowledge of germany's long-completed preparations at maubeuge, antwerp, along the heights of the aisne, and in other places, quite safe to assume that considerable—even greater—preparations have already been made in our own country—made in the days when the british public were lulled to sleep by the judas-like assurances of the kaiser and his friendly visits to our king, and when any honest attempt to lift the veil was met with abuse and derision. if we assume that preparations have been made, it is, surely, our duty to now discover them.
petrol and ammunition are the two things which the enemy will want if they dare to attempt a dash upon our coast. therefore it would be very wise for the authorities to make a house-to-house visitation, and search from garret to cellar all premises until lately occupied by aliens in the eastern counties, and all houses still occupied by "naturalised" foreigners, who, if they were honestly "british subjects" as they declare, could not possibly object.
there are many licensed premises, too, held by the "naturalised," and the cellars of these should certainly be searched. hundreds of[pg 92] "naturalised" germans and austrians are living—immune from even suspicion. they are of all grades, from watchmakers and hotel-keepers to wealthy financiers.
if only the government would deal with the "naturalised," as any sane system of government would in these unparalleled circumstances, then it would give a free hand to the chief constables of lincolnshire, norfolk, suffolk, essex, and kent to clear out, once and for ever, the canker-worm of espionage which has, alas! been allowed to eat so very nearly into britain's heart.
i am not affected by that disease known as spy-mania. i write only of what i know, of what i have witnessed with my own eyes and have heard with my own ears.
i therefore appeal most strongly, with all my patriotism, to the reader, man or woman, to pause, to reflect, to think, and to demand that justice shall, at this crisis of our national life, be done.
we want no more attempts to gag the press, no evasive speeches in the house—no more pandering to the foreign financier or bestowing upon him birthday honours: no more kid-gloved legislation for our monied enemies whose sons, in some cases, are fighting against us, but sturdy, honest and deliberate action—the action with the iron-hand of justice in the interests of our own beloved empire.
footnotes:
[2] even at this moment of our peril, it is doubtful if the public will find at new scotland yard a single detective able to pass himself off as a german and thus be in a position to make close investigation. there are, certainly, several who speak german, but in a dozen words they betray their british nationality. surely the police cannot hope for good results without possessing agents competent to carry out what is a difficult and delicate task. the extradition department is no longer what it was under chief-inspector greenham.
